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Abstract  
The Role of Personal Mitigating Factors in  
Criminal Sentencing Judgments: An Empirical Investigation 
 
Ian K. Belton 
 
Criminal sentencers must weight and integrate many different factors to reach a 
judgment, including aggravating factors that argue for a harsher sentence, and mitigating 
factors that suggest a more lenient sentence. Personal Mitigating Factors (PMFs) relate to the 
offender, rather than the offence (e.g., remorse or youth/immaturity). Research shows that 
discretionary sentencing produces inconsistency and bias and lacks the transparency needed 
to maintain public trust in justice. Although many jurisdictions have introduced more 
structured sentencing, the mitigation process remains largely discretionary. Structuring 
personal mitigation could help produce fairer sentences. Any structured approach must, 
however, be informed by empirical data, and little is known about how sentencers use PMFs, 
or how the public judges them. This thesis examined the role of three commonly occurring 
PMFs: remorse, good character, and addressing addiction.  
Study 1 examined sentencers’ use of PMFs in cases of assault and burglary through a 
statistical analysis of annual sentencing data from the Crown Court in England and Wales. 
Study 2 used a qualitative analysis of interviews with a small sample of Crown Court judges 
to further explore the findings of Study 1 and identify topics for future research. Studies 3 
and 4 used experimental designs to measure how the three PMFs influenced public judgments 
about sentencing fairness and choice of sentence length. Study 4’s “idiographic” design 
permitted evaluation of the variation between individuals’ judgments about PMFs.  
The present thesis identified several issues with current sentencing practice, notably 
the underweighting of multiple co-occurring PMFs, and proposed some practical options for 
structuring the personal mitigation process. The thesis also identified conflicts between 
sentencers’ use of PMFs and public judgments, and suggested how the gap between 
sentencers and the public could be closed. Lastly, the thesis illustrates how methodology 
from psychology can be used to advance our understanding of criminal sentencing.  
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1. Literature Review 
 
“Offenders are rarely so bad that nothing can be said on their behalf” 
Wasik (1993), p. 62. 
Criminal sentencing affects the lives of millions of people every year. In England and 
Wales alone in 2015, more than 1.2 million people were sentenced, of whom over 90,000 
were sent to prison (Ministry of Justice, 2016)1. The consequences of sentencing can be 
enormous for all those involved: not just the offenders, who may be deprived of their freedom, 
but also victims, their families and the wider public.  
Any sentencing system must try to achieve several (often contradictory) goals. These 
are to punish offenders on the ground of just deserts and/or retribution, to reduce crime by 
deterring and/or rehabilitating offenders, to protect the public by incapacitating dangerous 
offenders, and to compensate or “heal” victims through reparation (e.g., Australian Law 
Reform Commission, 2006; Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 142; Seghetti & Smith, 2007; 
United States Sentencing Commission, 2016).  
Sentencing is also a complex and challenging cognitive task. Under pressure and 
within a limited timeframe, sentencers must attend to a large quantity of information 
including offence seriousness, legal constraints such as legislation, case law and/or 
sentencing guidelines, and various aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating factors 
are those that suggest an increased sentence, while mitigating factors point towards a reduced 
sentence. Sentencers must then weight and integrate all of the information in each case in a 
                                                          
1 England and Wales are, together, a separate legal jurisdiction from both Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 
present research is focused on England and Wales only. 
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fair and unbiased way to reach a final sentence – a “cognitive balancing act” (Dhami, Belton, 
& Goodman-Delahunty, 2015).  
1.1. Judicial Discretion in Sentencing 
Sentencers traditionally perform the cognitive balancing act that their job requires 
through the exercise of what is referred to as “judicial discretion”, meaning that it is up to the 
individual judge to take account of all of the factors as he or she sees fit in each case. 
In England and Wales, the origins of judicial discretion in sentencing are inextricably 
linked to mitigation. Towards the end of the 19th century, when the severity of prescribed 
sentences began to be mitigated in appropriate cases, this was accomplished by giving judges 
wide discretion to tailor the sentence to the individual facts of the case (Thomas, 1977, 1979). 
Over the last century or so, judicial discretion has since become “the central principle of the 
English sentencing system” (Thomas, 1982, p. 473).  
The judiciary tend to view discretion as essential for individualised justice, the 
argument being that every case and every offender is unique, and so the sentencer must be 
permitted to use his or her judgment to reach a sentence that is fair given the specific 
circumstances of each individual case (Ashworth, 2015; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; House of 
Commons Justice Committee, 2009; Tata, 2000). Discretion is also seen as important for 
maintaining the independence of the judiciary from the legislature, a cornerstone of English 
constitutional law. Although the courts’ sentencing powers can be regulated by statute, judges 
retain the power to deal with individual cases, within the framework determined by 
Parliament (Ashworth, 2010). 
1.1.1. Judicial Discretion Leads to Sentencing Disparity 
3 
 
The exercise of judicial discretion has long been recognised as a source of 
inconsistency and bias in sentencing. As early as 1877, Serjeant Cox (1877, quoted in 
Crackanthorpe, 1902, p. 852) noted that, “the judge on one side of a wall might often be 
found passing one sentence, the judge on the other side passing quite another, for offences 
identical in name and similar in character”. Crackanthorpe himself observed that “the liberty 
of the subject must not be left to depend on caprice or whim of any judge, however highly 
placed” (Crackanthorpe, 1902, p. 856). 
Research shows that judicial discretion does lead to disparity in sentencing outcomes. 
Sentencing disparity has been defined as “a form of unequal treatment that is often of 
unexplained cause and is at least incongruous, unfair and disadvantaging in consequence” 
(Hagan & Bumiller, 1983, p. 9). There are many legitimate reasons why different offenders 
should be treated differently, such as the severity of their offence and their past criminal 
record. Disparity refers specifically to the unequal treatment of offenders that is “unexplained” 
in the sense that it cannot be justified on the basis of legitimate legal factors.  
It is possible to distinguish two forms of sentencing disparity. First, comparable 
offenders may be treated differently based on “extra-legal” factors – characteristics such as 
race and gender which, as a matter of law, should not be taken into account. Second, 
individual judges and/or courts and/or court districts may interpret legal (and/or non-legal 
factors) differently from one another, leading to comparable offenders receiving different 
sentences depending on where and by whom they are sentenced. The latter form of disparity 
is typically referred to as inconsistency. Consistency in punishment is viewed as “a 
fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice” (Mason J in Lowe v 
The Queen, 1984, pp. 610-611).  In England and Wales, the Sentencing Council has a 
statutory obligation to consider the need to promote consistency in sentencing (Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, s120(11)(f)).  
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Sentencing disparity has been identified in many different jurisdictions (Goodman-
Delahunty & Sporer, 2010; Sporer & Goodman-Delahunty, 2009). The next two sections 
contain summaries of past research into disparity based on extra-legal bias and disparity 
based on inter-judge/court/district inconsistency respectively. 
1.1.1.1. Disparity based on extra-legal factors. There is an extensive body of 
empirical research that has found sentencing disparity resulting from extra-legal factors. The 
following section summarises a representative selection of that research. The majority of 
evidence comes from the USA (where more detailed data sets are typically available) but 
there are also several studies from England and Wales and, to a lesser extent, from other 
jurisdictions. Researchers have tended to use one of two methods to examine disparity, 
namely statistical analysis of archival sentencing data or experimental designs. 
Statistical studies of sentencing data have regularly found racial bias in sentencing 
outcomes.  Black offenders are typically more likely to go to prison and receive longer 
custodial sentences than white offenders (Albonetti, 1997; Brennan, 2006; Demuth & 
Steffensmeier, 2004; Fearn, 2005; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Hood, 1992; Steffensmeier & 
Demuth, 2000; for reviews, see Mitchell, 2005 and Spohn, 2000). Findings also suggest there 
are various nuances in terms of where and when race matters – race effects have been found 
to be mediated by other factors including gender, age, socio-economic status, and community 
demographics (Britt, 2000; King, Johnson, & McGeever, 2010; Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; 
Nowacki, 2016; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 
2009). In Canada and Australia, some studies have found that indigenous offenders are 
sentenced more harshly than others (Lockwood, Hart, & Stewart, 2015; McGrath, 2016; 
Snowball & Weatherburn, 2007; Tonry & Frase, 2001), while others have found evidence for 
the opposite effect (Bond, Jeffries, & Weatherburn, 2011; Jeffries & Bond, 2012).  
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Statistical research also suggests that female offenders are less likely be imprisoned, 
and receive shorter custodial sentences than male offenders (Daly & Bordt, 1995; Flood-Page 
& Mackie, 1998; Franklin & Fearn, 2008; Hedderman, 1991; Hedderman & Dowds, 1997; 
Johnson, Kennedy, & Shuman, 1987; Moxon, 1988; Speed & Burrows, 2006; Steffensmeier, 
Kramer, & Streifel, 1993). The gender effect holds true across all racial groups (Doerner & 
Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006) unless a female offender’s behaviour violates 
traditional gender role expectations (e.g., infanticide - Finkel et al., 2000; Oberman, 2003).  
However, there is also evidence that women are more likely to receive a community sentence 
rather than a fine, compared to men (Dowds & Hedderman, 1997).  
Both experimental and statistical studies have identified a curvilinear effect of age on 
sentencing: sentencing severity is lower for offenders aged 20 or below, peaks between 21 
and 29 and then declines gradually over time, with offenders aged 60 or over receiving the 
most lenient sentences of all (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Doron, 2012; Johnson, van 
Wingerden, & Nieuwbeerta, 2010; Mueller-Johnson & Dhami, 2010; Steffensmeier, Kramer, 
& Ulmer, 1995; Steffensmeier & Motivans, 2000).  
Experimental studies have found that low socio-economic status (SES) defendants are 
more likely to receive greater punishment than high SES defendants (Freeman, 2006; 
Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Mazzella and Feingold’s (1994) meta-analysis of 20 studies 
from the 1970s and 80s found a significant effect of low SES for rape cases but not for 
homicide. There is also experimental and observational evidence that physical appearance 
may influence sentencing. First, physically attractive offenders may receive more lenient 
sentences for robbery and rape (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Stewart, 1980) and for fraud 
(only when male offenders were judged by women – Shechory-Bitton & Zvi, 2014). Second, 
offenders with “trustworthy” faces may be less likely to receive the death penalty (Wilson & 
Rule, 2015).  
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Research suggests that victim characteristics also affect sentence severity (for an 
overview, see Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2003).  In the USA, murderers are more likely to be 
sentenced to death if the victim is white and/or female (Holcomb, Williams, & Demuth, 2004; 
Paternoster et al., 2003; Paternoster & Brame, 2008; Stauffer, Smith, Cochran, Fogel, & 
Bjerregaard, 2006; United States General Accounting Office, 1990; Williams, Demuth, & 
Holcomb, 2007; Williams & Holcomb, 2004). Offenders guilty of non-capital homicide also 
tend to receive longer sentences if their victim is female (Curry, Lee, & Rodriguez, 2004; 
Franklin & Fearn, 2008; Johnson, van Wingerden, & Nieuwbeerta, 2010). In a Dutch study, 
Johnson et al. (2010) also found interactions between offender and victim gender: men killing 
other men and women killing other women were sentenced equivalently, men killing women 
received longer sentences, and women killing men received shorter sentences. Lastly, 
Johnson et al. (2010) also found that homicide offenders were sentenced much more severely 
if their victims were under 12 and somewhat more severely where victims were over 30.  
1.1.1.2. Disparity based on inter-judge/court/district inconsistency. Several 
studies both in the USA and the UK have identified disparities arising from inconsistency 
across courts and/or individual judges. 
In the USA, many statistical analyses of sentencing data using various kinds of 
regression modelling have identified inconsistency in outcomes across courts and/or court 
districts across various states, as well as at a federal level (for a comprehensive review, see 
Ulmer, 2012). Sentencing severity has been found to correlate negatively with, amongst other 
things, court caseloads (Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006) and the availability 
of local jail space (Johnson, 2006), and correlate positively with community levels of victim 
participation in sentencing, conservative attitudes to law and order (Helms, 2009), and 
religious homogeneity (Haynes, 2011; Ulmer, Bader, & Gault, 2008). Haynes, Ruback and 
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Cusik (2010) found that the composition of courtroom “workgroups” (judge, prosecutor and 
defence attorney) also influenced sentencing outcomes.  
In addition, the effect of offender characteristics on sentencing is conditioned by 
court- and district-level factors. For example, racial disparities in sentence length and 
imprisonment rate have been found to increase in districts with larger black minority 
populations (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004; Wang & Mears, 2010; Weidner, Frase, & Schultz, 
2005), but decrease as black representation amongst criminal prosecutors increases (Farrell, 
Ward, & Rousseau, 2009; King, Johnson, & McGeever, 2010).  
In England and Wales, there is wide variation in the proportion of offenders given 
immediate custody, community sentences or fines, and in custodial sentence lengths, across 
criminal justice (police and prosecution) areas (Mason, de Silva, Sharma, Brown, & Harper, 
2007; Ministry of Justice, 2010). In theory, this variation could be the result of differences in 
the overall profile of cases dealt with by the different areas. However, Mason et al. (2007) 
found that the inconsistency in sentencing across criminal justice areas was not well-
explained by differences in the characteristics of cases or offenders dealt with by the criminal 
justice areas. Tarling (2006) reached a similar conclusion following analysis of data across 30 
magistrates’ courts: cross-court disparity in the use of sentence types could not be accounted 
for by differences in the courts’ caseload profile.   
Pina-Sánchez and Linacre (2013) used linear regression analysis to explore 
inconsistency in the sentencing of assault cases across 75 Crown Court centres. The study 
found that only 1.8% of sentence variability was due to difference between courts. It was also 
found that of three mitigating and six aggravating factors tested, all but two were applied 
consistently across courts. However, the study excluded 38 out of 47 mitigating and 
aggravating factors listed in the assault guidelines. In addition, the authors were unable to 
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evaluate possible geographical disparities based on extra-legal factors such as offenders’ race, 
gender, or age, or inter-judge disparities within Crown Court centres. To date, the possible 
causes of inter-court inconsistency have not been investigated empirically in England and 
Wales. 
Statistical analyses of sentencing data have found significant inter-judge disparities in 
sentence severity, and in the extent to which judges’ sentences were affected by extra-legal 
offender characteristics including race, age, gender, and their interaction (Anderson & Spohn, 
2010; Johnson, 2006; Wooldredge, 2010). Interview and focus group studies carried out by 
Davies and Tyrer (2003), Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003), Jacobson and Hough (2007), 
and Raynard, Hebenton and Pease (1994) all found substantial variation in judges’ sentencing 
practice, including the severity of their sentences and their approach to the use of aggravating 
and mitigating factors.  
To date, there has been relatively little research into the possible causes of inter-judge 
variation. Studies have found correlations between sentencers’ attitudes to retribution, 
deterrence and incapacitation and length of punishment given (de Keijser, van der Leeden, & 
Jackson, 2002; Sporer, 1982). Various sentencer characteristics may also have an effect on 
sentence severity, although the evidence is equivocal. Steffensmeier and Hebert (1999) found 
that female judges gave somewhat harsher sentences, especially for repeat black offenders, 
but Johnson (2014) found the opposite effect. Some researchers have found ethnic minority 
judges more likely to imprison offenders (Steffensmeier & Brit, 2001), while others have 
found them to be less punitive (Johnson, 2006, 2014), or found no difference (Spohn, 1990). 
Studies have also found interactions between sentencer and offender characteristics. For 
example, Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010) found in-group ethnic bias amongst both 
Jewish and Arab judges in Israeli bail decisions; Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich and Guthrie 
(2009) found that when given hypothetical sentencing scenarios, black judges were more 
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likely to convict a white defendant but white judges’ decisions were unaffected by the 
defendant’s race. 
The impact of sentencers’ age and experience is also unclear, with some studies 
finding that they affect sentencing severity, and others finding no effect (Diamond, 1990; 
Gilchrist & Blissett, 2002; Johnson, 2006, 2014; Speed & Burrows, 2006; Wooldredge, 
Griffin, & Thistlethwaite, 2013). It is likely that sentencer attitudes, gender, race, age and 
experience all have an effect on sentencing, but the extent of their effect varies depending on 
the sentencer (and court, district, and/or jurisdiction) involved, and on complex interactions 
between characteristics. 
1.1.2. Psychological Explanations for Sentencing Disparity 
Psychological theory can provide important insights into the possible reasons why 
discretionary sentencing produces disparities, as well as identifying other limitations on 
human judgment that are likely to affect discretionary sentencing. On the one hand, some 
theories that have been advanced specifically to explain sentencing disparity are based on 
psychological phenomena.  On the other hand, psychological research has identified a 
number of issues arising from human intuitive judgment that are relevant to the sentencing 
domain. The following two sections cover these two areas of research in turn. 
1.1.2.1. Theories specific to sentencing. The three most influential psychological 
theories of sentencing disparity were actually developed by criminologists, rather than 
psychologists. First, Albonetti (1987, 1991) proposed that legal decision makers have to 
make important decisions using limited and often ambiguous information about highly 
relevant issues such an offender’s risk of reoffending and rehabilitative potential. In order to 
avoid or minimise the resulting uncertainty, sentencers make causal attributions about 
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reoffending and/or rehabilitation (a.k.a. “perceptual shorthand”) based on stereotypes relating 
to race, gender, and other extra-legal characteristics (see also Farrell & Holmes, 1991).   
Second, the “focal concerns” theory of sentencing (Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998) proposes that sentencers determine sentences by 
reference to three focal concerns of punishment: blameworthiness, community protection (i.e., 
offender dangerousness/rehabilitative potential), and practical constraints. This in itself 
amounts to little more than a simplified restatement of the goals of sentencing. The difference 
is that focal concerns theory proposes (like Albonetti’s causal attribution theory) that when 
evaluating their focal concerns, sentencers use both legal factors and stereotype-driven 
assumptions based on extra-legal factors.   
Third, the “court community” perspective views sentences as “joint social acts” 
(Ulmer, 2012, p. 7) that represent the sentencing norms of a distinctive culture unique to each 
court (Kramer & Ulmer, 2009). The presence of distinct court communities that are 
influenced by the political, social and organisational context in which each court operates 
may, in the absence of a structured sentencing system, lead to inter-court sentencing disparity 
(Eisenstein, Flemming, & Nardulli, 1988; Flemming, Nardulli, & Eisenstein, 1992; Ulmer, 
1997). 
Perceptual shorthand and focal concerns theory have been very influential on recent 
sentencing research but both lack precision in terms of generating specific testable 
behavioural hypotheses. Perhaps because of this (at least in part), very little empirical 
research appears to have been done to test either theory directly, except in the general sense 
that studies finding sentencing disparities based on offenders’ extra-legal characteristics are 
consistent with both theories, as are findings of inter-judge disparities. A rare exception is  
Bridges and Steen (1998), who tested Albonetti’s theory and found that probation officers’ 
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attributions about the causes of crime differed between white and minority youths, and that 
those attributions contributed to differential assessments of youths’ risk of reoffending and 
sentence recommendations (after adjusting for legally relevant offence and offender factors). 
Similarly, empirical support for the court communities perspective is mostly limited to 
studies that show inter-court disparities in the effects of legal and/or extra-legal factors (e.g., 
Kautt, 2002; Ulmer, 2005) but do not link those disparities to differences in court culture. An 
exception here is Haynes, Ruback and Cusik (2010), who found that relatively stable court 
workgroups, whose members worked in the same location and shared the same law school, 
were less likely to give prison sentences.  
1.1.2.2. Limitations on human judgment that affect sentencing. Decision science 
research has identified a number of issues arising from human intuitive judgment that are 
relevant to the sentencing domain. Decision science is an inter-disciplinary field that 
combines decades of research by cognitive psychologists and behavioural economists. The 
underlying principle of decision science is that people’s ability to make decisions is a 
function of basic cognitive abilities such as memory, attention and perception. Findings from 
decision science have been successfully applied to several domains, including medicine (e.g., 
Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015; Marewski & Gigerenzer, 2012), intelligence analysis 
(e.g., Belton & Dhami, 2016; Dhami, Mandel, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2015; Heuer, 1999), 
public policy (e.g., Bhargava & Loewenstein, 2015; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), and the law 
(e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001; von Helverson & Rieskamp, 2009).  
Dual-process theorists (e.g., Epstein, 1991; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2011; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) have identified two modes of human cognition with 
distinct characteristics. Intuition is unconscious, automatic, holistic, fast and relatively 
effortless. Conversely, analysis is conscious, controlled, deliberative, slow and effortful. 
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Alternatively, Hammond (1996, 2000) proposed that there is a continuum between intuition 
and analysis and argued that the mode of cognition used (intuition, analysis or a 
“quasirational” combination of the two) is determined by properties of the judgment task. 
Cognitive tasks may be distinguished from one another based on the mode of cognition they 
are likely to induce (Dhami, Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015; Dhami & Thomson, 
2012).  
Discretionary sentencing is a task that involves experienced judges integrating a large 
number of factors, some of which may be highly inter-correlated and many of which must be 
subjectively interpreted, and choosing from several response options (i.e., sentence types). 
These are all characteristics identified by Hammond (1996) as likely to promote primarily 
intuitive judgment (Dhami, Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015). This conclusion is 
supported by qualitative research that suggests sentencers trust their intuition and “just do it” 
(Jacobson & Hough, 2007, p. 48). Judges tend to describe sentencing as an intuitive process, 
using terms such as “instinct”, “experience”, “feel”, “hunch”, and “gut feeling” (Ashworth, 
Genders, Mansfield, Peay, & Player, 1984; Hutton, 2006; Lock, 2015; Mackenzie, 2006; see 
also Study 2 in this thesis). 
Several psychological perspectives have highlighted problems with intuitive judgment. 
Those described below have either been shown to apply directly to sentencing judgments or 
are theoretically relevant to them, based on their proven effects in other legal contexts. 
First, Kahneman, Tversky and colleagues proposed that we have evolved to make fast 
and effortless unconscious decisions based on simple, rule of thumb principles or “heuristics”, 
which although often useful can cause individuals to deviate systematically from normatively 
rational behaviour (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, 
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Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).  Many such deviations or “cognitive biases” have since been 
identified, including in a variety of legal contexts.  
One frequently identified cognitive bias, “anchoring”, is the tendency to make 
quantitative estimates “by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final 
answer [and]… adjustments are typically insufficient” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128).  
Studies suggest that judges’ sentencing decisions may be significantly affected by numerical 
anchors (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005, 2006; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001, 
2007; Rachlinski, Wistrich, Johnson, & Guthrie, 2009; Rachlinski, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2015) 
even where these are irrelevant (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 
2006; although relevant anchors have a stronger effect: Glöckner & Englich, 2015), or 
presented subliminally (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005).  The anchors may be received from 
various sources including the prosecution’s sentencing demand (Englich, Mussweiler, & 
Strack, 2005) and appear to affect expert judges and novices equally (Englich, Mussweiler, & 
Strack, 2006; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001).  
“Confirmation bias” refers to people’s tendency to search for and interpret 
information in a way that confirms a pre-existing theory or assumption (Klayman, 1995; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), especially where information is presented sequentially, as is 
the case in a sentencing hearing (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001).  Recent 
experimental research suggests that judges are susceptible to confirmation bias. Helm, 
Wistrich and Rachlinski (2016) found that both arbitrators and judges preferred to search for 
confirmatory evidence over disconfirming evidence in an employment discrimination claim. 
Schmittat and Englich (2016) found that judges given a sentencing scenario evaluated 
evidence supporting their preliminary decision as stronger and more credible than evidence 
conflicting with it (although they were less biased than laypeople).  
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Judges and other legal decision-makers (e.g., lawyers) have also been found to be 
susceptible to several other cognitive biases. Examples include “framing”, where choices are 
affected by the way in which information is presented, or “framed”; “hindsight bias”, the 
tendency to overestimate the predictability of past events; and “normality bias”, the tendency 
to react more strongly to negative outcomes that come from abnormal as opposed to normal 
circumstances (Belton, Thomson, & Dhami, 2014; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001, 
2007, 2009).  
Second, the “fast and frugal heuristics” research program (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & 
Pachur, 2011; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Group, 1999) is concerned with modelling the 
heuristic decision processes that underpin intuitive thought. Like heuristics and biases 
researchers, Gigerenzer and colleagues propose that we often use simple decision strategies 
to deal with complex decision problems. For example, where a number of relevant factors 
must be incorporated into a decision, rather than weighting and balancing them in a 
compensatory way, we may adopt simpler, often non-compensatory strategies based on 
limited information. Researchers have produced step-by-step process models of these 
strategies, which are referred to as “fast and frugal” because they search for and use limited 
information in a short time period.  
Fast and frugal heuristics are frequently “ecologically rational”, in that they can match 
or outperform far more complex strategies in appropriate environments (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996).  However, if used in a legal context they will often be at odds with the 
process prescribed by law. For example, when making bail decisions, judges are expected to 
take account of all available relevant information. However, Dhami and Ayton (2001) found 
that when predicting judges’ bail decisions on hypothetical cases involving nine cues, a 
simple, non-compensatory strategy that used only a few cues (only one was used by 75% of 
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participants) predicted judges’ behaviour better than compensatory strategies that used all 
nine cues. Von Helversen & Rieskamp (2009) found that judges’ sentencing decisions (both 
custodial sentence length and fine amount) were better predicted by a relatively simple – 
albeit compensatory – heuristic model that only took account of a limited number of factors 
than by models that integrated all legally relevant factors.  
Third, the existence of ‘implicit bias’, judgment bias that is “introspectively 
unidentified (or inaccurately identified)” (Lane, Kang, & Banaji, 2007, p. 429) is generally 
considered beyond reasonable doubt (Jost et al., 2009, Lane, Kang & Banaji, 2007; but see 
Tetlock & Mitchell, 2009). The Implicit Association Test (IAT - Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) assesses the strength of implicit associations between characteristics such as 
race, gender, age, or religion, and positive or negative attitudes, using a reaction time 
measure. Over 2.5 million people have been tested via the Project Implicit website - 
http://implicit.harvard.edu/ (see e.g., Nosek et al., 2007) and elsewhere. IAT scores have been 
found to correlate to a moderate degree with various measures of behaviour (see Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Lane, Kang, & Banaji, 2007). 
Several academics have highlighted the likely relevance of implicit bias to legal 
decision making (Bagenstos, 2007; Banks, Eberhardt, & Ross, 2006; Jolls, 2007; Jolls & 
Sunstein, 2004, 2006; Kang, 2005; Kang et al., 2012; Krieger, 1995; Krieger & Fiske, 2006; 
Lane, Kang, & Banaji, 2007). Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich and Guthrie’s (2009) 
experimental study of US circuit judges linked IAT results to decisions made in hypothetical 
criminal cases. The study found clear in-race bias amongst Caucasian judges but no clear 
preference in the African American judges.  However, African-American judges were more 
likely to convict a Caucasian defendant than an African-American defendant, while 
Caucasian judges’ conviction decisions were unaffected by the race of the defendant. 
Conversely, African-American judges with a stronger in-race preference in the IAT were less 
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likely to convict an African-American defendant. Perhaps surprisingly, this was also true for 
those Caucasian judges who exhibited a strong in-race preference in the IAT, which 
Rachlinski and colleagues concluded may be evidence of some judges’ ability to compensate 
for their implicit attitudes.  
1.1.3. Can Judicial Expertise Generate Skilled Discretion? 
One argument for the efficacy of intuition in sentencing comes from the notion of 
sentencers as experienced experts in their field. There is a common view amongst judges that 
sentencing expertise can only “be absorbed through the experience of doing it” (Wasik, 1993, 
p. 44). “Judicial experience in sentencing is a skill… Repeated exercise in synthesising 
sentencing factors can only hone the instinct required to translate such factors into just 
numerical outcomes.” (McHugh J in Markarian v The Queen (2005) at [78]).  Michael Kirby, 
the Australian High Court judge, has described intuition as “simply the application to a 
particular case of the accumulated experience of professional life” (Kirby, 1998).  Similarly, 
retired South African judge Albie Sachs notes that “[b]y the time one is appointed to sit on a 
Court like ours, one’s intuitions are not based on blind, untutored and highly subjective 
predilections.  … Life experiences… have been filtered and transmuted into an evolving 
lexicon of legal principles which I share with others who have followed quite different 
journeys.” (Sachs, 2011, p49; see also Hastie & Viscusi, 1998).  
There is certainly evidence that intuition can be an effective decision-making tool in 
certain contexts. Simon has proposed that “[i]ntuition is nothing more and nothing less than 
recognition” (Simon, 1992, p155).  Klein and colleagues’ model of “recognition-primed 
decisions” (RPD) builds on research into chess masters and proposes that experts can draw on 
a repertoire of patterns compiled over time to identify a plausible option, which, if 
appropriate, is then implemented or adapted as required to fit the situation at hand (Klein, 
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Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986).  Studies using the RPD model have found evidence 
of effective skilled intuition in the fields of firefighting, system design, military command 
and management of offshore oil installations (Klein, 1998, 2003).  
However, research suggests that effective intuition relies on learning appropriate 
decision strategies and using them consistently. An individual may only be able to develop 
effective intuition when he/she has rapid, unequivocal feedback on his or her performance 
(Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Shanteau, 1992), 
and even feedback may not be enough to facilitate learning of some complex tasks (Harvey, 
2011). Sentencers do not receive any regular, reliable feedback about whether their 
sentencing judgements are effective or not. There is no way for a judge to know whether a 
particular offender reoffends (unless they happen to appear before them in court again). 
Official statistics on issues such as recidivism rates may sometimes be available but these are 
averages over offence types, offender types and court types, and tend to be unreliable 
(Hedderman, 2009; Richards, 2011). Sentences can be appealed, but in practice this rarely 
happens: in England and Wales in 2011, appeals were heard for only 0.5% of magistrates’ 
court sentences and 2% of Crown Court cases (Jacobson, 2013). In addition, appeals are only 
likely to overturn manifestly inappropriate sentences, unless an error of fact or law is 
involved.   
The lack of feedback makes sentencing a “wicked” learning environment (Hogarth, 
2001), in which sentencers may only be able to develop skilled intuition regarding the “going 
rate” tariff for a particular combination of offender and offence factors based on what they 
have done in the past and ad hoc discussions with colleagues about comparable cases. But, of 
course, those going rates could be consistently unjust – influenced by extra-legal factors or 
arrived at without taking account of all relevant information – and may differ substantially 
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from judge to judge and court to court.  The research cited above suggests that this is indeed 
what happens in practice.  
Sentencers often seek refuge in the aphorism that there is such a thing as an incorrect 
sentence, but there is no such thing as a correct sentence (Cavadino, Dignan, & Mair, 2013; 
Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 2016; R v Ellis, 1986; two of the judges interviewed in Study 2 
also expressed this view). The rationale seems to be that as long as the sentence reached is 
roughly in line with the going rate for an offence and offender with a given set of legal 
characteristics (i.e., not manifestly wrong), then justice has been done (more or less). 
However, this way of thinking ignores the possibility, supported by the substantial body of 
research summarised above, that beneath such superficial consistency of approach may lie 
patterns of inconsistency and bias, where offenders with certain extra-legal characteristics are 
treated systematically differently than others, and comparable offenders receive different 
treatment depending on characteristics of the sentencers before whom they appear. 
In summary, the intuitive judgment induced by discretionary sentencing creates 
disparities and has been shown to be biased and inconsistent in a number of ways. Decision 
science research strongly suggests that discretionary sentencing is adversely affected by 
several other judgment biases as well. Furthermore, discretionary sentencing lacks 
transparency and, as a result, undermines the public’s sense of procedural justice. Lastly, 
sentencing is a wicked learning environment and so experience-based expertise is unlikely to 
reduce sentencers’ susceptibility to bias. Taken together, these conclusions raise serious 
concerns for sentencing systems that rely heavily on judicial discretion. 
1.2. Personal Mitigation in Sentencing – A Discretionary Process  
Mitigation lies at the heart of the English and Welsh criminal justice system. In the 
nineteenth century, many offences still carried severe mandatory penalties (most notably, the 
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death penalty).  Consequently, the primary function of the sentencer was to decide whether to 
mitigate the severity of the penalty which the law had appointed for the offence. As Cox 
(1877) put it, “the province of the judge is purely beneficent. The law affixes the punishment 
to the crimes and gives to the judge the power to mitigate that punishment, as in his judgment 
he may deem to be right, upon consideration of all the circumstances attending the particular 
case” (Thomas, 1977, p. 15, quoting Cox, 1877).  
Mitigating factors continue to play an important role in sentencing today. They can be 
categorised as relating either to the offence or the offender. Offence-related mitigating factors 
include provocation or limited property damage. Personal Mitigating Factors (PMFs) are 
those that relate to characteristics of the offender, and include remorse, serious medical 
conditions, good character, family responsibilities, and taking steps to deal with drug or 
alcohol addiction.  
1.2.1. Character-based PMFs 
 The present research chose to explore the influence of PMFs on sentencing judgments 
by focusing on three particular factors that it is argued have a central role to play in the 
mitigation process, namely, remorse, addressing addiction, and good character. Sentencing 
has been described as essentially a question of what one person (the sentencer) thinks about 
another (the offender): “are you looking at a fool... or someone who doesn’t give – anything?” 
(judge quoted in Jacobson & Hough, 2007, p. 48). From this perspective, sentencing is a 
holistic process where the sentencer integrates the facts of the case into a satisfying whole 
narrative, an overall view of the offender, his/her character and situation (Tata, 1997, 2007). 
This holistic perspective is analogous to leading psychological theories of legal decision-
making including the “story model” (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992), Bayesian approaches 
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(e.g., Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013) and cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Simon, Snow, 
& Read, 2004).  
Sentencing is also an essentially moral or ethical judgment task. Hough, Jacobson and 
Millie (2003, p. 41) found that in cases on the cusp of custody, sentencers’ judgments were 
“framed within a set of explicitly ethical concepts… [such as] the intentions and capabilities 
of the offender and his or her attitude towards the offence, and offending”.  Ashworth (2015, 
p. 199) describes sentencers’ judgment on the custody threshold as “a kind of moral 
assessment of the offender and his or her prospects”. This holistic moral assessment of the 
offender also reflects the approach taken by prosecution and defence counsel, each of whom 
will typically attempt to construct a coherent overall picture of the offender as either suitable 
for community punishment or requiring custody (Ashworth, 2015). There is evidence that the 
public also perceive sentencing holistically, evaluating offenders as, for example, “foolish” or 
“a loser” (Lovegrove, 2011, p. 45).  
If mitigation involves a global assessment of the offender’s morality (Ashworth, 2015; 
Fitzmaurice & Pease, 1986), then certain PMFs such as remorse, addressing addiction, and 
good character, are likely to play a central role in that assessment. Each of these “character-
based” PMFs involves behaviour – either in response to an offence, or otherwise – that 
illustrates something about the offender’s underlying character. To use the terminology of 
perceptual shorthand and focal concern theories (Albonetti, 1987, 1991; Kramer & Ulmer, 
2009; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998;), the information these three PMFs provide 
about offenders’ moral characters is likely to influence sentencers’ causal attributions about 
those offenders’ reasons for offending, and the likelihood of them reoffending or responding 
positively to rehabilitative efforts. An offender perceived as basically a good person who had 
a “moment of madness” may be given a community sentence, while someone perceived to be 
a “ne’er-do-well” may have more chance of being sent to prison. 
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Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003) cite remorse and the determination to stop 
offending as two factors that sentencers perceive as particularly important when making the 
choice between custody and a community sentence (see also Millie, Tombs, & Hough, 2007). 
The vital importance of character-based PMFs for sentencing, especially for offenders on the 
cusp of custody, means that it is critical for sentencers to approach these factors in a 
consistent, principled, and unbiased way. For this reason, the present research is focused on 
character-based PMFs, as distinct from those that relate, for example, to criminal culpability 
(age and/or lack of maturity, mental disorder), ability to deal with punishment (serious 
medical conditions), or external personal circumstances (sole or primary carer).  
1.2.2. The Current Status of PMFs in England Wales 
Sentencing statistics from the Crown Court2 in England and Wales suggest that the 
presence of one or more PMFs reduces both the likelihood of an offender receiving an 
immediate custodial sentence and the average custodial sentence length (Sentencing Council, 
2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015a). Many PMFs occur frequently (e.g., in 2014, remorse was 
mentioned in 21% of all burglary cases – Sentencing Council, 2015a). In addition, many 
cases involve the co-occurrence of more than one PMF (in 2014, 56% of cases involved 2 or 
more PMFs – Sentencing Council, 2015a). Research with sentencers has also found that 
PMFs may substantially influence sentencing, in particular by tipping the balance for 
borderline cases in favour of non-custodial sentences (Hough, Jacobson, & Millie, 2003; 
Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Millie, Tombs, & Hough, 2007; Tombs & Jagger, 2006). However, 
very little is currently known about the relative influence that different mitigating factors may 
have on sentencing outcomes. A full review of the empirical literature to date is included at 
pp. 38-50 below. 
                                                          
2 The Crown Court deals with relatively serious offences. “Indictable” offences, such as murder, rape and 
robbery, must be tried at the Crown Court. “Either way” offences, which include most types of burglary and 
assault, can be tried in either a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court. 
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Offence-specific sentencing guidelines currently exist in England and Wales for most 
common offences including assault, burglary, theft, and sexual offences (Sentencing Council, 
2011a, 2011b, 2013c, 2016b; copies of the guidelines for assault and burglary are also 
included at Appendices 1 and 2). The current guidelines break the sentencing process into 
nine steps. At Step One, the sentencer determines the offence’s category (from 1 to 3, with 1 
being the most serious), which is based on an assessment of the harm caused and the 
culpability of the offender. Harm and culpability are determined by reference to an 
exhaustive list of factors that indicate greater or lesser harm and higher or lower culpability.  
At Step Two, the sentence starting point and range are determined from the offence 
category. The sentence can then be adjusted up or down from the starting point, within the 
category range (or in exceptional cases, beyond it), depending on the presence of additional 
aggravating and/or mitigating factors. Step Three of each guideline allows for a reduction 
based on an offender giving assistance to the prosecution, Step Four requires an appropriate 
reduction for a guilty plea, and Step Five takes account of an offender’s potential 
dangerousness (only for certain offences). Step Six requires the sentencer to ensure that, 
where an offender is sentenced for multiple offences, the overall sentence is proportionate 
(the totality principle). Step Seven deals with compensation and ancillary orders, Step Eight 
requires the sentencer to give reasons for his or her sentence, and Step Nine involves 
accounting for time served on remand. 
Step Two of the guidelines includes a non-exhaustive list of the aggravating and 
mitigating factors that should be considered when deciding a sentence for that offence. Figure 
1.1 shows the list of factors included in the guideline for common assault (Sentencing 
Council, 2011a, p. 25). Several PMFs are included in the right-hand column under “factors 
reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation”, including remorse and good character.  
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Table 1.1 
Aggravating and mitigating factors to be taken account of in a case of common assault. 
Taken from Sentencing Council (2011a), p. 25.  
 
England and Wales’ sentencing guidelines prioritise certain aggravating and 
mitigating factors over others through the step-by-step process employed. Step One 
aggravating and mitigating factors, which are classed as affecting culpability or harm, 
determine the sentence starting point and range, while Step Two factors can generally only 
move a sentence up or down within the range. There is also some very limited guidance from 
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the Court of Appeal on the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating factors for certain 
specific offences (e.g., driving causing death – R v Richardson, 2001).  
However, there is currently no other guidance on when particular aggravating and 
mitigating factors should be applied, nor how multiple factors should be weighted and 
integrated to reach a sentence (Ashworth, 2010, 2011, 2015; Dhami, 2013a, 2013b), nor the 
relative weight that those factors should be given in different contexts, such as different 
offence types and/or seriousness (Ashworth, 2010, 2011, 2015), nor how they should affect 
the custody threshold (Roberts, 2008). The one exception is a guilty plea, for which there is a 
separate guideline (Sentencing Council, 2017). In addition, the aggravating and mitigating 
factors listed in the guidelines are left undefined and therefore open to judges’ subjective 
interpretation (Dhami, 2013a). This approach appears to reflect a general view that 
aggravation and mitigation are best dealt with by the exercise of judicial discretion (Roberts, 
2008, 2013). As discussed, however, relying on judicial discretion results in judgments that 
are inconsistent and adversely influenced by various psychological biases. 
Ashworth (2011, p. 22) described the current treatment of aggravating and mitigating 
factors as “a sphere in which discretion has led largely to anarchy”. He notes that while 
judges tend to resist the idea of allocating weight to individual factors, in practice each judge 
is bound to make particular assumptions about factors’ relevance and weight. Jacobson and 
Hough (2007) carried out interviews with 40 Crown Court sentencers and found evidence for 
substantial variation in the way that sentencers apply PMFs.  For example, opinion was 
divided over the weight to be given to a burglar’s commitment to enter a drug treatment 
programme. Raynard, Hebenton and Pease (1994) identified striking differences in judges’ 
weighting of the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in a Court of Appeal guideline 
judgment for rape cases.   
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One solution to the problems associated with intuitive judgment is to structure the 
sentencing task so that it induces a more analytical mode of cognition (Dhami, Belton, & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2015). A more structured sentencing process can potentially reduce the 
bias and inconsistency that result from discretionary judgment. In England and Wales, the 
current system of offence-specific guidelines includes a consistent, step-by-step process to 
follow and lists of relevant factors, while still retaining sufficient flexibility to deal with 
unique elements of each individual case. A recent statistical analysis of data from the Crown 
Court found evidence that the inter-court consistency of sentencing for assault cases 
improved after the introduction of the sentencing guideline for assault (Pina-Sánchez & 
Linacre, 2014). However, as described above, the use of PMFs in sentencing remains 
relatively unstructured and sentencers must use their intuition to determine the weight given 
to each PMF on a case-by-case basis.   
Researchers have repeatedly argued that the principles underlying the use of each 
specific PMF should be identified, and guidance provided on the use of these factors in 
practice (Ashworth, 2010, 2011, 2015; Dhami, 2013a, 2013b; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; 
Roberts, 2008). Roberts (2008) argues that since sentencing factors can determine whether an 
offender goes to prison or not, especially in borderline cases (Hough, Jacobson, & Millie, 
2003; Maslen, 2015; Millie, Tombs, & Hough, 2007), “it is vital that sentencers apply them 
in a uniform manner” (Roberts, 2008, p. 264), while research to date suggests that they do not 
(Corbett, 1987; Davies & Tyrer, 2003; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Raynard, Hebenton, & 
Pease, 1994). Roberts also asserts that the reasoning behind mitigation needs to be clarified 
because poorly understood sentencing factors can lead to public and media criticism of 
sentencers, especially when a factor leads to an offender escaping prison.  
Dhami (2013a, 2013b), Roberts (2008, 2011) and Young and King (2011) have all 
proposed moving beyond unweighted lists of aggravating and mitigating factors (such as 
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those produced by Jacobson & Hough, 2007) towards guidance on the typical weight that 
each aggravating and mitigating factor might be given across different offences. Aggravating 
and mitigating factors “are clearly not all equally important” and sentencers “should be 
provided with some sense of the relative power of these factors”, particularly in relation to 
the custody threshold (Roberts, 2008, p. 270). Alternatively, Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) 
suggest that sentencing guidance could give examples of circumstances where each factor is 
likely to be particularly important or unimportant for sentencing. Ashworth (2015, p. 201) 
notes that the guilty plea discount and the enhancement of sentences for racial aggravation 
both already have to be quantified, which illustrates that “some arithmetical clarity is 
possible”. 
Finally, Roberts (2008) and Ashworth (2010, 2015) agree that the Sentencing Council 
should specify the rationale behind each mitigating factor and give particular consideration to 
controversial factors such as having stable employment (which can indirectly discriminate 
against minority offenders), being under the influence of drugs or alcohol (which some view 
as an aggravating factor, and others as a mitigating factor – see  Lightowlers & Pina-Sanchez, 
2017; Padfield, 2011) and previous good character (which some argue should not be relevant 
- e.g., Ashworth, 2010; Maslen & Roberts, 2013). 
Any proposal to increase the structure of a sentencing system must be supported by 
both descriptive and normative research. Policy-makers first need to understand how the 
system currently operates; this means using empirical research to find out how PMFs are 
applied in current sentencing practice, both individually and in combination. Separately, 
researchers need to re-examine the legal and policy-based principles behind those factors that 
are currently treated as PMFs. These two lines of research can then be integrated to reach 
evidence-based conclusions about whether the current approach to personal mitigation is 
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acceptable or improvements need to be made, for example by adding or removing certain 
PMFs and/or specifying the weight that they should be given in different contexts. 
1.3. The Relevance of Public Opinion to Sentencing 
Sentencing is not just a matter for sentencers. It is generally accepted that the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system requires some level of correspondence between 
sentencing practice and public opinion about sentencing. There are several bases for arguing 
that public opinion on sentencing matters (Hough & Kirby, 2013; Wood & Tendayi, 2004). 
First, public confidence and trust in criminal justice is needed, since the effectiveness of the 
justice system depends on people respecting and ultimately complying with court judgments 
(Auld, 2001; Halliday, 2001; Morgan, 2002; Tyler, 2007). Trust is eroded if sentences are 
seen as unfair, and/or sentencers are viewed as out of touch with the values and attitudes of 
the general public (Henham, 2012; Lord Carloway, 2013). More specifically, the relevance of 
individual sentencing factors must be clear to the community, or misunderstanding and 
criticism of sentencing are likely to become issues (Roberts, 2008).  
Acknowledging the relevance of public opinion “is not a surrender to the clamour of 
the mob; it is realistic recognition that a sentence widely seen as unjustifiably lenient (or 
harsh) may ultimately be damaging to the defendant himself and even, unless and until 
corrected, to the administration of criminal justice” (Bingham, 2000, p. 82). This viewpoint is 
reflected in the Sentencing Council of England and Wales’ stated goal of “increasing public 
understanding of and confidence in sentencing and the criminal justice system” (Sentencing 
Council, 2016a, “Additional functions”).  
 Second, the democratic accountability of government means that politicians must 
represent the interests of the electorate: “public opinion should be the ultimate basis of the 
law” (Green, 1996, p. 116; see also Faulkner, 2006). This in turn requires a sentencing policy 
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that is responsive to, and bounded by, public opinion (Yankelovich, 1991 – although 
responsiveness can become cynical populism; Hough & Kirby, 2013).  
Third, it can be argued that in order to be fair, punishment should reflect shared 
cultural values (Robinson & Darley, 2007; Ryberg & Roberts, 2014). From this last 
perspective, the public’s view is arguably just as valid as that of sentencers. Overall, 
wholesale “sentencing by plebiscite” (Roberts & Hough, 2014, p. 171) is obviously 
unappealing, and raises many issues including the erosion of judicial independence and the 
proper role of legal principles in the sentencing process (Roberts, 2014). However, a strong 
case can be made that sentencing practice, and sentencing guidelines, should fall at least 
“within the outer limits of public tolerance” (Hough & Kirby, 2013, p. 147; see also Walker, 
1985). 
 There is conflicting evidence about whether public opinion on sentencing differs from 
sentencing practice. Hough, Bradford, Jackson and Roberts (2013) reviewed 25 years of 
surveys of the British public and found that throughout that period roughly 75% of those 
surveyed considered that criminal sentences were too lenient. Other studies have produced 
rather lower but still sizeable figures. Dawes, Harvey, McIntosh, Nunney and Phillips (2011) 
quote a figure of 65%, while the Ministry of Justice (2013) figure was 41%. A 2009 Ipsos 
MORI poll for the Home Office found that “punishment too lenient” was rated the equal most 
important crime issue facing Britain today (Ipsos MORI, 2010).  
However, researchers have found that when survey respondents are given more 
information about sentencing, their attitudes tend to become less punitive (Chapman, 
Mirrlees-Black, & Brawn, 2002; Hough & Park, 2002; Salisbury, 2004). In addition, when 
the public are given detailed case facts and asked to decide sentences themselves, they can 
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often be less punitive than sentencers (Hutton, 2005; Lovegrove, 2007, 2010, 20113; 
Mackenzie, Stobbs, Ferguson, & Gelb, 2014; Ministry of Justice, 2013; St Amand & Zamble, 
2001; but see de Keijser, van Koppen, & Elffers, 2007). Real jurors in Australia who were 
asked to propose a sentence for a case they had just heard were found to make judgments 
very close to the actual sentence passed by the judge in their case (Warner & Davis, 2012; 
Warner, Davis, Spiranovich, Cockburn, & Freiberg, 2016). 
In summary, there are strong reasons for asserting that public opinion is relevant to 
sentencing, and it is unclear whether, and to what extent, public opinion may diverge from 
current sentencing practice. If public opinion is relevant to sentencing as a whole, then it 
follows that public opinion about the importance of PMFs to the sentencing process should be 
taken into account when developing guidance or structure for the use of PMFs in sentencing. 
As with sentencers’ use of PMFs, taking proper account of public judgments about PMFs 
requires empirical research to determine what those judgments are. 
One particular area where public opinion and discretionary sentencing intersect is the 
issue of transparency. Intuitive judgment is necessarily unconscious (e.g., Epstein, 1991; 
Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). Thus, the 
process by which a discretionary sentence is reached cannot be transparent. Sentencers will 
generally mention the factors they believe they relied on in making their decision, but they do 
not – and cannot, since the process is intuitive – confirm whether they did, in fact, rely on 
those factors (Dhami & Ayton, 2001), or explain how the factors were weighted and 
integrated to arrive at a final sentence (Hutton, 2006). Consequently, it may be hard for those 
interested in the outcome of the case, including the offender(s), victim(s), family, friends, and 
                                                          
3 For a critique of Lovegrove’s methodology and conclusions, see Roberts, Hough, and Ashworth (2011). 
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the wider public, to understand how the judgment was reached (Sentencing Council, 2013a).4  
Studies show that the public believe sentences are the product of judges’ own out-of-touch 
personal views (Mattinson & Mirrlees-Black, 2000; Roberts & Hough, 2005).  
A growing body of research shows that when assessing the fairness of a legal 
judgment, people may care more about fair procedures than fair outcomes. The concept of 
“procedural justice” proposes that our perceptions of an authority’s decision as fair or unfair 
are affected not just by the outcome of the decision but by whether the decision appears to be 
the result of an acceptable decision-making procedure (Folger, 1977; Thibault & Walker, 
1975).  Tyler (2006a) defines procedural justice in terms of four key expectations: (1) voice – 
the ability to express one’s viewpoint; (2) neutrality – consistently applied legal principles, 
unbiased decision makers and transparency about how decisions are made; (3) respectful 
treatment – treating individuals with dignity and protecting their rights; and (4) trust – the 
belief that authorities are benevolent, caring and sincerely motivated to help litigants and treat 
them fairly.   
Studies suggest that procedural justice is typically a more important determinant of 
satisfaction with the criminal justice system than outcome fairness (e.g., Casper, Tyler, & 
Fisher, 1988; Hough, Bradford, Jackson, & Roberts, 2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Rottman, 
2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002) 
and its importance increases the more that an outcome is perceived as unfavourable 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).  Procedural justice may reduce recidivism and enhance 
compliance with the law, because fair procedures cultivate the perception that authorities are 
both legitimate and moral (Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Tyler, 2006b; 
Tyler, Sherman, Strang, & Barnes, 2007).  
                                                          
4 It also creates practical difficulties for both defence and prosecution counsel, who have to decide whether to 
appeal the sentence and, if so, on what grounds. 
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The principles of procedural justice predict that non-transparent, discretionary 
sentences are less likely to be accepted by the public as fair and more likely to provoke 
dissatisfaction and non-compliance with the criminal justice system than sentences generated 
by a transparent, structured process. It is therefore important to have a system that gives 
sentencers the opportunity to show to the public (and victims, offenders, and policy makers) 
that sentences are determined based on legitimate, objective criteria applied in a consistent, 
unbiased way, rather than based on an individual sentencer’s whims or prejudices. In fact, 
one of the key goals of the Sentencing Council of England and Wales is to promote greater 
transparency in sentencing (Sentencing Council, 2016a).  
1.4. Methods Used to Study Sentencing 
 Many different methodological approaches have been used to investigate sentencing 
judgments. These methodologies can be divided into two main categories: self-report 
methods and behavioural methods. Self-report methods involve asking people to report their 
own judgment strategies – for example, whether they took account of particular information 
in making their judgments and how important that information was. Self-report methods 
include surveys, interviews, questionnaires, and analysis of sentencers’ reasons in reported 
cases. Behavioural methods aim to record observable behaviour only, such as judgments 
made and information that was present or absent during the judgment process. There is no 
reliance on participants’ introspection about their behaviour. Behavioural methods include 
court observations, analysis of sentencing statistics and/or court records, and experiments.  
1.4.1. Self-report Methods 
Much sentencing research, including the majority of the research to date on PMFs in 
sentencing, has been carried out using surveys, questionnaires and/or interviews with 
sentencers or the public, or analysis of the reasons given by judges and magistrates in court or 
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in reported sentencing cases. Self-report methods do not permit researchers to draw 
conclusions about causal relationships between sentencing factors (such as PMFs) and 
sentence outcomes. This is because there is substantial evidence from psychological research 
that individuals cannot accurately describe the strategies they use when making judgments 
and/or that traditional post facto self-assessment approaches such as interviews and surveys 
are ineffective for this purpose (e.g., Galotti, Tandler, & Wiener, 2014; Newell & Shanks, 
2014; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner, 2002, 2004; Wilson, 2002). Interview- or survey-
based approaches are also susceptible to social desirability response bias (Paulhus, 1991; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and other method biases (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012), which may produce unreliable or invalid data.  
Studies of judgment and decision making that used experimental methodologies to 
determine people’s judgment strategies have found that they differ substantially from 
people’s self-reported judgment strategies (Arkes, 1981; Balzer, Rohrbaugh, & Murphy, 1983; 
Evans, Clibbens, Cattani, Harris, & Dennis, 2003; Slovic, Fleissner, & Bauman, 1972; Slovic 
& Lichtenstein, 1971), including in legal decision making contexts (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; 
Dhami & Harries, 2001; Konečni & Ebbesen, 1982, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). Furthermore, these studies found that the experimentally 
captured judgment strategies predicted peoples’ judgments significantly better than did their 
self-reports. 
1.4.2. Behavioural Methods 
1.4.2.1. Statistical analysis of archival data. The behavioural methodology most 
commonly used in sentencing research is statistical analysis of pre-existing sentencing data or 
data from court records. Statistical studies typically use one or other form of regression 
modelling to explore relationships between factors at various levels of the sentencing 
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structure (offender, judge, court, and/or district) and sentencing outcomes (see Dhami & 
Belton, 2016). The most common source of data is sentencing statistics compiled by the 
courts or other governmental institutions. Archival sentencing statistics are a useful source of 
large-scale data across whole populations, but they often contain only a few case-level 
variables. In particular, sentencing statistics very rarely record mitigating or aggravating 
factors.  
A recent source of archival data that does include comprehensive information on both 
mitigating and aggravating factors is the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS). Between 
2010 and 2015, the CCSS collected data on approximately 60% of all cases sentenced in the 
Crown Court in England and Wales. A more detailed description of the CCSS is contained in 
the introduction to Study 1 (pp. 61-62).  
The mitigating and aggravating factors recorded in the CCSS data are arguably self-
report data in the sense that the decision-maker recorded which factors he or she took account 
of when deciding on the sentence. However, they are only self-report data in a limited sense, 
since unlike in self-report studies where sentencers were asked to rate the importance of one 
factor or another, CCSS forms did not require sentencers to give any indication of the weight 
given to particular sentencing factors in each case – they simply ticked a box to indicate 
whether the factor was present in the case or not. The weight given to each factor across the 
data set can then be estimated using statistical analysis (i.e., a behavioural methodology), as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
Another alternative is to collect and analyse the data recorded in court records. Court 
records contain substantially more data than is available in most sentencing statistics. 
However, it can be extremely time-consuming, costly and difficult for researchers to get 
access to such records and so they are rarely used in practice, at least in England and Wales 
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(Dhami & Belton, 2015; Dhami & Souza, 2009a, 2009b; Merrall, Dhami, & Bird, 2010). A 
third option is to collect observational data in court; to date, sentencing researchers have only 
used observational data to produce descriptive statistics or for qualitative analysis (e.g., 
Shapland, 1981; Jacobson & Hough, 2007), once again preventing cause-effect conclusions 
about judgment strategies. 
Studies involving analysis of statistics, court records, or observations generate 
findings that are externally valid, since they record sentencers deciding on real cases. 
However, they are still somewhat limited in their ability to determine causal relations 
between sentencing factors and outcomes. Regression analysis is correlational and so can 
only provide evidence of associations, not confirm that the presence of a given factor is 
causally related to a particular outcome. In addition, researchers cannot take account of every 
possible factor that could have influenced particular cases in one way or another – they can 
only analyse the data recorded in the files, or referred to in court. Nevertheless, statistical 
analysis of court data can provide a good indication of the likely impact of sentencing factors 
on sentences and, perhaps for this reason, it has become a very popular approach amongst 
sentencing researchers; for example, Dhami and Belton (2016) identified 30 studies since 
2000 that have used multilevel regression modelling to analyse sentencing data. 
1.4.2.2. Experimental designs. An alternative behavioural method for the study of 
human judgment that is common in decision science is the use of experimental designs. 
Experimental designs involve systematically manipulating one or more independent 
variable(s), either by varying the stimuli given to two or more randomly assigned groups of 
people, or by giving the same people several different versions of the stimuli. The effect of 
the independent variable(s) on one or more dependent variables is then measured, while 
controlling for any other variables that could potentially influence the dependent variable(s) 
(by holding them constant or allowing them to vary randomly). Consequently, experimental 
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findings can be used to draw conclusions about cause-effect relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables studied. Past research has used experimental designs to 
study the effect on sentencing judgments of several variables including offender remorse, age, 
race, social class, and ill health, and sentencer age and gender (Corwin, Cramer, Griffin, & 
Brodsky, 2012; Forsterlee, Forsterlee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Higgins, Heath, & 
Grannemann, 2007; Loeffler & Lawson, 2002; Mueller-Johnson & Dhami, 2010; Rachlinski, 
Guthrie, & Wistrich, 2013).  
One long-standing programme of research in decision science is social judgment 
theory (Cooksey, 1996; Doherty & Kurtz, 1996; Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinman, 
1975). In reality, social judgment theory is not a theory, since it does not provide any testable 
hypotheses about human judgment (Dhami & Harries, 2001). Hammond (e.g., Hammond et 
al., 1975) described it as a “meta-theory” because it provides a structure for investigating 
decision making, rather than presenting a theory of decision making as such.  Social 
judgment theory is focused on describing the processes people use to carry out specific real-
world judgment tasks, without relying on people’s verbal explanations of their introspections 
regarding their judgment processes (Hammond et al., 1975). The ultimate hope of social 
judgment theory research is that by showing people the strategies they actually use to make 
judgments, their judgments can be aided and/or improved in future. 
Social judgment theory is built around a method called “policy capturing”. Policy 
capturing involves several steps. The first step is identifying the judgment task (e.g., 
determining an offender’s sentence). This step also involves identifying the variables, or 
“cues” that individuals use to complete the task. In the case of sentencing, the relevant cues 
will include aggravating and mitigating factors. The researcher then asks an individual to 
make judgments about a series of cases that are representative of the judgment task (e.g., a set 
of hypothetical sentencing scenarios) while the cues are manipulated systematically (e.g., by 
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varying which aggravating and/or mitigating factors are present or absent). Lastly, the data 
collected is used to build a statistical model of how the cues influenced that individual’s 
judgments, referred to as their “judgment policy”.  
Statistical judgment models produced by policy capturing studies have been found to 
differ substantially from, and predict legal decision-makers’ judgments better than, those 
individuals’ self-reported judgment policies (e.g., Dhami, 2003; Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Klaas, 
Mahoney, & Wheeler, 2006; Konečni & Ebbesen, 1982, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; 
von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009; York, 1992). Additionally, unlike traditional “nomothetic” 
experimental design, which involves generalising results across groups of individuals, policy 
capturing analyses data on a person-by-person or ‘idiographic’ basis. The idiographic 
approach is a powerful research tool, since it provides much richer data on the judgments 
made by a sample of individuals than can be obtained aggregated group data. As well as 
evaluating each individual’s unique judgment policy, it is also possible to measure the level 
of agreement or disagreement between different individuals’ judgment policies. This is 
particularly useful in a domain such as sentencing where individuals’ judgments have been 
found to vary widely. Additionally, an idiographic approach allows for comparisons between 
people’s statistically derived judgment policies and their explicit self-reports (which can be 
collected separately). Lastly, in the sentencing domain, idiographic studies can have more 
impact since they allow researchers to report on sentencing practice judge-by-judge, rather 
than aggregated across a whole jurisdiction or court district (Dhami & Belton, 2017). 
 Social judgment theory research typically (but not necessarily – See Dhami & Ayton, 
2001) uses linear regression models to estimate individuals’ judgment policies (Cooksey, 
1996). Regression analysis is also the standard approach used in the (nomothetic) study of 
sentencing factors (e.g., Anderson & Spohn, 2010; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Pina-Sánchez 
& Linacre, 2013; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Regression models are highly unlikely to be 
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“isomorphic” representations of human judgment (i.e., actually representing what goes on in 
the decision-maker’s brain – Hoffman, 1960). Further, it has been argued that linear models 
are psychologically implausible (e.g., Dhami & Harries, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996). The complex calculations involved in weighting and integrating multiple items of 
information quickly “grow unfeasibly large” for human processing (Todd & Gigerenzer, 
2000, p. 728), given the limited computational capacity of the human brain (Simon, 1956). 
Researchers therefore propose that simple, “fast and frugal heuristics” (described at p. 14 
above), which use relatively little cognitive effort, are a more plausible description of human 
judgment. Another criticism of regression modelling is that it is static, in the sense that it 
assumes people weight and use cues in the same way for every case that they encounter 
(Dhami & Harries, 2001; Harvey, 2001).  
 However, recent work by Glöckner and others (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 
2008b, 2012; Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014; Glöckner & Hodges, 2011) suggests that 
human information-processing capacity may be greater than previously thought. People may 
actually be able to integrate multiple cues intuitively through a system of rapid, complex, 
compensatory parallel processing. If Glöckner and colleagues are correct, weighted additive 
models may not be so implausible after all. There have also been questions raised about the 
plausibility of fast and frugal models (e.g., Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; 
Glöckner & Betch, 2008a, 2008b). Newell (2005) makes the point that fast and frugal 
heuristics’ plausibility advantage based on frugality of information use only applies in a serial 
cognitive architecture, whereas a parallel architecture (such as those used in Glöckner and 
Betch’s 2008a model) breaks the link between amount of information used and decision 
speed (see also Bröder & Newell, 2008).  
In any case, using a statistical model to analyse human judgment which does not 
isomorphically represent that judgment is not necessarily a problem; the problem is treating it 
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as if it were isomorphic. A linear regression model can be useful on a “paramorphic” basis 
(Hoffman, 1960), i.e., to the extent that it can predict the outcome of a person’s judgment 
process based on a specified set of inputs, despite not capturing the process itself (Harte & 
Koele, 2001). It is proposed that this is sufficient to achieve the ultimate goal of the present 
research, which is to understand more about the importance of PMFs in sentencing, rather 
than learning about the inner mechanics of human judgment per se. 
A limitation of experimental designs is the lack of external validity. Experimental 
studies often involve students making judgments on simplified, hypothetical scenarios in 
controlled laboratory conditions. Consequently, the findings may not be generalisable to 
judgments made in the outside world, such as those made by judges and magistrates in real 
court cases (e.g., Berkeley & Humphries, 1982; Condlin, 2010; Dhami & Belton, 2017; 
Mitchell, 2002)5. 
1.5. Past Research on the Role of PMFs in Sentencing 
The following two sections summarise the research to date on sentencers’ use of 
PMFs in sentencing and public judgments about PMFs in sentencing, respectively. 
1.5.1. Research on Sentencers’ Use of PMFs 
Despite playing an important role in sentencing outcomes, personal mitigation is 
currently under-researched and very little is known about sentencers’ use of PMFs in practice 
(Ashworth, 2015; Bagaric, 2014; Roberts, 2011). The majority of sentencing studies, in 
England and Wales and abroad, have been focused on the impact on sentencing outcomes of 
extra-legal factors such as offender race or gender.  In addition, the findings on PMFs that do 
exist are predominantly from studies that have used courtroom observation, interviews with 
                                                          
5 Such experimental studies are also easy for sentencers to dismiss as not being applicable to them (Dhami & 
Belton, 2017). 
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sentencers, and/or questionnaires. As discussed above, these research methods have 
significant limitations. The following section reviews the limited research that has been 
carried out in England and Wales to date. Except where specified, the studies did not 
distinguish PMFs from other mitigating factors, although the majority of mitigating factors 
studied were, in fact, PMFs. 
In an early study, Shapland (1981) observed and transcribed 126 speeches in 
mitigation made by defence counsel across 30 Crown Court and 70 magistrates’ court cases 
in a range of Greater London locations. It was found that defence counsel mentioned a huge 
array of different mitigating factors in their speeches: 229 different mitigating factors across 
876 mitigating factor mentions.  In Crown Courts, five mitigating factors were mentioned 
more than 10 times: minor role in the offence (17 mentions), minor offence of its type (12 
mentions), co-operated with police (12 mentions), kept out of trouble since last conviction 
(11 mentions), and has job/good job (10 mentions).  In magistrates’ courts, eight factors were 
mentioned more than 10 times: has job/good job (18 mentions), good work record (15 
mentions), apologised (15 mentions), settled relationship with family (14 mentions), no 
previous convictions (13 mentions), drunk (11 mentions), co-operated with police (10 
mentions), and in financial difficulties (10 mentions). Shapland’s study was, however, purely 
descriptive; her research methodology did not allow her to explore the relationships between 
mitigating factors and different sentencing outcomes. 
Gelsthorpe and Loucks (1997) interviewed 189 magistrates (nine groups and 35 
individuals) about their approach to sentencing and analysed the interviews qualitatively (the 
precise form of analysis used was not specified). The researchers noted that every 
group/individual apart from one agreed that remorse was an important mitigating factor but 
their analysis was more focused on how magistrates assessed whether an offender’s remorse 
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was genuine or not. Other analysis of mitigation was limited to the influence of family 
circumstances such as dependent children and stability of employment/income. 
Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) examined the records of 3,000 cases from 25 
magistrates’ courts and 1,800 from 18 Crown Courts, supplemented with courtroom 
observations. As part of their study, they compared the overall percentage of Crown Court 
offenders sentenced to immediate custody (57%) with cases involving various aggravating or 
mitigating factors. The most influential mitigating factors identified were provocation (42%), 
minor role in the offence (43%) and mental illness (51%). For violent offences (overall 59%), 
minor injury to victim had the most impact (40%), followed by employed (47%) and previous 
good character (53%). For burglary (overall 67%), the most significant factor was first 
offender (31%), then on bail prior to sentencing (48%) and financial problems (57%). For 
suspended custodial sentences, the authors noted the reasons given for suspending the 
sentence. Most common was physical/mental illness (14 cases), then looking after dependent 
relative (12), previous good character (12), personal difficulties/stress (2) and remorse/change 
in lifestyle (2).  The likelihood of a community sentence (33% overall) was increased by 
youth (38%), mental illness (37%), and spontaneity (46%). Unfortunately, Flood-Page and 
Mackie’s study design made no allowance for co-occurring factors or interactions between 
factors, and the value of their findings is substantially diminished as a result.  
Davies & Tyrer (2003) investigated judges’ attitudes to sentencing burglars. Fifty-one 
Crown Court judges were each given five hypothetical cases of domestic burglary. The 
judges had to decide an appropriate sentence for each scenario and explain their reasoning. 
The results were then analysed qualitatively. One of the scenarios included personal 
mitigation: an offender who was the sole provider for his children and terminally ill wife. All 
but one judges stated that although domestic burglary typically attracted a custodial sentence, 
the mitigating circumstances would make a non-custodial sentence likely. However, there 
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was much more variation in the sentences given for this scenario than the other three 
scenarios, with different judges proposing 12-24 months’ probation, curfew orders or 
between 60 and 200 hours of community service. 
Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003) explored the factors that sentencers considered 
determine whether an offender is given a custodial sentence or not. The authors conducted 
focus groups with 80 magistrates, followed up with questionnaires, and one-to-one interviews 
with 48 Crown Court sentencers and five members of the senior judiciary. Respondents were 
each asked to describe four cases they had sentenced that were on the cusp between custody 
and a community sentence. The factors cited most often were divided into six categories. 
Three categories exclusively contained PMFs. “Response to prosecution” covered remorse, a 
guilty plea, and co-operation with the authorities. “Condition of the offender” comprised 
motivation to address offending behaviour, treatable psychiatric problems, medical problems, 
and youth/old age. “Situation of the offender” comprised family responsibilities, family 
support, stable relationship, current employment or prospects, positive references, and 
accommodation. The other three categories appear to include both aggravating and mitigating 
factors: “criminal history”, “nature of offence” and “other”. This is frustrating as it is not 
possible to compare the number of PMFs and aggravating factors cited overall, nor to 
compare PMFs to other mitigating factors. The number of times factors from each category 
were cited across the 311 cases described by respondents is set out in Table 1.1 below. Chi-
square tests on Hough et al.’s data confirm that all three categories of PMF were cited 
significantly more often in non-custodial cases than in custodial cases.  
Table 1.2  
Categories of aggravating and mitigating factor cited by sentencers in interview when 
describing sentenced cases that were on the cusp of custody. Adapted from Hough et al. 
(2003).  
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Factors Non-custodial  
cases 
Custodial 
cases 
PMF categories   
Response to prosecution 61 27 
Offender’s situation 71 9 
Offender’s condition 73 9 
Categories including PMFs and  
aggravating factors 
  
Criminal history 58 71 
Nature of offence 39 91 
Other 60 34 
 
Speed and Burrows (2006) explored the influence of various aggravating and 
mitigating factors on sentence types received in cases of theft from shops. The authors’ 
analysis was based on data collected from a sample of 1,563 Crown Prosecution Service files 
from 2003 to 2004 (1,433 from the magistrates’ court and 130 from the Crown Court).  
Bivariate analysis of each factor was carried out, along with a multinomial logistic regression. 
The bivariate analysis found significant relationships between five mitigating factors and 
sentence type. Offenders in employment had a 15% lower chance of custody; offenders with 
a fixed abode had a 28% lower chance of custody; offenders on benefits had a 28% higher 
chance of a community sentence rather than other sentence types; offenders showing remorse 
had a 11% higher chance of a discharge and a 14% lower chance of custody; and offenders 
showing evidence of “self-treatment” (i.e., addressing addiction) had a 23% higher chance of 
receiving a community sentence rather than other sentence types. Previous good character 
was not found to have any significant association with sentence type. However, the 
multinomial logistic regression found that of the mitigating factors identified in the bivariate 
analysis, only two were significantly associated with sentence type. Offenders on benefits 
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were 3.88 times more likely to receive a community sentence rather than a discharge (i.e., an 
aggravating effect) but 3.57 times less likely to receive custody rather than a community 
sentence. Offenders with a fixed abode were 3.09 times less likely to receive custody rather 
than a discharge, and 2.26 times less likely to receive custody rather than a community 
sentence.  
Jacobson and Hough (2007) explored sentencers’ use of PMFs by observing 132 
Crown Court cases across a wide range of offences, and interviewing 40 Crown Court 
sentencers. Sentencers mentioned PMFs in their reasons in 127 of the 132 observed cases. 
The most commonly mentioned PMFs were good character (mentioned 21 times), addressing 
drug/alcohol problems (mentioned 19 times), and youth (mentioned 19 times).  Judges stated 
in court that mitigation had reduced the sentence from immediate custody to another sentence 
in 43 cases, with personal mitigation playing a major part in at least 38 of those cases. In 40 
cases, of which 34 included personal mitigation, judges stated that mitigation other than a 
guilty plea resulted in a shorter custodial sentence.  
In interview, Jacobson and Hough (2007) asked sentencers to rate the relative 
importance of various PMFs across three sentencing scenarios: an assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm (ABH), a burglary, and a death caused by dangerous driving. Each scenario 
included several mitigating factors, and the judges were asked to score the factors for the 
impact they should have on sentencing: either A (major impact), B (moderate impact) or C 
(no impact). Factors rated as having a moderate impact or higher for ABH were severe 
depression and profound regret; for burglary, motivation to get drug treatment; and for death 
by dangerous driving, support from the victim’s family, intense remorse and married with 
three children.  
44 
 
Jacobson & Hough included different PMFs across the different offences, which 
limits the value of comparisons made across offences. The authors nevertheless collated the 
results and reported that severe depression, support of the victim’s family and addressing 
addiction were most important to sentencers (out of 13 PMFs tested). Qualitative analysis of 
the interviews revealed that the judges were agreed about the importance of some PMFs, such 
as clinical depression at the time of the offence. However, their approaches to other factors 
were very inconsistent, including the impact of an offender’s commitment to join a drug 
treatment programme and whether remorse is itself enough to merit mitigation unless 
additional steps were taken (e.g., attempting reparation). 
Overall, the above studies tell us relatively little about the impact that different PMFs 
have on sentencing outcomes. Shapland (1981), Gelsthorpe and Loucks (1997), Hough, 
Jacobson and Millie (2003) and Jacobson and Hough (2007) all used research designs that do 
not allow conclusions to be drawn about the relationships between PMFs and sentences. 
Speed and Burrows’ (2006) findings were limited to cases of shop theft but do raise questions 
given that their multivariate analysis found that several commonly occurring PMFs including 
remorse, good character, and addressing addiction had no significant effect on sentencers’ 
choice of sentence. 
Three recent studies have used statistical analysis of data from the Crown Court 
Sentencing Survey to explore sentencers’ use of PMFs. Only a brief summary is provided 
here; the research is reviewed in detail in the introduction to Chapter 2 (pp. 62-67). Pina-
Sanchez and Linacre (2013) explored the consistency of sentencers’ use of aggravating and 
mitigating factors across Crown Court centres using 5,527 assault cases from the 2011 CCSS 
data. The authors examined three PMFs (remorse, sole/primary carer and no previous 
convictions) and six aggravating factors (previous convictions, gang membership, vulnerable 
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victim, public worker victim, being under the influence of drugs/alcohol, and sustained 
assault). All three PMFs were found to be significant predictors of a reduced sentence.  
Maslen (2015a) used 5,405 cases of assault from the 2011 CCSS data to examine the 
extent to which remorse and previous convictions predicted whether an offender received a 
custodial or non-custodial sentence. Remorseful offenders were found to be exactly half as 
likely to go to prison as those who did not. Maslen also looked for an interaction between 
remorse and previous convictions, but did not find one.  
Lastly, Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) used a sample of 4,645 domestic burglary 
cases from the 2012 CCSS data to explore the relationship between each of the 18 mitigating 
factors and 23 aggravating factors specified in the burglary guidelines (see Appendix 2) and 
sentence type/length. Irwin-Rogers and Perry found that 15 mitigating factors (including 
remorse, good character and addressing addiction) significantly predicted sentence category. 
Unfortunately, all of the CCSS studies to date had substantial limitations. For example, 
Pina-Sanchez and Linacre (2013) and Maslen (2015a) only included a small number of 
sentencing factors in their analysis, while Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) did not control for 
offence seriousness. The studies also contain very little exploration of cases involving 
multiple co-occurring PMFs. A fuller critique of these studies is included at pages 62-67 of 
Chapter 2. 
1.5.2. Research on character-based PMFs 
The following section reviews empirical research to date in relation to the three 
character-based PMFs that are the subject of the present research, namely remorse, 
addressing addiction, and good character. 
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1.5.2.1. Remorse. The expression of remorse is a very well-recognised PMF in 
England and Wales; in the Crown Court in 2012, remorse was the most frequently applied 
PMF across eight out of the ten offence categories reported (and second-most frequent in the 
other two), applied in 31% of cases overall (Sentencing Council, 2013a).  Shapland (1981) 
found that apology and/or other factors relating to remorse (e.g., realising one’s actions were 
wrong, accepting responsibility for the offence, and appreciating the impact on the victim) 
were mentioned 63 times in 126 pleas in mitigation across Crown and magistrates’ courts. 
Jacobson and Hough (2007) found that remorse was the seventh-equal most mentioned PMF 
across 132 Crown Court sentencing cases (nine mentions) and third-equal most mentioned in 
40 sentencer interviews (13 mentions). In the Crown Court in 2014, domestic burglary cases 
involving remorse were associated with a custody rate of 59% (compared to the average of 
77%) and an average custodial sentence length of three years (compared to the average of 3 
years, one month – Sentencing Council, 2015a).  
The 40 sentencers interviewed by Jacobson and Hough (2007) rated remorse fourth 
most important out of 13 PMFs tested. Maslen (2015a) found that remorseful assault 
offenders were exactly half as likely to go to prison as those who did not express remorse, 
while Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) found that sentencers choosing between a community 
sentence and a prison sentence for a case of domestic burglary were 1.32 times more likely to 
choose a community sentence for a remorseful offender. Conversely, Speed and Burrows’ 
(2006) multivariate analysis of CPS data on theft from shops found no significant relationship 
between remorse and the type of sentence received. Rachlinski, Guthrie and Wistrich (2013) 
found that a group of 34 US federal judges were unaffected by an offender’s apology, while 
the other judges tested (120 from Ohio, 81 from Canada, and 75 from an unidentified US 
jurisdiction) chose a shorter custodial sentence when the offender apologised for his actions. 
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Research suggests remorse is taken more seriously when it is demonstrated by actions 
rather than just words, such as a letter of apology to the court or efforts at reparation 
(Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010). However, some academics 
argue that remorse should not be a PMF at all. Since minimum standards of human decency 
require offenders to be contrite when they break the law, displaying that contrition should not 
result in a reduced sentence (e.g., Bagaric, 2014; Bagaric & Amarasekara, 2002; Lippke, 
2008; Tudor, 2008; for a full discussion of the arguments for and against remorse as a PMF, 
see Maslen, 2015b). There is also the related question of whether absence of remorse (or 
positive “defiance”) should be an aggravating factor, as is already the case in some 
jurisdictions (e.g., Delaware – see Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission, 2016). 
1.5.2.2. Addressing drug or alcohol addiction. Addressing addiction has been 
identified as an important factor, especially where property crime is committed to fund drug 
dependency. The offender must, however, show a genuine willingness to deal with his or her 
addiction, for example by participating in an appropriate rehabilitation programme (Jacobson 
& Hough, 2007; Padfield, 2011; Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010; Shapland, 2011). 
Shapland (1981) found that factors related to addressing drug or alcohol addiction were 
mentioned 17 times in 126 pleas in mitigation across Crown and magistrates’ courts. In the 
Crown Court in 2012, addressing addiction was ranked amongst the five most common 
mitigating factors cited for three out of ten offence categories (burglary, drug offences, and 
arson and criminal damage) and was mentioned, on average, in 12% of cases across those 
categories (Sentencing Council, 2013a). Jacobson and Hough (2007) found that addressing 
addiction was the second-equal most mentioned PMF across 132 Crown Court sentencing 
cases (19 mentions) and the second most mentioned in 40 sentencer interviews (15 mentions).   
In the Crown Court in 2014, domestic burglary cases involving addressing addiction 
were associated with a custody rate of 47% (compared to the average of 77%) and an average 
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custodial sentence length of two years, ten months (compared to the average of three years, 
one month – Sentencing Council, 2015a). However, Speed and Burrows’ (2006) multivariate 
analysis of CPS data on theft from shops found no significant relationship between 
addressing addiction and the type of sentence received. Jacobson and Hough (2007) did not 
gather any data on the relative importance to sentencers of addressing addiction, as it was not 
one of the 13 PMFs included in their sentencing scenarios.  
Finally, there is some suggestion in the current England and Wales sentencing 
guidelines that the mitigating effect of addressing addiction should be limited to less serious 
offences. The burglary guideline (Sentencing Council, 2011b, p. 8) includes a comment that 
for addicts with “sufficient prospect of success, a community order with a drug rehabilitation 
requirement may be a proper alternative to a short or moderate custodial sentence” (italics 
added).   
1.5.2.3. Good character. Good character is a very long-established mitigating factor 
in England and Wales (Crackanthorpe, 1902; Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 2016). Shapland 
(1981) found 64 mentions of factors relating to positive good character (i.e., separate from 
lack of previous convictions) across 126 pleas in mitigation. In the Crown Court in 2012, 
good character or “offence out of character”6 was ranked amongst the five most common 
mitigating factors cited for eight out of ten offence categories and was mentioned, on average, 
in 20% of cases across those categories (Sentencing Council, 2013a). Jacobson and Hough 
(2007) found that good character was the PMF most frequently mentioned by sentencers 
across 132 Crown Court cases (21 mentions) and fifth most mentioned in 40 sentencer 
interviews (11 mentions).  In the Crown Court in 2014, domestic burglary cases involving 
                                                          
6 The Sentencing Council’s data were collected using the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS). The CCSS 
used forms for each offence category that reflected the sentencing guidelines for that category. In 2012, only 
three offence categories had guidelines that included a specific mitigating factor of “good character/exemplary 
conduct”: assault, burglary and drug offences. 
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good character were associated with a custody rate of 27% (compared to the average of 77%) 
and an average custodial sentence length of two years (compared to the average of 3 years, 
one month) (Sentencing Council, 2015a). The closest PMF to good character tested by 
Jacobson and Hough (2007) was “respected individual”. The 40 sentencers interviewed rated 
“respected individual” ninth most important out of 13 PMFs tested. 
Despite its common usage and apparent impact on sentence outcomes, good character 
is an “elusive and psychologically problematic” PMF (Freckelton, 2001, p.208). In the first 
place, it is not properly defined anywhere; Roberts (2008) notes that it is particularly in need 
of guidance, as it is unclear what sort of good behaviour should properly be taken into 
consideration, and to what extent. Roberts has a point: the terminology used to describe good 
character in England and Wales is at best unclear and at worst misleading. Current 
Sentencing Practice (Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 2016), the standard practitioner textbook 
on sentencing, uses “previous good character” to mean a lack of previous convictions. A 
survey of 100 transcripts of Crown Court judges’ sentencing reasons that mention good 
character (Belton, 2017) found that judges also tend to use “previous good character”, “prior 
good character” and the expression “a man of good character” to refer to someone with no 
previous convictions (70% of all references to good character in the transcripts).  
However, the Sentencing Advisory Council (2010) used the term “positive good 
character” to refer to contributions to the community such as through charitable work, and 
selfless acts of bravery or service. The PMF “good character/exemplary conduct” is listed in 
the current sentencing guidelines (e.g., Sentencing Council, 2011a, 2011b) as a separate Step 
Two PMF from “no previous convictions”.  The sexual offences guideline (Sentencing 
Council, 2013c) states explicitly that “previous good character/exemplary conduct is different 
from having no previous convictions” (without giving any further details). Meanwhile, 
Current Sentencing Practice (Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 2016) describes this kind of 
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positive behaviour as “meritorious conduct wholly unrelated to the case”. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, judges appear confused. The Sentencing Council’s research into sentencing 
sexual offences found that some judges “felt previous good character and no previous 
convictions were interchangeable, potentially encouraging double counting” (Sentencing 
Council, 2013b, p. 11). Several of the judges interviewed in Study 2 in this thesis also 
appeared unclear about the relationship between good character in the sense of positive good 
character, and good character in the sense of no previous convictions – see Chapter 3, pp. 
145-146. 
Another issue surrounds the examples of positive good character used in the 
sentencing literature. Sentencing textbooks and articles typically focus on “meritorious 
conduct”, exceptional one-off acts such as saving a drowning child, and rarely refer to public 
service such as charitable acts (e.g., Banks & Harris, 2012; Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 
2016). Yet Study 2’s interviews with judges (see Chapter 3, pp. 145-147 below) and the 
present author’s review of judges’ sentencing reasons (Belton, 2017) suggest that the 
everyday “bread and butter” of good character is character testimonials from family, friends, 
employers, community leaders, and so on. These testimonials deal with a broad range of 
character-related issues including public service but also matters such as trustworthiness and 
reliability as a worker or partner, caring responsibilities, and status within the community. 
There is no discussion anywhere in the published literature or reported cases about the level 
of influence that this kind of everyday good character evidence has, or ought to have, on 
sentencing judgments. 
Finally, many sentencing commentators have criticised mitigation based on good 
character as “social accounting” (Ashworth, 2010, 2015; Von Hirsch, 2011), “character 
retributivism” (Murphy, 2006), or “intrusive moral policing” (Maslen & Roberts, 2013), 
which they argue should have no place in sentencing since it undermines the fundamental 
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principle of proportionality. In England and Wales, the sentencing guideline for sexual 
offences downplays the importance of good character as a PMF, stating that “[t]he more 
serious the offence, the less the weight which should normally be attributed to this factor” 
(Sentencing Council, 2013c, p. 11).  In addition, for certain serious sexual offences including 
rape, the guideline specifies that “previous good character/ exemplary conduct should not 
normally be given any significant weight and will not normally justify a reduction” 
(Sentencing Council, 2013c, p. 11). 
1.5.3. Research on Public Judgments about PMFs 
Previous research suggests that the public in England and Wales may not prioritise the 
same PMFs as those emphasised by sentencers. Russell and Morgan (2001) explored public 
opinion of sentencing for domestic burglary using face-to-face interviews with 795 members 
of the public, 12 follow-up interviews, and two group discussions.  The mitigating factors 
most often mentioned without prompting were all PMFs: first offence (22% of respondents), 
mentally ill (15%), financial hardship (11%), and youth (9%).  Forty-four percent of those 
asked said there were no mitigating factors or could not think of any (versus 6% who could 
not think of any aggravating factors). When prompted with 11 mitigating factors, mentally ill 
was the PMF rated most important by the most respondents (44%), followed by previous 
good character (19%), young person playing a minor role (8%) and financial hardship (4%). 
Results for the other factors are not given. The mitigating factors most likely to be judged 
irrelevant were drunk/high at the time of the offence (40%), trying to support drug/alcohol 
dependency (40%), and female (20% - it is interesting that 80% considered this relevant, 
given that it is an extra-legal factor).  The authors also asked respondents to choose a 
sentence for three scenarios involving combinations of aggravating and mitigating factors. 
However, the factors were not arranged orthogonally across the scenarios and so no valid 
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conclusions can be drawn about the independent effect of any mitigating factors or about 
interactions between factors. 
Clarke, Moran-Ellis and Sleney’s (2002) study of public attitudes to rape involved 
qualitative analysis of 28 focus group discussions (5-9 people per group) and 62 face-to-face 
individual interviews  with 37 members of the public and 25 rape survivors. “Very few” 
respondents felt that any factors should mitigate rape (Clarke et al., 2002, p. 55). The 
principle of reducing sentence for a guilty plea was acknowledged, but there was a strong 
view that it was counter-productive since it gave offenders an opportunity to “play the system” 
(Clarke et al., 2002, p. 56). The only other mitigating factors mentioned were mental illness 
and learning disability.  
Hough, Roberts, Jacobson, Bredee and Moon (2008) examined public attitudes to 
sentencing for causing death by driving. The authors carried out 12 focus groups with a total 
of 101 participants, 11 interviews with victims’ relatives, and a survey of 1,031 people. Each 
survey participant read 10 scenarios of causing death by driving with different combinations 
of aggravating and mitigating factors present and was asked to choose an appropriate 
sentence (in months). Participants were also asked to identify which of a list of 10 mitigating 
factors (seven of which were PMFs) should reduce a sentence.  
Survey data was first analysed using conjoint analysis7 in order to test the relative 
influence of 10 aggravating and six mitigating factors on survey respondents’ choice of 
custodial sentence length. Four of the six mitigating factors were PMFs: offender helped 
victim and called emergency services, remorse, experienced driver, and inexperienced driver. 
The other two mitigating factors tested were offender badly injured in the crash and victim’s 
                                                          
7 Conjoint analysis is a statistical technique commonly used in marketing research to examine consumer 
preferences for a product or service with different combinations of attributes/features. Each participant is only 
shown a few of the possible combinations of items, and different combinations are shown to different 
participants, varied systematically across the sample. The relative effect of each attribute/feature on participants’ 
preferences is then estimated statistically. 
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parents asked court for leniency. Overall, the aggravating factors had a greater impact (a 
mean difference of +5.4 months) than the mitigating factors (a mean difference of -1.8 
months). The three mitigating factors that reduced participants’ choice of sentence length by 
the greatest amount were offender helped victim and called emergency services (- 4 months), 
remorse (-3 months), and inexperienced driver (-2 months).   
Hough et al. (2008) state that they also asked participants directly about which factors 
should reduce a sentence “in order to see whether this alternate methodology would yield 
very different results” (p. 38). However, all of the mitigating factors used in the self-report 
study were different from those used in the conjoint analysis – precluding any meaningful 
comparison between the two studies. In the self-reports, the three most commonly chosen 
PMFs were no previous driving convictions (37%), previous good character (35%8), and sole 
carer for others (31%). 16% of participants thought none of the factors should mitigate the 
offence.  
Qualitative analysis of data from the focus groups revealed that participants gave little 
weight to any mitigation for causing death by driving. Remorse, in particular, was viewed as 
unimportant because it is a reaction that the offender ought to have in any case, and there was 
scepticism about the sincerity of remorse expressed in court. The 11 relatives interviewed 
were particularly sceptical about remorse – several saying that offenders “pretended” in order 
to get a reduced sentence – and objected to mitigation in general on the grounds that factors 
such as youth or a guilty plea did not alter the seriousness of what the offender had done. 
Hough, Roberts, Jacobson, Steele and Moon’s (2009) research is the only study to 
date that has focused exclusively on the role of PMFs in sentencing. The study surveyed 
                                                          
8 This was included as a separate mitigating factor from no previous convictions, even though Hough et al. 
define good character as “an offender with no previous misconduct” (Hough et al., 2008, p. 45), i.e., equivalent 
to no previous convictions. As discussed at pp. 48-50, this is typical of the confusion that surrounds the meaning 
of good character as a PMF.  
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1,023 members of the public and held eight focus groups, involving a total of 69 people. 
Survey respondents were asked to rate the importance of 13 mitigating factors, namely crime 
committed in an emergency, no prior convictions, minor role in the crime, remorse, assisting 
police, medical condition, led on by others, treated for depression, elderly, abused as a child, 
main carer of elderly relative, single parent, and youth.  Of those, 11 were PMFs but two of 
them (crime committed in an emergency and minor role in crime) relate to the characteristics 
of the offence rather than the offender.  Hough et al. found that the three PMFs rated as most 
important (out of 11) were no prior convictions, remorse, and assisting the police/authorities 
(the findings are also reported in Roberts, Hough, Jacobson, & Moon, 2009, Roberts & 
Hough, 2011, and Roberts & Hough, 2014).  
 Hough et al. (2009) also carried out a conjoint analysis to estimate the influence of 
various aggravating factors and PMFs on people’s choice of custody or not. Each participant 
was asked to choose a sentence for two versions of two hypothetical property offences and 
two versions of two violent offences (eight scenarios in total). The presence of six PMFs was 
varied across the scenarios, with different participants seeing different PMF combinations9. 
Unfortunately, the authors used a different set of aggravating factors and PMFs for the 
property offences and the violent offences, so comparison across offence types was not 
possible. For the property offences, reparation was the PMF that had the strongest mitigating 
effect, followed by addressing drug addiction, being in debt, a history of abuse, and then 
family pressure. For the violent offences, the PMFs remorse, mental illness, and the risk of 
losing a job all had the same effect, and they were all more influential than a history of abuse. 
Hough and colleagues (2009) also used their conjoint analysis to test for interactions between 
PMFs and aggravating factors, i.e., whether the effect of one PMF or aggravating factor was 
influenced by the presence of another PMF or aggravating factor. The authors found no 
                                                          
9 For a description of conjoint analysis, see footnote 7 above. 
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interactions between factors. They concluded that “the public have a simpler model of 
sentencing [than sentencers], one which does not necessarily consider Factor X in light of 
Factor Y” (Hough et al., 2009, p. 49).  
 Lastly, Hough et al. carried out a qualitative analysis of the focus group data. 
Participants were asked to choose a sentence for an offender in two vignettes, a burglary and 
an assault. They were then asked to comment on the relevance of a set of 13 mitigating 
factors (all of them PMFs): single parent, voluntarily paid compensation, ‘genuine’ remorse, 
treated for depression, employed/will lose job, learning disabilities, under pressure from 
uncle, in drug treatment, youth, severely abused as a child, elderly, chronic physical illness, 
and in considerable debt. Why a slightly different set of mitigating factors and some different 
wording were used for the focus groups than for the survey is not stated, but it is unhelpful 
for making comparisons between the two elements of the study. The focus group analysis 
was collated across the two vignettes and the 13 PMFs were grouped into four factors given 
“high” significance by participants (single parent, treated for depression, youth), four given 
“moderate” significance (genuine remorse, under pressure from uncle, in drug treatment, and 
abused as a child), and five given “low” significance (elderly, chronic physical illness, 
employed/will lose job, in debt, and voluntarily paid compensation). Remorse and continuing 
drug treatment were both given “moderate” significance. In addition, the focus groups 
revealed that while all participants believed that at least some of the PMFs should have an 
impact on sentencing, there was wide variation in how participants perceived the PMFs.   
Hough et al.’s (2009) study was ground-breaking research but did have several 
limitations. These are discussed in detail below given the study’s exclusive emphasis on 
PMFs in sentencing. First, the authors did not report any tests of statistical significance or any 
other way of assessing whether the results are generalizable to the wider population (e.g., 
confidence intervals). Second, the conjoint analysis used different PMFs across the two 
56 
 
offence types. Third, the authors did not provide sufficient information about the conjoint 
analysis to properly evaluate its design. In particular, it is difficult to see given the small 
number of PMF and/or aggravating factor combinations shown to each participant (eight out 
of a possible 256) how interactions between sentencing factors could be estimated reliably10.  
Fourth, the study did not provide any useful comparative evidence on the character-
based PMFs that are the subject of the present study. Remorse was found to be a substantial 
PMF in all three elements of Hough et al.’s study (the survey, the focus groups, and the 
conjoint analysis). However, addressing addiction was only included in the focus groups, 
where it was put in the “medium” category along with remorse, and in the conjoint analysis, 
where it was tested in relation to property offences, while remorse was tested in relation to 
violent offences. Good character was not included in the study at all. Therefore, no 
comparison between the character-based PMFs is possible based on Hough et al.’s findings. 
The omission of good character is perhaps surprising given it has been identified as a 
particularly ill-defined and problematic PMF (e.g., Maslen & Roberts, 2013; Murphy, 2006; 
Roberts, 2008). Finally, the criteria for including PMFs and aggravating factors was not 
specified and two of the three most commonly occurring aggravating factors, namely 
previous convictions and under the influence (based on Sentencing Council, 2014), were also 
excluded from the study. 
McNaughton Nicholls, Mitchell, Simpson, Webster and Hester (2012) explored 
people’s views on aggravating and mitigating factors in the context of sexual offences 
through qualitative analysis of 12 focus groups with 82 members of the public and interviews 
with 46 sexual offence victims. Focus group participants and victim/survivors were generally 
                                                          
10 Fractional factorial designs that use only a small fraction of the full factorial design (i.e., every combination of 
every variable) do not have the power to estimate interactions between variables. It is not clear from Hough et 
al.’s paper how many combinations of factors were used across all participants, since they state that each 
participant was shown a different eight combinations of variables. It is therefore unclear whether their design 
actually had the ability to identify interactions between variables.  
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unable or unwilling to acknowledge clear factors that would mitigate a sexual offence, even 
where PMFs were explicitly suggested to them. The only PMF participants accepted should 
definitely result in a reduced sentence was mental health issues/learning difficulties. There 
was little support for a guilty plea reduction, and young age, offender having received abuse 
(with limited exceptions), and good character were all rejected as PMFs. Overall, aggravating 
factors were viewed as more important than mitigating factors, and participants felt that no 
amount of mitigation should reduce an offender’s sentence below a specified minimum.  
In summary, past research on public attitudes to PMFs suggests that the public may 
prioritise widely varying PMFs across different offence types. There is also some evidence, 
particularly from the qualitative studies, of a lack of public enthusiasm for PMFs in general. 
However, studies to date have examined very varied combinations of PMFs, making it 
extremely hard to draw any overall conclusions. There is also evidence that different research 
methods may produce different results – for example, Hough and colleagues’ (2008, 2009) 
conjoint analyses both found that remorse had a substantial mitigating effect, while their and 
others’ qualitative findings suggest only limited support for remorse and widespread 
scepticism about the authenticity of offenders’ apologies. In addition, most of the studies 
used interviews and/or self-report surveys to gather data on sentencing judgments. This 
approach creates problems which were discussed at pp. 31-32 above.   
1.6. The Present Research 
1.6.1. Research Aims and Rationale 
The primary aim of the present research was to learn more about the role that PMFs 
play in criminal sentencing judgments. To what extent are sentencers influenced by 
considerations such as an offender making an apology, or having lived a previously virtuous, 
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constructive life? This primary aim was advanced by focusing on three centrally important 
character-based PMFs, namely, remorse, good character, and addressing addiction.  
There were also three secondary aims. The first was to examine empirically how 
sentencers use character-based PMFs in their sentencing judgments. The second was to 
explore public judgments about the role of character-based PMFs in sentencing. The third 
was to compare sentencers’ use of character-based PMFs with public judgments about those 
PMFs. Each of the four studies contained in the thesis also had a set of objectives, which are 
listed at the beginning of the chapters dealing with those studies. 
The primary rationale for the present research was to inform the development of 
future guidance and/or other decision support for sentencers on the use of PMFs in sentencing. 
It has been argued that discretionary sentencing encourages intuitive judgment, which in turn 
leads to inconsistency, bias, and lack of transparency. The alternative is to have more 
structured sentencing that encourages or requires more analytical judgment. Critics of 
structured sentencing argue that it prevents properly individualised sentencing. However, 
recent research suggests that for most offenders, individualised sentencing may be a myth in 
any case. Consequently, structured sentencing can potentially offer reduced inconsistency and 
bias, while also producing more individualised sentences than are typically handed down in 
discretionary sentencing systems. 
In order to produce guidance regarding the use of PMFs, however, evidence is needed 
of how sentencers currently use PMFs in sentencing, including the relative importance they 
give to different factors and whether the presence of one factor affects the impact of another 
factor. Public judgments about sentencing fairness are also an important part of the 
sentencing process. Public support for sentencing is required to maintain the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system (amongst other things). Research on both sentencers’ use of PMFs 
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and public judgments about PMFs is currently sorely lacking, and as discussed above, most 
of the research to date has been limited in one way or another.  
This thesis combined statistical analysis of real-life sentencing decisions and 
experimental studies on individuals’ sentencing judgments to analyse the relative importance 
of different PMFs to sentencers and the public, and whether the co-occurrence of PMFs 
affects their impact on sentencing outcomes. Qualitative analysis of sentencers’ perceptions 
regarding PMFs was used to explore questions raised by the statistical analysis and identify 
areas where further research may be needed to understand the process of personal mitigation 
more fully. 
It is hoped that the present research findings can be used to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of current sentencing practice in relation to PMFs, including whether it is in line 
with public judgments about the proper role of PMFs in sentencing. That knowledge can, in 
turn, contribute to the development of evidence-based guidance on the use of PMFs in 
England and Wales sentencing practice, and inform sentencing in other jurisdictions. 
1.6.2. Structure of This Thesis 
The research in this thesis comprises four studies. Study 1 (Chapter 2) explored 
sentencers’ use of character-based PMFs in their judgments, using statistical analysis of 
CCSS data. Study 2 (Chapter 3) was a qualitative analysis of sentencers’ perceptions about 
PMFs, designed to explore the findings of Study 1 further and generate ideas for further 
research. Study 3 (Chapter 4) used an experimental design to measure public judgments about 
PMFs in sentencing.  Study 4 (Chapter 5) used an idiographic experimental design to 
examine public judgments about PMFs in more detail, in particular to explore the variation 
between individuals’ judgments. The methodological and practical implications of the present 
research findings are discussed in Chapter 6, along with proposals for future research. 
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2. Study 1 
 
Personal mitigation in practice: An analysis of data from the Crown Court 
Sentencing Survey 
2.1. Introduction  
It was argued in Chapter 1 that guidelines and/or a more structured approach to personal 
mitigation are needed in order to improve sentencing consistency and transparency, while 
reducing the likelihood of bias. It was proposed that guidelines need not prevent 
individualised sentencing and could, in fact, produce a more individualised approach to 
personal mitigation than that generated by the current discretionary regime. Developing 
guidelines requires empirical data on sentencers’ use of PMFs in sentencing so that policy-
makers can determine whether PMFs are being used in a way that is consistent with current 
sentencing principles and policy. 
Sentencing statistics suggest that the presence of PMFs reduces both the likelihood of 
an offender receiving an immediate custodial sentence and the average custodial sentence 
length (Sentencing Council, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015a). However, as the Sentencing Council 
itself acknowledges, the figures in its reports are descriptive statistics that simply report the 
percentage of cases where a particular PMF is present that result in a custodial sentence, and 
the length of that sentence. They do not account for the fact that PMFs’ effects may in part be 
the product of their co-occurrence with other PMFs and/or AFs, and so they are potentially 
misleading. 
There has been very little past empirical research on sentencers’ use of PMFs. The 
research to date is reviewed in detail in Chapter 1, pp. 38-50. As discussed in Chapter 1, most 
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studies to date (e.g., Gelsthorpe & Loucks, 1997; Hough et al., 2003; Jacobson & Hough, 
2007; Shapland, 1981) have been methodologically limited in their ability to reach any firm 
conclusions about relationships between PMFs and sentencing outcomes. Specific findings in 
relation to the three character-based PMFs that are the focus of this thesis (remorse, good 
character, and addressing addiction) are summarised in Chapter 1, pp. 45-50.  
2.1.1. The Crown Court Sentencing Survey 
The Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS) was designed by the Sentencing 
Council to obtain data on the factors used by the court when deciding a sentence. The CCSS 
started in October 2010 and ran until March 2015. It used brief forms to collect information 
from judges on cases sentenced in the Crown Court in England and Wales. A different CCSS 
form was produced for each of several offence categories. In some cases, the category 
covered by the form was equivalent to the group of offences covered by a particular guideline, 
but this was not always the case. For example, the burglary form was used for aggravated 
burglary, domestic burglary, and non-domestic burglary. These are the three offences 
included in the burglary guideline (Sentencing Council, 2011b). However, the assault and 
public order form covered all of the assault offences included in the assault guideline 
(Sentencing Council, 2011a) and also public order offences such as harassment and affray, 
for which there are currently no guidelines.  
Copies of the CCSS forms for assault and public order offences and burglary offences 
are in Appendix 3. The categories of offence covered by the CCSS forms issued to the courts 
were as follows: arson and criminal damage, assault and public order, burglary, driving 
offences, drug offences, offences causing death, robbery and assault with intent to rob, sexual 
offences (except indecent photographs of children), indecent photographs of children, 
theft/dishonesty/fraud, and other offences.  
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 The CCSS form for each category of offence contains a list of mitigating and 
aggravating factors taken from the sentencing guideline relevant to that offence category (see 
Appendix 3).  After sentencing a case, judges used the appropriate form to record which of 
the sentencing factors specified in the relevant guideline were taken into account in 
determining the offender’s sentence.  
The CCSS has some limitations. First, its completion was not mandatory and the 
average response rate was approximately 60%. Therefore, the CCSS data may only reflect the 
behaviour of judges who, for example, had a relatively positive view of the Sentencing 
Council and the sentencing guidelines, or simply had lighter caseloads and therefore time to 
complete the forms.  
Second, fewer than 10 percent of the sentences in England and Wales each year are 
passed in the Crown Court; the remainder are made in magistrates’ courts. This means the 
picture of sentencing provided by the CCSS is only generalizable to the Crown Court, 
although these do deal with the more serious and complex cases. Unfortunately there are 
currently no sentencing data available for magistrates’ courts of the kind found in the CCSS.  
Third, the lists of mitigating and aggravating factors set out in the guidelines (and 
hence forms) are non-exhaustive: the court can in theory take account of any other factors it 
considers relevant to a given case and, if it does so, they will not be recorded in the CCSS 
form. There is currently no way of knowing how often factors other than those specified in 
the guidelines are used by judges in practice, and no past research has explored this issue. 
Despite these limitations, CCSS has nevertheless generated huge and detailed datasets of real 
sentencing cases that enable useful in-depth analysis of Crown Court sentencing practice. 
2.1.2. Past Research on Mitigating Factors using CCSS Data 
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 The Sentencing Council produced annual sentencing reports based on CCSS data for 
the years 2011-2014 (Sentencing Council, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015a). The reports for 2013 
and 2014 included breakdowns of custody rate and average custodial sentence length 
associated with the seven most commonly occurring mitigating factors in cases of domestic 
burglary (Sentencing Council, 2014, 2015a). The results are set out in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 
Custody rates and average custodial sentence length associated with each mitigating factor 
occurring in more than 2% of cases of domestic burglary in England and Wales in 2013 and 
2014. 
 2013  2014 
 
PMF 
Prevalence 
(%) 
Custody 
rate (%)* 
ACSL** 
(Months) 
 Prevalence 
(%) 
Custody rate 
(%)* 
 
ACSL** 
(Months) 
Good character 4 32 25  3 27 24 
No previous 
convictions 
9 38 23  8 31 27 
Subordinate in group N/A N/A N/A  5 40 30 
Mental disorder 2 45 28  2 41 33 
Addressing addiction 9 47 35  9 47 34 
Age/lack of maturity 8 55 28  7 51 28 
Remorse 22 60 34  21 59 30 
*The overall custody rate in both 2013 and 2014 was 77%. 
**Average Custodial Sentence Length. The ACSL in 2013 was 36 months; in 2014 it was 37 months.  
Table 2.1 suggests that good character has the greatest mitigating effect of any PMF 
on custody rate in both 2013 and 2014 and on custodial sentence length in 2014 (second in 
2013), while remorse has the least effect. However, the Sentencing Council statistics are 
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purely descriptive, and do not allow for possible correlations and/or interactions between 
multiple mitigating and aggravating factors.  In practice, mitigating factors frequently co-
occur with other mitigating factors (in 2014, 34% of Crown Court cases involved two or 
more mitigating factors – Sentencing Council, 2015a) and it is likely that they also co-occur 
frequently with aggravating factors. In order to address these limitations, the following 
studies all used some form of multivariate statistical analysis to take account of inter-
correlations and interactions between factors. 
Pina-Sánchez and Linacre (2013) used regression modelling to examine whether the 
use of various mitigating and aggravating factors specified in the sentencing guidelines for 
assault varied between Crown Court centres.  Pina-Sánchez and Linacre’s study used a 
sample of 5,527 cases of Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) and 
GBH with intent from the 2011 CCSS dataset. New sentencing guidelines for assault were 
introduced during 2011. (The changes made to the assault guidelines in 2011 are explained 
further below). As a result of inconsistencies between the old and new guidelines, Pina-
Sánchez and Linacre only included three out of 17 possible mitigating factors in their 
regression model (although all were PMFS: remorse, primary/sole carer, and no previous 
convictions).  Six aggravating factors were also included, out of a possible 31 (i.e., previous 
convictions, gang membership, vulnerable victim, victim was a public worker, offender was 
under the influence of alcohol/drugs, and sustained assault). A preliminary regression 
analysis found that all of the mitigating and aggravating factors tested significantly predicted 
custodial sentence length in the expected direction. The three mitigating factors were 
associated with a reduced sentence length and with two exceptions (gang membership and 
public worker victim) the aggravating factors were associated with an increased sentence 
length. Gang membership was non-significant and public worker victim actually had a 
mitigating effect.  
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 Unfortunately, Pina-Sánchez and Linacre’s focus was on assessing whether factors 
were used consistently across different courts, rather than on the weight given to one factor or 
another. Their findings about the relative strength of the mitigating and aggravating factors 
tested are substantially limited by their failure to control for all the other mitigating and 
aggravating factors that can be present in assault cases alongside the chosen factors. Pina-
Sánchez and Linacre also did not examine any interactions between factors.  
 Maslen (2015a) used 5,405 cases from the 2011 CCSS data of offenders sentenced for 
an assault offence to explore the effects of remorse and previous convictions on sentence 
outcomes. Maslen conducted a binary logistic regression analysis with the following 
predictor variables: remorse, number of previous convictions, number of other aggravating 
factors (excluding previous convictions) and number of other mitigating factors (excluding 
remorse).  In other words, Maslen did not control fully for the individual effects on sentence 
outcomes of mitigating and aggravating factors other than remorse and previous convictions. 
The outcome variable was whether an offender received a custodial or non-custodial sentence. 
Maslen found that both remorse and previous convictions were significant predictors. 
Remorse had an odds ratio of 0.50 (i.e., remorseful offenders were half as likely to go to 
prison), and previous convictions had an odds ratio of 1.24 (i.e., offenders with previous 
convictions were 1.24 times more likely to go to prison). Seriousness (odds ratio 1.79), 
number of aggravating factors (1.43), and number of mitigating factors (0.62) were also 
significant predictors of custodial sentence choice.  
 Maslen also explored whether there were any two-way interactions between remorse, 
previous convictions, and/or offence serious. There was no significant interaction between 
remorse and previous convictions but there were significant interactions between remorse and 
offence seriousness, and previous convictions and offence seriousness. As offence 
seriousness increased, the impact of both remorse and previous convictions on custodial 
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sentence likelihood gradually decreased to zero. Maslen’s findings would be more persuasive 
if she had controlled separately for the effects of more sentencing factors. 
 Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) explored the impact of mitigating and aggravating 
factors on sentence outcomes using a sample of 4,645 cases of domestic burglary from the 
2012 CCSS dataset. The authors carried out separate bivariate analyses for each of the 18 
mitigating factors and 23 aggravating factors specified in the burglary guidelines followed by 
an ordinal logistic regression with all 41 factors as predictor variables. No attempt was made 
to control for offence seriousness. The outcome variable was sentence type/length, split into 
five categories. The original eleven categories of custodial sentence length recorded in the 
CCSS were collapsed to four in order to make the results of the ordinal logistic regression 
easier to interpret. In addition, non-custodial sentence was included as a category along with 
the custodial sentence length categories. This is a questionable approach to take because the 
decision whether to imprison is quite distinct from the choice of custodial sentence length, 
rather than being one point along some kind of ordinal scale from a fine to several years in 
prison. 
 Irwin-Rogers and Perry’s regression model found that 30 factors (15 mitigating and 
15 aggravating factors) significantly predicted sentence category. The study discussed the 
results for certain mitigating and aggravating factors but did not have any particular focus, 
and more emphasis was placed on descriptive statistics than the logistic regression results. 
The main aim appears to have been to illustrate the kind of information available in the CCSS 
data. Findings included that offence committed on impulse had a stronger mitigating effect on 
sentence category (odds ratio = 0.47) than remorse (0.76) or subordinate role in a group 
(0.57). Under the influence of alcohol/drugs – listed in the guidelines as an aggravating factor 
– was actually found to have a (statistically non-significant) mitigating effect (an odds ratio 
of 0.94), which the authors suggested may be because it is sometimes treated as a mitigating 
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factor.  In addition to their failure to control for offence seriousness and lack of analytic focus 
as regards the mitigating and aggravating factors they chose to report in detail, Irwin-Rogers 
and Perry did not examine interactions between sentencing factors, and their study was 
limited to domestic burglary cases. 
 In summary, the studies based on statistical analysis of CCSS data have provided 
some insight into the relationships between PMFs and sentence outcomes. However, each of 
the studies above suffered from one or more limitations. All three studies were limited to a 
single offence category (or in the case of Irwin-Rogers and Perry, 2015, a single offence) – 
preventing any comparison of mitigating and aggravating factor use between offences.  None 
of the studies included all three character-based PMFs. In addition, all three studies used 
CCSS data from only one year, whereas four years of data is now available. Pina-Sánchez 
and Linacre (2013) and Maslen (2015a) included only a small number of factors in their 
models, while Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) did not control for offence seriousness, and did 
not discuss findings for any PMFs other than remorse. Finally, only Maslen (2015a) 
investigated any interactions between factors. 
2.1.3. Focus of the Present Study 
The present study used data from the CCSS to investigate the role of PMFs in Crown 
Court sentencing judgments, and in particular the weight sentencers give to remorse, good 
character, and addressing addiction. In doing so, it also aimed to overcome the limitations of 
past CCSS research. First, the present study included all relevant PMFs and AFs in its 
analysis, while also controlling for offence seriousness. Second, it compared two offence 
types, assault and burglary (including non-domestic burglary, which has not been studied 
before). Third, it examined theoretically interesting interactions between PMFs. The present 
study also incorporated data from more than one year (i.e., 2011, 2012, and 2013). Using data 
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from multiple years gives a fuller overall picture of current sentencing practice than can be 
obtained from one year’s data alone, since sentencing practice may vary from one year to 
another. 
 The primary focus of the present study was on sentencing factors that are included at 
step two of the new (post-2011) England and Wales sentencing guidelines (see e.g. 
Sentencing Council, 2011a, 2011b). Steps one and two of the guidelines sentencing process 
are illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. Step one factors are used to determine the seriousness of 
the offence on a scale of 1-3, with 1 being most serious. The seriousness score, in turn, 
determines the sentence starting point and range. Step two factors are then taken into account 
when deciding where the final sentence should fall within the chosen range. There are several 
further steps after step two that deal with issues such as guilty pleas and sentencing of 
multiple offences but they are excluded from Figure 2.1, for clarity. A more comprehensive 
flowchart of the whole sentencing process can be found in Dhami (2013b). Almost all PMFs 
are listed in the guidelines as step two factors11. The decision to focus on step two factors 
therefore reflects the primary aim of the study which is to learn more about the role of PMFs 
in real world sentencing decisions.  
                                                          
11 The sole exception is “mental disorder or learning disability, where linked to the commission of the offence”, 
which is listed under “factors indicating lower culpability” in step one. 
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Figure 2.1. Flow diagram of steps one and two of the sentencing process required by the new 
(post-2011) England and Wales sentencing guidelines. 
 In order to analyse the distribution of step two MFs and AFs within the CCSS data, 
two contrasting, very commonly occurring offence categories were examined, namely assault 
and burglary. In the remainder of this chapter, the terms “assault” and “burglary” are used to 
refer to the category of assault offences, and the category of burglary offences, respectively. 
Both offence categories have new sentencing guidelines that were introduced at 
approximately the same time12. Both offence categories have been studied individually in 
previous research using the CCSS data, but no research has ever compared the two directly. 
Offenders guilty of assault or burglary can receive a wide range of sentences encompassing 
everything from fines and/or community penalties through to substantial time in prison. 
Approximately 53% of assault offenders and 75% of burglars receive an immediate custodial 
sentence (based on the datasets analysed in this study), and many of those who do not will be 
close to the margin, as only relatively serious assaults or burglaries are sentenced in the 
Crown Court. This makes assault and burglary interesting offence categories from the point 
                                                          
12 The new assault guideline came into force on 13 June, 2011; the new burglary guideline came into force on 16 
January, 2012. 
Factors indicating 
greater or lesser 
harm 
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higher or lower 
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Final 
sentence 
Step One Step Two 
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of view of personal mitigation, given that personal mitigation is often seen as being 
particularly important for determining whether an offender goes to prison or not. 
2.2. Aims and Objectives 
 The main aim of this study was to investigate the role of PMFs in sentencing practice. 
The objectives were: 
1. To examine how PMFs co-occur with other MFs and with AFs in Crown Court 
sentencing cases. 
2. To explore the relationships between PMFs and Crown Court sentencing outcomes. 
3. To examine the strength of the relationships between the three character-based PMFs 
and sentence outcomes, relative to other PMFs and to each other. 
4. To investigate whether the relationships between character-based PMFs and sentence 
outcomes vary across different types of offence (assault versus burglary). 
5. To explore whether character-based PMFs interact with one another, i.e., whether the 
presence of one affects the impact of another and, if so, how. 
 
2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Design of the CCSS Datasets 
 The Sentencing Council has published the CCSS data as a series of Microsoft Excel 
data files, separated by offence category and year (Sentencing Council, 2015c). Table 2.1 
presents a breakdown of cases contained in the CCSS datasets. In addition, the 2011 and 
2012 files for assault and burglary offences are further subdivided to reflect changes to forms 
that took place during that period. New forms for assault and burglary offences were 
introduced in June 2011 and January 2012 respectively, in order to reflect the introduction of 
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new guidelines (see Appendix 3 for copies of the assault and burglary forms). In Table 2.1, 
data from these forms are headed “New forms (1)”.  In April 2012, new forms were 
introduced for all offences (including assault and burglary). Data from these forms are headed 
“New forms (2)”. The April 2012 forms had an improved layout but did not ask any new 
questions (although certain question responses were amended). For further notes on the 
structure of the datasets, see Appendix 4 to this thesis.  
Table 2.2 
Number of cases contained in the CCSS datasets, by offence category and year 
Offence 
category 
(CCSS form) 
Number of cases 
2011  2012  
2013 Old 
forms 
New 
forms(1)  
Old 
forms 
New 
forms(1) 
New 
forms(2)   
Arson & 
criminal 
damage 
896 -  191 - 649  814 
Assault & 
public order 9,081 5,420  181 3,094 8,553  11,510 
Burglary 6,679 -  967 656 4,943  6,753 
Offences 
causing death 620 -  150 - 687  710 
Driving 
offences 1,991 -  495 - 1,318  1,886 
Drug 
offences  9,000 -  2,426 - 6,364  9,373 
Robbery & 
assault with 
intent to rob 
3,425 -  924 - 2,212  2,985 
Sexual 
offences 3,553 -  957 - 1,906  3,875 
Theft, 
Dishonesty, 
Fraud 
8,880 -  2,296 - 6,093  8,293 
Other 
offences 4,504 -  990 - 3,017  4,545 
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DATABASE 
TOTAL 
 
48,629 
 
5,420 
 
 
9,577 
 
3,750 
 
35,742 
 
 
50,744 
No form 
returned* -   9,692 26,213  33,744 
Wrong form 
used** 2,438   820  170  - 
* This indicates that a CCSS form was not completed. 
** This indicates that the wrong CCSS form was filled out, and so the data from that form could not be used. 
  
2.3.1.1. Offences. Specific offences within each category are recorded in the CCSS 
datasets. Burglary includes aggravated burglary, domestic burglary, non-domestic burglary, 
and other burglary. Assault includes common assault, assault on a police constable, assault 
with intent to resist arrest, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH), inflicting grievous 
bodily harm (GBH), and GBH with intent.  
Sentence type 
• Discharge 
• Fine 
• Community order 
• Suspended sentence order 
• Immediate custody (length given in categories e.g.  >3 months to 6 months) 
• Other 
 
2.3.1.2. Aggravating factors (AFs). The AFs that were present in each case are recorded 
in the CCSS datasets. The AFs included in the data are all those listed in the guideline for 
each offence. Since AFs vary to some extent depending on the offence involved, the CCSS 
data covers all possible AFs for every offence within a given category. In each guideline, AFs 
are divided into step one and step two factors (see Figure 2.1 above).  
 Step one AFs for assault are set out below. The list is stated in the guideline to be 
exhaustive. Step one AFs are divided into those indicating greater harm, and those indicating 
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higher culpability. Higher culpability factors include those specified by statute, and other 
factors. 
Greater harm AFs 
• Injury serious in the context of the offence 
• Vulnerable victim 
• Sustained/repeated assault 
Higher culpability AFs 
• Statutory factors: 
o Motivated by hostility to sexual orientation 
o Motivated by hostility to disability 
• Other factors: 
o Premeditation 
o Use of weapon/equivalent 
o Intention to commit more serious harm 
o Deliberately causes more harm 
o Vulnerable victim deliberately targeted 
o Leading role in group/gang 
o Motivated by hostility to age, sex, gender identity 
 
 Step two AFs for assault are presented in the guideline as a non-exhaustive list. They 
are divided into statutory AFs and other AFs. 
Statutory AFs 
• previous convictions (1-3, 4-9, 10+) 
• offence committed on bail 
Other AFs 
• location of offence 
• timing of offence 
• ongoing effect on victim 
• offence against public sector/service worker 
• gratuitous degradation 
• victim forced to leave home 
• failure to comply with court orders 
• office committed on licence 
• abuse of power/trust 
• exploiting contact arrangements with child 
• evidence of community impact 
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• steps taken to prevent reporting/assisting prosecution 
• Offences taken into consideration (TICs) 
 Step one AFs for burglary are set out below. As with assault, the list is stated in the 
guideline to be exhaustive. Step one AFs are divided into those indicating greater harm, and 
those indicating higher culpability.  
Greater harm AFs 
• significant degree of loss 
• soiling/ransacking/vandalism 
• victim on/returns to premises 
• significant psychological injury/trauma 
• violence used/threatened 
• Context of general public disorder 
Higher culpability AFs 
• deliberately targeted 
• Significant degree of planning 
• Equipped for burglary 
• Weapon present/carried 
• Member of group/gang 
 
 Step two AFs for burglary are presented in the guideline as a non-exhaustive list. 
They are divided into statutory AFs and other AFs. 
Statutory AFs 
• previous convictions (1-3, 4-9, 10+) 
• offence committed on bail 
Other AFs 
• child at home/returns 
• offence committed at night 
• abuse of power/trust 
• gratuitous degradation 
• prevention of reporting/assisting prosecution 
• victim compelled to leave home 
• evidence of community impact 
• under the influence of alcohol/drugs 
• failure to comply with court orders 
• on licence 
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• TICs 
 
2.3.1.3. Mitigating factors. The MFs that were present in each case are also recorded in 
the CCSS datasets. The MFs included in the data are all those listed in the guideline for each 
offence. Since MFs, like AFs, vary to some extent depending on the offence involved, the 
CCSS data covers all possible MFs for every offence within a given category. In each 
guideline, MFs are divided into step one and step two factors (see Figure 2.1 above).  
 Step one MFs for assault are set out below. The list is stated in the guideline to be 
exhaustive. Step one MFs are divided into those indicating lesser harm, and those indicating 
lower culpability.  
Lesser harm MFs 
• Injury less serious in the context of the offence 
Lower culpability MFs 
• Subordinate role in group/gang 
• Provocation 
• No premeditation 
• Mental disorder/learning disability (linked to offence) 
• Excessive self defence 
 
 Step two MFs for assault are presented in the guideline as a non-exhaustive list. They 
are divided into statutory MFs and other MFs. 
Statutory MFs 
• guilty plea (+ when entered and discount given)  
Other MFs 
• no previous relevant convictions 
• single blow 
• remorse 
• good character/exemplary conduct 
• Addressing addiction/behaviour 
• serious medical conditions 
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• isolated incident 
• age/lack of maturity affecting responsibility 
• lapse of time not fault of offender 
• mental disorder/learning disability (not linked to offence) 
• sole/primary carer 
 Step one MFs for burglary are set out below. The list is stated in the guideline to be 
exhaustive. Step one MFs are divided into those indicating lesser harm, and those indicating 
lower culpability.  
Lesser harm MFs 
• no physical psychological injury 
• no violence used/threatened 
• nothing stolen or very low value 
• limited damage/disturbance 
Lower culpability MFs 
• offender exploited by others 
• committed on impulse/limited intrusion 
• mental disorder/learning disability (linked to offence) 
 
 Step two MFs for burglary are presented in the guideline as a non-exhaustive list. 
They are divided into statutory MFs and other MFs. 
Statutory MFs 
• guilty plea (+ when entered and discount given)  
Other MFs 
• subordinate role in group/gang 
• injuries caused recklessly 
• nothing stolen/very little value 
• made voluntary reparation 
• no previous relevant convictions 
• remorse 
• good character/exemplary conduct 
• determination to address addiction/behaviour 
• serious medical conditions 
• age/lack of maturity affecting responsibility 
• lapse of time not fault of offender 
• mental disorder/learning disability (not linked to offence) 
77 
 
• sole/primary carer 
 
2.3.1.4. Other legal factors. The CCSS datasets include some other variables that are 
stated by law to be relevant to the severity of a sentence. 
• Offence seriousness (category 1, 2, or 3 – see Figure 2.1 above) 
• Guilty plea: timing and percentage reduction applied 
 
2.3.1.5. Extra-legal factors. The CCSS datasets include two variables that are “extra-
legal”, i.e., as a matter of law, they should be irrelevant to the sentencing process. 
• Age 
• Gender 
 
2.3.2. Ethical Considerations 
All of the data used in the present study are publicly available on the Sentencing 
Council website, and were downloaded from the following location: 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/analysis-and-research/crown-court-sentencing-
survey/record-level-data/. The Sentencing Council website explicitly states that these data 
“can be used for analysis” (Sentencing Council, 2018, paragraph 1) and the data user guides 
state that “The Council hope that publishing this record level data will enable others to make 
use of the data to research further on sentencing and sentencing practice” (e.g. Sentencing 
Council, 2015b, p.4). The CCSS data are fully anonymised to protect the identity of the 
individuals recorded in the data sets. Notable features to ensure anonymity include that fine 
amounts are not recorded and, for custodial sentences, sentence lengths are recorded in 12 
bands (up to 3 months, between 3 and 6 months, between 6 and 12 months, etc.) rather than 
providing exact sentence lengths. Retrospective ethical approval for the present study was 
obtained from the Middlesex University Psychology Research Ethics Committee (REF: 3517). 
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2.4. Analysis of the CCSS Data for Assault 
In order to create an assault dataset, the 2013 CCSS data were amalgamated with the 
new form 2011 assault and public order data and all of the 2012 assault and public order data. 
This produced an initial dataset of 28,577 cases. Offences for which no new sentencing 
guidelines exist were removed from the dataset (affray, cruelty/neglect of a child, harassment, 
s.4 of the Public Order Act 1986 (POA), s.4a of the POA, s.5 of the POA, violent disorder, 
and offences classed as “other assault and public order”13). Cases of assault on a police 
officer and assault with intent to resist arrest were also removed from the dataset, as there 
were too few cases to permit statistical analysis14.  
 The remaining dataset comprised 20,245 cases across the four most frequently 
occurring assault offences. The dataset included 2,703 cases of common assault; 9,699 cases 
of assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH; s.47 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 (OAPA)); 5,463 cases of inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH; s.20 OAPA); and 
2,380 cases of GBH with intent (s.18 OAPA). The dataset contained 90.6% male offenders 
and 9.4% female offenders.  
2.5. Findings for Assault 
2.5.1. Distribution of MFs and AFs in the Assault Dataset 
 The step two AFs and MFs listed in the assault guideline and therefore found in the 
assault dataset are set out in Table 2.2. These are organised by the percentage of cases in the 
dataset that include each factor. The three most frequently occurring AFs were previous 
convictions (present in 52.5% of cases), location (35.5%), and under the influence (27.6%). 
                                                          
13 These offences together comprised 7,897 cases. 
14 There were 144 cases of assault on a police officer between 2011 and 2013. There were 50 cases of assault 
with intent to resist arrest between 2011 and 2013. 
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The three most frequently occurring MFs were remorse (present in 35.7% of cases), no 
previous convictions (26.4%), and single blow (20.3%). 
Table 2.3 
Percentage (and frequency) of AFs and MFs in assault cases sentenced in the Crown Court 
Sentencing factor  % of cases 
(frequency) 
Aggravating factors   
 Previous convictions15 52.5 (9,607) 
 Location of the offence 35.5 (7,181) 
 Commission of offence whilst under the influence of alcohol 
 or drugs 
27.6 (5,595) 
 Ongoing effect upon the victim 23.0 (4,648) 
 Presence of others including relatives, especially children or 
 partner of the victim 
19.3 (3,900) 
 Timing of the offence 18.4 (3,725) 
 Failure to comply with current court orders 7.4 (1,493) 
 Previous violence or threats to the same victim 6.4 (1,296) 
 Offence committed against those working in the public 
 sector or providing a service to the public 
4.6 (940) 
 Abuse of power and/or position of trust 3.0 (612) 
 Offence committed whilst on bail 2.7 (547) 
 Offence committed whilst on licence 2.5 (507) 
 Gratuitous degradation of victim 2.2 (455) 
 In domestic violence cases, victim forced to leave their home 2.1 (426) 
 Failure to respond to warnings or concerns expressed by 
 others about the offender’s behaviour 
1.5 (313) 
 An attempt to conceal or dispose of evidence 0.9 (190) 
 Any steps taken to prevent the victim reporting an incident, 
 or obtaining assistance and/or from assisting or supporting 
 the prosecution 
0.6 (125) 
 Established evidence of community impact 0.4 (77) 
 Exploiting contact arrangements with a child to commit an 
 offence 
0.2 (40) 
                                                          
15 This is an abbreviation of “Previous convictions, having regard to a) the nature of the offence to which the 
conviction relates and its relevance to the current offence, and b) the time that has elapsed since the conviction” 
(Sentencing Council, 2011a, p. 5).  
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 Offences taken into consideration (TICs) 0.1 (14) 
Mitigating factors  
 Remorse 35.7 (7,219) 
 No previous relevant convictions or no relevant/recent 
 convictions 
26.4 (5,341) 
 Single blow 20.3 (4,107) 
 Isolated incident 16.8 (3,402) 
 Good character and/or exemplary conduct 16.7 (3,376) 
 Age and/or lack of maturity where it affects the 
 responsibility of the offender 
8.8 (1,779) 
 Determination and/or demonstration of steps taken to 
 address addiction or offending behaviour (addressing 
 addiction) 
8.3 (1,672) 
 Mental disorder/learning disability or learning disability, 
 where not linked to the commission of the offence 
3.4 (684) 
 Sole or primary carer for dependent relatives 4.1 (820) 
 Lapse of time since the offence where this is not the fault of 
 the offender 
2.7 (542) 
 Serious medical conditions requiring urgent, intensive or 
 long-term treatment 
2.6 (528) 
Note. MFs in bold are the three character-based PMFs that are the main focus of this study. Words in italics are 
the abbreviations used to refer to each AF or MF through the remainder of the assault analysis. 
 The next step in the analysis of the dataset was to identify the number of cases within 
the assault dataset that contain different frequencies of MFs or AFs. Overall, 61.6% of assault 
cases (12,477) involved one or more MFs, while 77.0% of cases (15,588) involved one or 
more AFs. The detailed breakdown of the frequency of assault cases involving one or more 
MF or AF is presented in Figure 2.2 below. 
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Figure 2.2. Frequency of assault cases involving one or more MF or AF. The grey bars 
represent cases where either no MFs or no AFs are present. 
 MFs and AFs also frequently occur together in Crown Court cases. Figure 2.3 shows 
the distribution of assault cases involving different numbers of MFs and/or AFs. Overall, 8.9% 
of cases involved no AFs or MFs. 29.5% of cases involved one or more AFs but no MFs, 
14.1% involved one or more MFs but no AF, and 47.5% involved one or more MFs and one 
or more AFs. Amongst those cases where both AFs and MFs were present, 45.4% involved 
more AFs than MFs, 32.7% involved more MFs than AFs, and 21.9% had the same number 
of AFs and MFs present.
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Figure 2.3. Number of assault cases involving different combinations of MFs and AFs, organised by MFs. The first grouping represents 0 MFs + 
0-11 AFs, in the format “MF#, AF#”; the second grouping represents 1 MF + 0-9 AFs; etc. The grey bar represents cases where no MFs or AFs 
are present. 
1799
1568
1323
1195
912
556
256
101
3914 3 2
678
1049
913
765
541
323
138
64
14 4 2
672
757
607
514
344
185
88
24 9 2 1
601
488
435
334
232
92
36
5 4
472
332
247
189
94
48
12 2
275
177
144
90
55
20 3 4
125
70473124 3 2819 5 12 5 3 2 5 3 3 0 1 2 1 2 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0,
0
0,
1
0,
2
0,
3
0,
4
0,
5
0,
6
0,
7
0,
8
0,
9
0,
10
0,
11 1,
0
1,
1
1,
2
1,
3
1,
4
1,
5
1,
6
1,
7
1,
8
1,
9
1,
10 2,
0
2,
1
2,
2
2,
3
2,
4
2,
5
2,
6
2,
7
2,
8
2,
9
2,
10 3,
0
3,
1
3,
2
3,
3
3,
4
3,
5
3,
6
3,
7
3,
8
4,
0
4,
1
4,
2
4,
3
4,
4
4,
5
4,
6
4,
7
5,
0
5,
1
5,
2
5,
3
5,
4
5,
5
5,
6
5,
7
6,
0
6,
1
6,
2
6,
3
6,
4
6,
5
7,
0
7,
1
7,
2
7,
3
7,
4
7,
5
7,
6
8,
0
8,
1
8,
2
8,
3
8,
4
9,
0
9,
1
9,
2
9,
3
Nu
m
be
r o
f a
ss
au
lt 
ca
se
s
Number of MFs present, number of AFs present
83 
 
In line with the study’s focus on PMFs that are particularly related to the evaluation of 
an offender’s character, the next set of analyses examined the distribution of remorse, good 
character, and addressing addiction in the assault dataset. First, crosstabs were used to 
examine the extent to which the three PMFs co-occur within the assault dataset. Figure 2.4 
shows that there is significant cross-over between the three PMFs: 70.2% of good character 
cases and 70.0% of addressing addiction cases also included remorse and 44.8% of remorse 
cases also included one or both of the other two PMFs. 
 
Figure 2.4. Venn diagram showing frequency of remorse, good character and addressing 
addiction across Crown Court assault cases. Circle sizes and positions are approximate only. 
 Second, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the extent to which the three PMFs co-occurred in 
the assault dataset with other MFs or with AFs. Remorse was relatively more likely to occur 
without other MFs than the other two PMFs. Both remorse and addressing addiction most 
often occurred with one or two other MFs, while good character was most likely to occur 
with two or three other MFs.  
Remorse 
7,219 
Addressing 
addiction  
1,672 
Good 
character 
3,376 
863 
307 
977 2,064 
3,985 
474 
28 
n = 20,245 
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With regard to AFs, good character was much more likely than the other PMFs to occur 
without AFs. Zero or one AFs were most likely for remorse and one or two AFs were most 
likely for addressing addiction. 
 
Figure 2.5. Co-occurrence of selected PMFs with other MFs in Crown Court assault cases.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Co-occurrence of selected PMFs with AFs in Crown Court assault cases.  
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2.5.2. Associations Between MFs and AFs and Sentencing Outcomes 
 After investigating the distribution of MFs and AFs within the assault dataset, the 
study next examined the relationship between MFs, AFs and sentencing outcomes. 
Sentencing options available for assault include custody (immediate or suspended), a 
community penalty such as unpaid work and/or drug/alcohol rehabilitation, a fine, or a 
discharge. Across the assault dataset, 52.9% of offenders received immediate custody, 30.4% 
received a suspended sentence, 13.5% received a community order, 0.8% received a fine, and 
1.4% received a discharge16. Mean sentence length cannot be calculated from the dataset 
because sentence lengths are recorded in 12 categories - up to three months; over three 
months and up to six months; over six months to less than 12; 12 months; over 12 months 
and up to 18 months; over 18 months and up to three years; over three years and less than 
four years; four years; over four years and up to five years; over five years and up to 10 years; 
over 10 years and less than life; and life or indeterminate. The three most common sentence 
lengths in the dataset were over 18 months and up to three years (23.3%), over 12 months and 
up to 18 months (18.3%), and over six months to less than 12 (14.4%). 
 The sentencing outcome chosen for the present analysis was whether or not an 
offender received an immediate custodial sentence, since research suggests that personal 
mitigation can have a particular impact on a sentencer’s decision whether to imprison or not 
(Hough, Jacobson & Millie, 2003; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Millie, Tombs & Hough, 2007; 
Sentencing Council, 2012, 2013a, 2014). This binary variable has frequently been examined 
by sentencing researchers both in the UK and elsewhere (e.g. Bond & Jeffries, 2011; 
Lightowlers & Pina-Sanchez, 2017; Maslen, 2015a; Roberts & Pina-Sanchez, 2014; 
Snowball & Weatherburn, 2007; Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, 1998; Wooldredge, 2010). 
                                                            
16 1.0% of offenders received a sentence that did not fall into any of the above categories.  
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2.5.2.1. Presence of an MF, an AF or both. The study first examined whether the 
presence of an MF or an AF predicts whether an offender will receive a custodial sentence. 
The study compared cases in the assault dataset involving only one MF, one AF, or one MF 
and one AF with cases where no MFs or AFs were present.  Figure 2.7 shows the percentage 
of immediate custody associated with each of the MF/AF combinations.  
 
Figure 2.7. Percentage of assault cases that receive an immediate custodial sentence when 
differing MF and/or AF combinations are present. 
 Loglinear analysis was used to explore the association between the presence of an MF 
and/or an AF and whether an offender received an immediate custodial sentence. The 
analysis first examined all assault offences, then the four specific offences within the assault 
dataset. A two-way loglinear analysis for MF/AF combination and sentencing outcome 
(immediate custody or not) produced a model that retained all effects. The model’s likelihood 
ratio was χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. The interaction between MF/AF combination and outcome was 
significant, χ2(3) = 283.15, p <.001. Odds ratios indicated that offenders were 1.17 times less 
likely to receive an immediate custodial sentence when one MF and no AF was present, 
compared to no MF or AF, but the difference was not statistically significant. Where one AF 
and no MF was present, offenders were 2.88 times more likely to receive immediate custody, 
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compared to no MF or AF (χ2(1) = 223.34, p <.001). When one MF and one AF were present, 
offenders were 1.4 times more likely to receive immediate custody than when no MF or AF 
was present (χ2(1) =19.09, p <.001).   
 Figure 2.8 shows the percentage of immediate custody associated with each of the 
MF/AF combinations, broken down by the four specific assault offences contained in the 
assault dataset. 
 
Figure 2.8. Percentage of cases with differing MF and/or AF combinations that receive an 
immediate custodial sentence, by specific assault offence.  
 A three-way loglinear analysis including the four specific assault offences, MF/AF 
combination and sentencing outcome (immediate custody or not) also produced a model that 
retained all effects. The likelihood ratio of this model was χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. The analysis 
indicated that the highest-order interaction (offence x MF/AF combination x outcome) was 
significant, χ2(9) = 24.01, p = .004. To break down this effect, chi-square tests for the MF/AF 
combination and outcome variables were performed separately for each offence and odds 
ratios calculated. The results are presented in Table 2.3 below. Of the four assault offences, 
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common assault is considered least serious, then Actual Bodily Harm (ABH), then Grievous 
Bodily Harm (GBH), then GBH with intent. 
 Chi-square tests showed that each offence was associated with a higher likelihood of 
immediate custody than the one immediately below it in seriousness (ABH vs. common 
assault - χ2(1) = 100.11, p <.001; GBH vs. ABH - χ2(1) = 162.35, p <.001; GBH vs. GBH 
with intent - χ2(1) = 1267.20, p <.001). For all four offences, the presence of one AF 
increased the odds of a custodial sentence compared to cases with no AF or MF. However, 
while the presence of one MF reduced the odds of a custodial sentence for common assault 
and ABH cases, for GBH and GBH with intent cases one MF did not make a significant 
difference to the odds of a custodial sentence, compared to cases with no AF or MF.  
Common assault cases involving one AF and one MF had the same odds of receiving custody 
as cases with neither factor, indicating that the AF and MF balanced each other out. For the 
other three offences, cases with both an AF and an MF were associated with higher odds of 
custody than cases with no AF or MF, suggesting that the presence of an AF tended to 
override the presence of an MF.  
Table 2.4 
χ2 and odds ratios for differing MF and AF combinations by specific assault offence 
Specific 
offence 
χ2 for 
MF/AF x 
custody or 
not 
0 MF, 1 AF vs.  
0 MF, 0 AF 
 1 MF , 0 AF vs. 
0 MF, 0 AF 
 1 MF, 1 AF vs.  
0 MF, 0 AF 
Odds 
ratio 
χ2  Odds 
ratio 
χ2  Odds 
ratio 
χ2 
Common 
assault 
64.41*** 2.84 38.12***  0.51 6.21*0  0.92 .118000 
ABH 153.65*** 2.81 102.24***  0.70 7.37**  1.30 4.81*00 
GBH 75.43*** 3.95 73.64***  1.38 2.5200  1.82 14.28**
* 
GBH with 
intent 
15.37*00       3.41 9.07**0  1.56 .8500  7.33+ 9.36**0 
Note. * p < .05 **p <.01  *** p <.001. + Expected count in one cell was < 5 (4.94) and so the odds ratio may be 
inaccurate. Cramer’s V for this comparison was .19, (on a scale from 0 to 1), suggesting a relatively small effect. 
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2.5.2.2. Independent effects of individual MFs and AFs. Descriptive statistics for 
the percentage of assault cases involving immediate custody that were associated with each 
of the step two MFs and AFs are included at Appendix 5. A binary logistic regression was 
carried out in order to examine the extent to which individual step two MFs and AFs predict 
immediate custodial sentences independent of the effects of all other step two MFs and AFs 
(and other relevant variables). The predictor variables were the step two sentencing factors 
listed in the assault guidelines (see Table 2.2 above), coded as dummy variables (i.e., 1= 
present, 0 = absent). The binary outcome variable was whether or not an offender received an 
immediate custodial sentence.  
 Crosstabs confirmed that all step two MFs and AFs were significantly correlated with 
the outcome variable and so all were included in the logistic regression model. Two other 
predictor variables were included in the regression model to control for their independent 
effects on sentence outcomes. These were: specific assault offence (a four-level categorical 
variable comprising common assault, ABH, GBH, and GBH with intent, with common 
assault being the reference category) and offence seriousness (a three-level categorical 
variable, with category 3 – the least serious category – being the reference category). Offence 
seriousness was included to capture the cumulative effect on sentence outcome of step one 
AFs and MFs.  
 The model was found to be significantly different from a constant-only model (χ2(36) 
= 9462.76, p <.001) and predicted 83.0% of immediate custody sentences and 78.2% of other 
sentences correctly, giving an overall success rate of 80.8%. Residual statistics were 
examined (including Cook’s distance, leverage, DFBetas and standardised residuals) and did 
not raise any concerns.  
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 Table 2.4 shows regression coefficients, standard errors, odds ratios, and 95% 
confidence intervals for the odds ratios for each predictor. The results for the three PMFs of 
interest (remorse, good character and addressing addiction) are marked in bold.  
Table 2.5 
Results from binary logistic regression of step two assault MFs and AFs predicting 
immediate custody 
Predictor       b Std 
error 
Exp(b) 
(Odds 
ratio) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(b) 
Lower Upper 
Constant -2.343*** 0.91 .096   
Aggravating factors      
 Previous convictions 0.800*** 0.051 2.225 2.013 2.460 
 Location 0.186** 0.054 1.204 1.083 1.339 
 Under the influence  0.237*** 0.048 1.267 1.153 1.392 
 Ongoing effect 0.585*** 0.054 1.795 1.616 1.993 
 Presence of others 0.291*** 0.056 1.338 1.199 1.494 
 Timing  0.111 0.064 1.118 .985 1.268 
 Current court orders 1.221*** 0.094 3.392 2.819 4.080 
 Previous violence 0.513*** 0.094 1.670 1.388 2.009 
 Offence against public sector 0.502*** 0.097 1.651 1.365 1.998 
 Abuse of power 0.498*** 0.127 1.646 1.283 2.111 
 On bail  1.163*** 0.152 3.199 2.375 4.308 
 On licence  1.693*** 0.184 5.436 3.793 7.789 
 Gratuitous degradation  0.676*** 0.164 1.966 1.427 2.709 
 Victim forced to leave 0.504** 0.161 1.656 1.207 2.271 
 Failure to respond to warnings 0.714*** 0.193 2.043 1.400 2.980 
 Attempt to conceal evidence 2.522*** 0.465 12.458 5.003 31.019 
 Steps taken to prevent reporting 0.356 0.347 1.428 0.724 2.819 
 Community impact  0.190 0.334 1.210 0.616 2.375 
 Exploiting contact  0.881 0.536 2.412 0.843 6.903 
 TICs  -1.281 1.507 0.278 0.014 5.325 
Mitigating factors      
 Remorse  -0.628*** 0.048 0.533 0.486 0.586 
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 No previous convictions  -0.281*** 0.061 0.755 0.670 0.850 
 Single blow -0.375*** 0.054 0.688 0.618 0.764 
 Isolated incident  -0.699*** 0.065 0.497 0.438 0.565 
 Good character -0.526*** 0.069 0.591 0.516 0.676 
 Age and/or lack of maturity -0.384*** 0.080 0.681 0.583 0.796 
 Addressing addiction -1.355*** 0.082 0.258 0.220 0.303 
 Mental disorder  -1.053*** 0.126 0.349 0.273 0.446 
 Sole or primary carer  -1.288*** 0.117 0.276 0.219 0.347 
 Lapse of time  -0.908*** 0.138 0.403 0.308 0.529 
 Serious medical conditions  -1.228*** 0.149 0.293 0.219 0.393 
Specific offence      
 s.47 (ABH) 0.735*** 0.070 2.086 1.818 2.393 
 s.20 (GBH) 1.835*** 0.078 6.263 5.377 7.296 
 s.18 (GBH with intent) 5.956*** 0.183 386.075
17 
269.74
0 
552.583 
Seriousness      
 Category 2 0.849*** 0.067 2.337 2.049 2.666 
 Category 1 2.332*** 0.077 10.301 8.856 11.982 
Note. * p <.05 ** p <.01 ***p <.001. R2 = .399 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .423 (Cox & Snell), .565 (Nagelkerke).  
 
 Some sentencing factors that failed to reach statistical significance as predictors in the 
logistic regression may have done so because they occurred only rarely in the data. This was 
true of several AFs that occurred in fewer than 1% of cases, namely TICs (0.1%), exploiting 
contact (0.2%), community impact (0.4%), and steps taken to prevent reporting (0.6%). A 
similar pattern was evident in the burglary dataset. 
 Figures 2.9 and 2.10 compare the odds ratio scores for each MF and AF from the 
logistic regression with the percentage of cases receiving immediate custody that are 
associated with each MF and AF. The figures for percentage of cases receiving custody are 
purely descriptive statistics of the kind published by the Sentencing Council in its annual 
                                                            
17 The sentencing range for a category 3 GBH with intent offence (the lowest category) is 3-5 years’ custody and 
offenders convicted of GBH with intent receive a custodial sentence in 96.8% of cases. The extremely high odds 
ratio may simply reflect this fact.  
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CCSS reports (e.g., Sentencing Council, 2014) and therefore do not allow for the independent 
effects of other MFs and/or AFs or other variables such as offence seriousness that may co-
occur with the MF or AF in question. 
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Figure 2.9. Percentage of cases given immediate custody that are associated with each MF in the assault dataset (left-hand graph), compared to the number of 
times less likely an offender is to receive immediate custody if each MF is present, based on the results of a binary logistic regression (right-hand graph).  
Character-based PMFs are shaded dark blue. Error bars in the right-hand graph are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.10. Percentage of cases given immediate custody that are associated with each AF in the assault dataset (left-hand graph) compared to the number of 
times more likely an offender is to receive immediate custody if each AF is present, based on the results of a binary logistic regression (right-hand graph). In 
the right-hand graph, error bars are 95% confidence intervals and non-significant results are shaded in pink. 
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 2.5.2.3. Interactions between variables. A second binary regression model was run 
to test for specific interactions between the predictor variables. In each case, a significant 
interaction indicates that the effect of one variable differs depending on whether the other 
variable is present or absent (and vice versa). First, two-way interactions were examined 
amongst the three PMFs of interest (remorse, good character and addressing addiction). 
Second, the model tested for interactions between each PMF of interest and previous 
convictions. Previous convictions was chosen because Maslen (2015a) proposed that remorse 
may have less impact for repeat offenders, but she found no interaction between remorse and 
previous convictions. Therefore, it was decided to test for this interaction again, using a 
larger sample and a more comprehensive set of predictor variables, to see if there was any 
relationship between previous convictions and any of remorse, good character, or addressing 
addiction. The third group of interactions tested was between each PMF of interest and ABH, 
GBH and GBH with intent (with common assault being the reference category). This last 
group of interactions was tested because Maslen (2015a) found a positive interaction between 
remorse and offence seriousness. 
 The interaction model was found to be significantly different from the model without 
interactions (χ2(15) = 78.25, p <.001)18 and predicted 83.0% of immediate custody sentences 
and 78.1% of other sentences correctly, giving an overall success rate of 80.8%. Table 2.5 
shows regression coefficients, standard errors, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for 
the odds ratios for each interaction term. The main effects of all of the predictor variables 
from the model presented in Table 2.4 were also included in the interaction model but are 
omitted from Table 2.5. The omission of main effects is for two reasons: firstly for clarity, 
                                                            
18 For both assault and burglary, the models including the interactions had a lower deviance score (-2LL) than 
the model without the interactions. In each case, the chi-square statistics (reported in the main text) indicated 
that the difference between the two models was significant. 
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and secondly because they would be misleading. In the model that includes interaction effects, 
the b-weights produced for the ‘main effects’ of each predictor variable involved in the 
interactions are not true main effects. Instead of representing the effect of the predictor with 
all the other predictors controlled for, the b-weights represent the effect of each predictor 
involved in interactions when the values of all interacting predictors are zero.
Table 2.6 
Results from binary logistic regression to examine selected interactions between variables 
predicting immediate custody 
Interaction b Std 
error 
Exp(b) 
(Odds 
ratio) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(b) 
Lower Upper 
Remorse*Good character -0.139 0.138 0.871 0.664 1.141 
Remorse*Addressing addiction 0.411* 0.174 1.509 1.073 2.122 
Good character*Addressing addiction 0.174 0.286 1.190 0.679 2.085 
Remorse*Previous convictions -0.147 0.102 0.863 0.707 1.053 
Good character*Previous convictions -0.548* 0.254 0.578 0.351 0.951 
Addressing addiction*Previous 
convictions 
-0.270 0.189 0.763 0.527 1.105 
Remorse*s.47 (ABH) 0.058 0.179 1.060 0.746 1.506 
Remorse*s.20 (GBH) 0.319 0.186 1.376 0.956 1.979 
Remorse*s.18 (GBH with intent) 1.476*** 0.375 4.375 2.097 9.124 
Good character*s.47 (ABH) 0.358 0.321 1.430 0.762 2.683 
Good character*s.20 (GBH) 0.478 0.322 1.613 0.858 3.032 
Good character*s.18 (GBH with intent) 0.628 0.463 1.873 0.756 4.639 
Addressing addiction*s.47 (ABH) -0.221 0.319 0.802 0.429 1.497 
Addressing addiction*s.20 (GBH) 0.259 0.330 1.295 0.678 2.475 
Addressing addiction*s.18 (GBH with 
intent) 
1.185 0.626 3.272 0.959 11.158 
Note. * p <.05 ** p <.01 ***p <.001. 
There was a significant interaction between remorse and addressing addiction. For 
cases that did not involve addressing addiction, an offender was 2.1 (1/0.479) times less 
likely to receive immediate custody if remorse was present than if it was absent.  For cases 
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that did involve addressing addiction, an offender was only 1.4 (1/0.722) times less likely to 
receive immediate custody if remorse was also present (exp (-0.736 + 0.411) = 0.722). In 
other words, remorse had a weaker effect when addressing addiction was also present as a 
factor. Since interactions are symmetric, addressing addiction also had a weaker effect when 
remorse was present than when it was absent. Specifically, for cases that did not involve 
remorse, an offender was 4.3 (1/0.234) times less likely to receive immediate custody if 
addressing addiction was present than if it was absent. For cases that did involve remorse, an 
offender was only 2.8 (1/0.353) times less likely to receive immediate custody if addressing 
addiction was also present (exp (-1.452 + 0.411) = 0.353). Perhaps each of these factors is 
under-valued when the other is present because they are both viewed as part of an offender 
taking responsibility for his or her offending behaviour. 
 An interaction effect was also found between good character and addressing addiction 
in the same direction as the interaction between remorse and addressing addiction, but the 
effect was much smaller, and did not reach statistical significance. In addition, the 95% 
confidence interval for the interaction’s odds ratio included 1 (indicating that the odds ratio is 
unlikely to be reliable).  
There was also a significant interaction between good character and previous 
convictions. For cases that did not involve previous convictions, an offender was 2.3 (1/0.423) 
times less likely to receive immediate custody if good character was present than if it was 
absent. For cases that did involve previous convictions, an offender was 4 times (1/0.250) 
less likely to receive immediate custody if good character was also present (exp (-0.840 + -
0.548) = 0.250). In other words, good character had a stronger effect when previous 
convictions was also present as a factor. This could be because cases involving no previous 
convictions tend not to result in a custodial sentence anyway, and so the presence of good 
character may not make as much difference to the outcome, whereas cases involving previous 
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convictions are more likely to be on the borderline between custody and a community 
sentence, where the presence of good character could have a more significant impact.  
 An interaction with previous convictions in the same direction was also found for 
both remorse and addressing addiction but the effects were smaller and did not reach 
statistical significance, and the 95% confidence intervals for their odds ratios included 1. 
Finally, there was a significant interaction between remorse and GBH with intent. In 
assault offences other than GBH with intent, an offender was 2.1 (1/0.479) times less likely to 
receive immediate custody if remorse was present than if it was absent. In GBH with intent 
cases, an offender was 2 times more likely to receive immediate custody if remorse was 
present than if it was absent (exp (-0.736 + 1.476) = 2.096). Interactions with GBH with 
intent in the same direction were found for addressing addiction and good behaviour but they 
were not significant. This result cannot easily be explained. Qualitative research carried out 
by the Sentencing Council to explore sentencers’ perceptions of the assault guideline found 
that they thought mitigation counted for much more in ABH cases than in cases of GBH with 
intent (Lock, 2015). This may be because s18 is an intentional crime – GBH is committed by 
definition with the intention of seriously injuring the victim. Therefore, sentencers may be 
likely to view an offender who claims to be remorseful as disingenuous.   If sentencers are 
generally closed (or even hostile) to the idea of mitigation for GBH with intent, it could be 
that there is some sort of backfire effect of pleading remorse, whereby a judge is more likely 
to give a custodial sentence to an offender who claims to be remorseful than one who does 
not.  
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2.6. Analysis of the CCSS Data for Burglary 
 In order to create a dataset of burglary offences, the 2013 CCSS burglary offences 
data were amalgamated with the 2012 burglary data. The 2011 data date from before the new 
guidelines for burglary were introduced in January 2012 and so are incompatible with the 
2012 and 2013 data. This process produced an initial dataset of 11,907 cases. Cases classified 
as “other burglary” were removed from the dataset because these cases were not covered by 
the guidelines19. Aggravated burglary cases were also removed as there were too few cases to 
permit statistical analysis20. The remaining dataset comprised 11,285 cases across two 
offences: domestic burglary and non-domestic burglary. The dataset contained 93.6% male 
offenders and 4.4% female offenders. 
2.7. Findings for Burglary 
2.7.1. Distribution of MFs and AFs Within the Burglary Dataset 
 The step two MFs and AFs listed in the burglary guideline and therefore found in the 
burglary dataset are set out in Table 2.6 below. These are organised by the percentage of 
cases in the dataset that include each factor. The three most frequently occurring AFs were 
previous convictions (present in 72.7% of cases), offence committed at night (26.1%), and 
under the influence (15.6%). The three most frequently occurring MFs were remorse (present 
in 21.5% of cases), addressing addiction (9.6%), and nothing stolen (9.3%). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 287 cases were removed from the dataset. 
20 335 cases were removed from the dataset. 
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Table 2.7 
Frequency of occurrence of individual sentencing factors in burglary cases, arranged by 
category and % present in the dataset. 
Sentencing factor (Step 2) % of cases 
(frequency) 
Aggravating factors  
 Previous convictions21 72.7 (8,201) 
 Offence committed at night 26.1 (2,943) 
 Commission of the offence whilst under the influence of 
 alcohol or drugs 
15.6 (1,762) 
 Failure to comply with current court orders 11.9 (1,341) 
 Offence committed whilst on licence 10.4 (1,169) 
 Offences taken into consideration (TICs) 7.7 (873) 
 Offence committed whilst on bail 6.6 (745) 
 Child at home (or returns home) when offence committed* 4.7 (534) 
 Abuse of power and/or position of trust** 2.7 (310) 
 Established evidence of community impact 2.2 (243) 
 Victim compelled to leave their home (in particular victims 
 of domestic violence)* 
0.8 (93) 
 Gratuitous degradation of victim 0.6 (68) 
 Any steps taken to prevent the victim reporting the incident 
 or obtaining assistance and/or from assisting or supporting 
 the prosecution 
0.4 (48) 
 
Mitigating factors 
 
 Remorse 21.5 (2,423) 
 Determination and/or demonstration of steps taken to 
 address addiction or offending behaviour (addressing 
 addiction) 
9.6 (1,086) 
 Nothing stolen or only property of very low value to the 
 victim  (whether economic, commercial, sentimental or 
 personal)22 
9.3 (1,054) 
                                                            
21 This is an abbreviation of “Previous convictions, having regard to a) the nature of the offence to which the 
conviction relates and its relevance to the current offence, and b) the time that has elapsed since the conviction” 
(Sentencing Council, 2011b, p. 5). NB: A third domestic burglary committed after 30/11/99 (after being 
convicted of two other burglaries) requires the court to apply s111 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 and impose a custodial term of at least three years (unless it would be unjust to do so). 
22 This mitigating factor only appears in the guideline for aggravated burglary (not included in the dataset) but 
was nevertheless cited in 822 cases of domestic burglary and 232 cases of non-domestic burglary. 
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 No previous convictions or no relevant/recent convictions 9.2 (1,034) 
 Age and/or lack of maturity where it affects the 
 responsibility of the offender 
7.3 (821) 
 Subordinate role in a group or gang 5.3 (599) 
 Good character and/or exemplary conduct 3.9 (438) 
 Mental disorder or learning disability, where not linked to 
 the commission of the offence 
2.2 (246) 
 Sole or primary carer for dependant relatives 1.7 (190) 
 Serious medical conditions requiring urgent, intensive or 
 long-term treatment 
1.3 (152) 
 Lapse of time since the offence where this is not the fault of 
 the offender 
0.9 (103) 
 Offender has made voluntary reparation to the victim 0.9 (96) 
 Injuries caused recklessly23 0.1 (11) 
Note.*Domestic burglary only. **Non-domestic burglary only. MFs in bold are the three character-based PMFs 
that are the main focus of this study. Words in italics are used to refer to the sentencing factors through the rest 
of the section dealing with burglary. 
 The next step in the analysis was to identify the number of cases within the burglary 
dataset that contain different frequencies of mitigating or aggravating factors. These data are 
presented in Figure 2.11 below. 40.5% of burglary cases (4,566) involved one or more MFs, 
while 83.6% of cases (9,438) involved one or more AFs.  
                                                            
23 This mitigating factor only appears in the guideline for aggravated burglary (not included in the dataset) but 
was nevertheless cited in nine cases of domestic burglary and two cases of non-domestic burglary. 
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Figure 2.11. Number of burglary cases involving one or more MFs or AFs. The grey bars 
represent cases where either no MFs or no AFs are present. 
 MFs and AFs also frequently occur together in Crown Court cases. Figure 2.12 
shows the distribution of burglary cases involving different numbers of MFs and/or AFs. 
Overall, 9.0% of cases involved no AFs or MFs, 50.5% of cases involved one or more AFs 
but no MFs, 7.2% involved one or more MFs but no AF, and 33.3% involved one or more 
MFs and one or more AFs. Amongst those cases where both AFs and MFs were present, 43.0% 
involved more AFs than MFs, 25.9% involved more MFs than AFs, and 31.1% had the same 
number of AFs and MFs present. 
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Figure 2.12.  Number of burglary cases involving different combinations of MFs and AFs, organised by MFs. The first grouping represents 0 
MFs + 0-11 AFs, in the format “MF#, AF#”; the second grouping represents 1 MF + 0-9 AFs; etc. The grey bar represents cases where no MFs 
or AFs are present.  
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The next set of analyses examined the distribution in the burglary dataset of the three 
selected PMFs that arguably reflect offenders’ character, i.e. remorse, good character, and 
addressing addiction. First, crosstabs were used to examine the extent to which the three 
PMFs co-occur within the burglary dataset. Figure 2.13 shows that there is significant cross-
over between the three PMFs: 64.6% of good character cases and 53.4% of addressing 
addiction cases also included remorse and 34% of remorse cases also included one or both of 
the other two PMFs. 
 
Figure 2.13. Venn diagram showing frequency of remorse, good character and addressing 
addiction across Crown Court burglary cases. Circle sizes and positions are approximate only. 
 Second, Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show the extent to which the three selected PMFs co-
occurred in the burglary dataset with other MFs or with AFs. Remorse was relatively more 
likely to occur without other MFs than the other two PMFs. Both remorse and addressing 
addiction most often occurred with zero or one other MF, while good character was mostly 
likely to occur with two or three other MFs. As regards AFs, good character was much more 
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likely than the other PMFs to occur without AFs, with one or two AFs most likely for both 
remorse and addressing addiction. 
 
Figure 2.14. Co-occurrence of selected PMFs with other MFs in Crown Court burglary cases. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. Co-occurrence of selected PMFs with AFs in Crown Court burglary cases. 
2.7.2. Associations Between MFs and AFs and Sentencing Outcomes 
 After investigating the distribution of MFs and AFs within the burglary dataset, the 
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(immediate or suspended), a community penalty such as unpaid work and/or drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation, a fine, or a discharge. Across the burglary dataset, 74.2% of offenders received 
immediate custody, 16.5% received a suspended sentence, 8.7% received a community order, 
fewer than 0.1% received a fine, and 0.2% received a discharge24. The burglary dataset used 
11 of the 12 categories of custodial sentence length used in the assault dataset (there was no 
“life or indeterminate” category). The three most common sentence lengths in the dataset 
were over 18 months and up to three years (39.7%), over 12 months and up to 18 months 
(16.7%), and 12 months (9.8%). The chosen sentencing outcome for analysis was whether or 
not an offender received an immediate custodial sentence (discussed further above in 
reference to the assault dataset). 
 2.7.2.1. Presence of an MF, an AF or both. As with the assault data, the study first 
examined whether the presence of an MF or an AF predicts whether an offender will receive 
a custodial sentence. The study compared cases in the burglary dataset involving only one 
MF, one AF, or one MF and one AF with cases where no MFs or AFs were present.  Figure 
2.16 shows the percentage of immediate custody associated with each of the MF/AF 
combinations.  
 
                                                            
24 1.0% of offenders received a sentence that did not fall into any of the above categories.  
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Figure 2.16. Percentage of burglary cases with differing MF and/or AF combinations that 
receive an immediate custodial sentence. 
 A two-way loglinear analysis for MF/AF combination and sentencing outcome 
(immediate custody or not) produced a model that retained all effects. The model’s likelihood 
ratio was χ2(0) = 0, p = 1. The interaction between MF/AF combination and outcome was 
significant, χ2(3) = 233.30, p <.001. Odds ratios indicated that offenders were 1.67 times less 
likely to receive an immediate custodial sentence when one MF and no AF was present, 
compared to no MF or AF (χ2(1) = 13.32, p <.001). Where one AF and no MF was present, 
offenders were 2.46 times more likely to receive immediate custody, compared to no MF or 
AF (χ2(1) =117.56, p <.001). When one MF and one AF were present, offenders were 1.14 
times less likely to receive immediate custody than when no MF or AF was present but the 
difference was not statistically significant.  
 Figure 2.17 shows the percentage of immediate custody associated with each of the 
MF/AF combinations, broken down by the two specific offences contained in the burglary 
dataset. 
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Figure 2.17. Percentage of cases with differing MF and/or AF combinations that receive an 
immediate custodial sentence, by specific burglary offence. 
 A three-way loglinear analysis including non-domestic burglary and domestic 
burglary, MF/AF combination and sentencing outcome (immediate custody or not) also 
produced a model that retained all effects. The likelihood ratio of this model was χ2(0) = 0, p 
= 1. The analysis indicated that the highest-order interaction (offence x MF/AF combination 
x outcome) was significant, χ2(3) = 8.68, p = .034. To break down this effect, chi-square tests 
for the MF/AF combination and outcome variables were performed separately for each 
offence and odds ratios calculated.  Domestic burglary is considered a more serious offence 
than non-domestic burglary and, as one would expect, was associated with a higher 
likelihood of immediate custody (χ2(1) = 208.01, p <.001).  
 Odds ratios indicated that when one MF and no AF was present, offenders sentenced 
for non-domestic burglary were 1.19 times less likely to receive immediate custody, 
compared to no MF or AF, but the difference was not statistically significant, while offenders 
guilty of domestic burglary were 1.85 times less likely to receive immediate custody (χ2(1) = 
14.55, p <.001). Where one AF and no MF was present, non-domestic burglary offenders 
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were 2.02 times more likely to receive immediate custody, compared to no MF or AF (χ2(1) = 
20.16, p <.001) and domestic burglary offenders were 2.76 times more likely to receive 
immediate custody ((χ2(1) = 102.40, p <.001 ). When one MF and one AF were present, 
offenders guilty of non-domestic burglary were 1.49 times less likely to receive immediate 
custody, compared to no MF or AF (χ2(1) = 4.14, p = .042) and offenders sentenced for 
domestic burglary were 1.03 times less likely to receive immediate custody, a difference 
which was not statistically significant. 
2.7.2.2. Independent effects of individual MFs and AFs. Descriptive statistics for 
the percentage of burglary cases involving immediate custody that were associated with each 
of the step two MFs and AFs are included at Appendix 5. As with the assault dataset, a binary 
logistic regression was carried out to examine the extent to which individual step two MFs 
and AFs predict custodial sentences independent of the effects of all other step two MFs and 
AFs (and other relevant variables). The predictor variables were the step two sentencing 
factors listed in the burglary guidelines (see Table 2.6 above), coded as dummy variables (i.e., 
1 = present, 0 = absent).  The binary outcome variable was whether or not the offender 
received an immediate custodial sentence. Crosstabs confirmed that all step two MFs and 
AFs were significantly correlated with the outcome variable and so all were included in the 
logistic regression model.  
 Two other predictor variables were included in the regression model to control for 
their independent effects on sentence outcomes: specific burglary offence (a binary 
categorical variable comprising domestic burglary and non-domestic burglary, with non-
domestic burglary being the reference category) and offence seriousness (a three-level 
categorical variable, with category 3 – the least serious category – being the reference 
category). Offence seriousness was included to capture the cumulative effect on sentence 
outcome of step one AFs and MFs.  The model was found to be significantly different from a 
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constant-only model (χ2(29) = 3513.738, p <.001) and predicted 92.2% of immediate custody 
sentences and 54.0% of other sentences correctly, giving an overall success rate of 82.2%. 
Residual statistics were examined (including Cook’s distance, leverage, DFBetas and 
standardised residuals) and did not raise any concerns. Table 2.7 shows regression 
coefficients, standard errors, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for the odds ratios for 
each predictor. The results for the three PMFs of interest (remorse, good character and 
addressing addiction) are marked in bold. 
Table 2.8 
Results from binary logistic regression of step two burglary MFs and AFs predicting 
immediate custody 
Sentencing factor b Standard 
error 
Exp(b) 
(Odds 
ratio) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(b) 
Lower Upper 
Constant -1.004 0.095 0.366   
Aggravating factors      
 Previous convictions 0.945*** 0.071 2.573 2.241 2.955 
 At night 0.394*** 0.072 1.483 1.288 1.709 
 Under the influence 0.084 0.082 1.088 0.927 1.276 
 Current court orders 0.993*** 0.105 2.699 2.199 3.313 
 On licence 1.384*** 0.143 3.991 3.013 5.285 
  TICs 1.128*** 0.143 3.090 2.335 4.089 
 On bail 0.767*** 0.134 2.154 1.655 2.804 
 Child at home 0.593** 0.177 1.810 1.280 2.561 
 Abuse of power/trust 0.283 0.167 1.327 0.956 1.842 
 Community impact 0.512* 0.241 1.668 1.040 2.674 
 Victim compelled to leave -0.169 0.328 0.844 0.444 1.605 
 Gratuitous degradation 0.883 0.509 2.417 0.891 6.557 
 Steps taken to prevent reporting  1.495* .700 4.459 1.130 17.596 
Mitigating factors      
 Remorse -0.488*** 0.071 0.614 0.534 0.705 
 Addressing addiction -1.594*** 0.088 0.203 0.171 0.241 
111 
 
 Nothing stolen -0.627*** 0.088 0.534 0.450 0.634 
 No previous convictions -0.689*** 0.101 0.502 0.412 0.612 
 Age and/or lack of maturity -0.588*** 0.103 0.555 0.454 0.680 
 Subordinate role -0.906*** 0.117 0.404 0.322 0.508 
 Good character -.523*** 0.142 0.593 0.449 0.784 
 Mental disorder -0.924*** 0.173 0.397 0.283 0.557 
 Sole or primary carer -1.059*** 0.197 0.347 0.236 0.510 
 Serious medical conditions -1.190*** 0.229 0.304 0.194 0.477 
 Lapse of time -0.962*** 0.253 0.382 0.233 0.627 
 Voluntary reparation -1.104*** 0.294 0.331 0.186 0.589 
 Injuries caused recklessly -1.250 0.956 0.286 0.044 1.864 
Specific offence      
 Domestic burglary 0.926*** 0.067 2.524 2.214 2.876 
Seriousness      
 Category 2 0.724*** 0.069 2.064 1.802 2.364 
 Category 1 2.520*** 0.101 12.429 10.205 15.138 
Note.* p <.05 ** p <.01 ***p <.001. R2 = .308 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .298 (Cox & Snell), .436 (Nagelkerke).  
 Some sentencing factors that failed to reach statistical significance as predictors in the 
logistic regression may have done so because they occurred only rarely in the data. This was 
true of three AFs and MFs in the burglary dataset, namely gratuitous degradation (0.6%), 
victim compelled to leave (0.8%), and injuries caused recklessly (0.1%).   
 Figures 2.18 and 2.19 compare the odds ratio scores for each MF and AF from the 
logistic regression with the percentage of cases receiving immediate custody that are 
associated with each MF and AF. The figures for percentage of cases receiving custody are 
purely descriptive statistics of the kind published by the Sentencing Council in its annual 
CCSS reports (e.g., Sentencing Council, 2014) and therefore do not allow for the independent 
effects of other MFs and/or AFs or other variables such as offence seriousness that may co-
occur with the MF or AF in question. 
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Figure 2.18. Percentage of cases given immediate custody that are associated with each MF in the burglary dataset (left-hand graph), compared to the number 
of times less likely an offender is to receive immediate custody if each MF is present, based on the results of a binary logistic regression (right-hand graph). 
Character-based PMFs are shaded dark blue. In the right-hand graph, error bars are 95% confidence intervals and non-significant results are shaded pale blue.
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Figure 2.19. Percentage of cases given immediate custody that are associated with each AF in the burglary dataset (left-hand graph), compared to the number of 
times less likely an offender is to receive immediate custody if each AF is present, based on the results of a binary logistic regression (right-hand graph). In the 
right-hand graph, error bars are 95% confidence intervals and non-significant results are shaded pink.
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 2.7.2.3. Interactions between variables. A second binary regression model was run 
to test for several interactions between the predictor variables. In each case, a significant 
interaction indicates that the effect of one variable differs depending on the level of the other 
variable. First, interactions were examined between the three PMFs of interest (remorse, good 
character and addressing addiction). Second, the model tested for interactions between each 
PMF of interest and previous convictions. The third group of interactions tested was between 
each PMF of interest and domestic burglary (with non-domestic burglary being the reference 
category). The model was found to be significantly different from the model without 
interactions (χ2(9) = 48.42, p <.001) and predicted 93.0% of immediate custody sentences and 
51.6% of other sentences correctly, giving an overall success rate of 82.2%. Table 2.8 shows 
regression coefficients, standard errors, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for the 
odds ratios for each interaction term. The main effects of all of the predictor variables from 
the model presented in Table 2.7 were also included in the interaction model but are omitted 
from Table 2.8 for clarity.  
Table 2.9 
Results from binary logistic regression to examine selected interactions between variables 
predicting immediate custody 
Interaction b Std 
error 
Exp(b) 
(Odds 
ratio) 
95% C.I. for 
Exp(b) 
Lower Upper 
Remorse*Good character 0.067 0.286 1.069 0.610 1.874 
Remorse*Addressing addiction 0.721*** 0.177 2.057 1.453 2.911 
Good character*Addressing addiction 1.020* 0.506 2.774 1.028 7.483 
Remorse*Previous convictions -0.211 0.152 0.810 0.601 1.091 
Good character*Previous convictions -0.199 0.602 0.819 0.252 2.668 
Addressing addiction*Previous 
convictions 
-0.601* 0.234 0.548 0.346 0.867 
Remorse*Domestic burglary -0.039 0.172 0.962 0.687 1.347 
Good character*Domestic burglary -0.585 0.340 0.557 0.286 1.086 
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Addressing addiction*Domestic burglary 0.304 0.213 1.355 0.892 2.057 
Note. * p <.05 ** p <.01 ***p <.001.  
There was a significant interaction between remorse and addressing addiction. For 
cases that did not involve addressing addiction, an offender was 1.6 (1/0.628) times less 
likely to receive immediate custody if remorse was present than if it was absent. When 
addressing addiction was present as a factor, an offender was actually 1.29 times more likely 
to receive immediate custody if remorse was also present (exp (-0.466 + 0.721) = 1.29). I.e., 
addressing addiction appears to reverse the effect of remorse as a mitigating factor. Similarly, 
when cases did not involve remorse, an offender was 5.4 (1/0.184) times less likely to receive 
immediate custody if addressing addiction was present than if it was absent.  When remorse 
was present, an offender was only 2.6 (1/0.379) times less likely to receive immediate 
custody if addressing addiction was also present (exp (-1.692 + 0.721) = 0.379). This is a 
difficult interaction to explain. It is the same pattern as was found in assault (each PMF 
weakens the other) but much stronger. It is almost as if judges discount both PMFs so much 
when they are present together that they end up reducing sentences by less than if only one of 
the PMFs was present in the case.  
There was also a significant interaction between good character and addressing 
addiction. For cases that did not involve addressing addiction, an offender was 1.1 (1/0.882) 
times less likely to receive immediate custody if good character was present than if it was 
absent. When addressing addiction was present, an offender was 2.44 times more likely to 
receive immediate custody if good character was also present (exp (-0.126 + 1.020) = 2.44). 
I.e., as with remorse, the presence of addressing addiction appears to reverse the effect of 
good character as a mitigating factor. For cases that did not involve good character, offenders 
were 5.4 (1/0.184) times less likely to receive immediate custody if addressing addiction was 
present than if it was absent. When good character was present, offenders were only 2.0 
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(1/0.511) times less likely to receive immediate custody if addressing addiction was also 
present (exp (-1.692 + 1.020) = 0.511). Again, it is difficult to explain the reversal of good 
character as a factor.  Perhaps the notion of being an addict cancels out the possibility in the 
judges’ minds of the offender having a good character. The court may, therefore, tend to 
think less of an offender who pleads good character in these circumstances. The discounting 
issue described in relation to the interaction of remorse and addressing addiction may also 
apply here.  
Finally, there was a significant interaction between addressing addiction and previous 
convictions. For cases that did not involve previous convictions, an offender was 5.4 (1/0.184) 
times less likely to receive immediate custody if addressing addiction was present than if it 
was absent. When previous convictions were present, an offender was 9.9 (1/0.101) times 
less likely to receive immediate custody if addressing addiction was also present (exp (-1.692 
-0.601) = 0.101). This is similar to the interaction between good character and previous 
convictions in assault cases and the explanation may be the same: cases involving previous 
convictions are more likely to be on the borderline between custody and a community 
sentence, where the presence of a mitigating factor such as addressing addiction could have a 
more significant impact.   
 An interaction with previous convictions in the same direction was also found for 
both remorse and good character but the effects were smaller and did not reach statistical 
significance, and the 95% confidence intervals for their odds ratios included 1. 
2.8. Comparison of Assault and Burglary Offences 
 The results obtained from the assault dataset were compared to those from the 
burglary dataset. This comparison focuses on the character-based PMFs, i.e., remorse, good 
character and addressing addiction.  As Figure 2.20 shows, remorse and good character were 
117 
 
both much more prevalent in assault cases than burglary cases. The frequency of addressing 
addiction was very similar across the two offence types. In addition, addressing addiction co-
occurred with remorse much more frequently in assault cases (71.2% of cases involving 
addressing addiction also involved remorse) than in burglary cases (53.5%).  The co-
occurrence of good character with remorse was relatively similar across assault cases (70.8%) 
and burglary cases (65.5%).  
 
Figure 2.20. Percentage of Crown Court cases involving each of remorse, good character and 
addressing addiction, by offence category. 
 The logistic regressions suggested that addressing addiction had a weaker effect in 
assault cases (where offenders were 3.88 times less likely to receive custody), than in 
burglary cases (where offenders were 4.93 times less likely to receive custody). An opposite, 
although much weaker, pattern was found for remorse. Assault offenders showing remorse 
were 1.88 times less likely to receive immediate custody, whereas burglary offenders who 
showed remorse were only 1.62 times less likely to receive immediate custody. The results 
for good character were almost identical across the two offence types. See Figure 2.21. 
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Figure 2.21. Number of times less likely an offender is to receive immediate custody if 
remorse, good character or addressing addiction is present by offence type, based on the 
results of a binary logistic regression. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 The pattern of interactions between sentencing factors was also somewhat different 
between assault and burglary cases. In assault cases, there was a significant interaction 
between remorse and addressing addiction, with both PMFs having weaker predictive power 
when the other PMF was also present. However, there were no significant interactions 
between remorse and good character, or good character and addressing addiction. In addition, 
good character was found to be a stronger predictor when it co-occurred with previous 
convictions, and remorse was a weaker predictor for cases of GBH with intent than for cases 
of common assault.  
 For burglary, there was an interaction between remorse and addressing addiction in 
the same direction as for assault, but the effect was much stronger, actually reversing the 
mitigating effect of remorse. There were also two significant interactions found in the 
burglary dataset that were not present in the assault data. First, the presence of addressing 
addiction reversed the effect of good character in much the same way as remorse. Second, 
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addressing addiction (rather than good character) had a stronger mitigating effect in cases 
involving previous convictions. 
2.9. Discussion 
 Multiple MFs and/or AFs frequently occur together in Crown Court cases sentenced 
from 2011 to 2013, with 80.0% of assault cases and 66.7% of burglary cases involving two or 
more MFs and/or AFs. For both assault and burglary offences, AFs were more common than 
MFs. The character-based PMFs that are the main focus of this study were found to co-occur 
frequently both with each other and with other MFs and AFs.  In particular, it was relatively 
uncommon to find a case involving either good character or addressing addiction that did not 
also involve remorse. On the one hand, these findings highlight the importance of examining 
the effect of individual PMFs in isolation from the effects of other sentencing factors. On the 
other hand, the frequent co-occurrence of remorse, good character and addressing addiction 
emphasises the need to establish whether these factors interact with one another or are used in 
a purely additive manner. 
 The study found that across all the 31,530 assault and burglary offences studied, the 
presence of a single AF was associated with a higher chance of immediate custody 
(imprisonment). Conversely, while the presence of a single MF in cases of common assault, 
ABH and domestic burglary was associated with a lower chance of immediate imprisonment, 
one MF made no difference to cases of GBH, GBH with intent, or non-domestic burglary. 
For every offence studied, the association between an AF and an increased chance of 
imprisonment was stronger than that between an MF and a decreased chance of imprisonment. 
These findings suggest that cases involving one MF and one AF should be associated with a 
higher chance of imprisonment than cases where no MF or AF was present, because the 
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presence of an MF would not fully cancel out or compensate for the (stronger) effect of an 
AF. 
 However, the picture varied between offences. For ABH, GBH and GBH with intent, 
cases with one MF and one AF were, as expected, linked to a higher chance of imprisonment 
than cases with no MF or AF present. However, for common assault and domestic burglary, 
there was no difference between the two groups, and for non-domestic burglary, cases with 
one MF and one AF actually had a lower chance of resulting in immediate custody than cases 
with no MF or AF. 
  These apparently mixed findings could be explained partly by different combinations 
of single MFs and AFs being present across the different offences studied (e.g., some 
offences may have involved more cases where relatively weak AFs co-occurred with 
relatively strong MFs).  For example, addressing addiction, the strongest MF predictor in 
both datasets, was much more prevalent relative to other AFs and MFs in burglary cases than 
in assault cases. Future research could explore whether the patterns of co-occurring AFs and 
MFs vary significantly between offences and offence categories. 
 All three of the character-based PMFs (i.e., remorse, addressing addiction, and good 
character) significantly predicted a reduced chance of offenders receiving custodial sentences. 
In terms of the relative impact of the three character-based PMFs, the binary logistic 
regression models showed a similar pattern across assault and burglary offences. In each 
dataset, addressing addiction most strongly predicted a lower chance of imprisonment, while 
remorse and good character were two of the weaker MFs (i.e., were only weakly associated 
with a reduced chance of immediate custody), particularly for burglary. Remorse was a 
slightly stronger MF than good character for assault but was weaker for burglary. The 
findings that addressing addiction had a strong mitigating effect, while good character had a 
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significant, but smaller effect, are broadly consistent with Jacobson and Hough’s (2007) self-
report study of 40 Crown Court judges. Jacobson and Hough found that sentencers ranked 
“motivated to get drug treatment” third out of 13 possible MFs and “respected individual”, 
the closest MF in the study to good character, ninth out of 13 MFs. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the findings from self-report studies may be unreliable in any case. 
 The findings for remorse were consistent with past statistical analyses of CCSS data. 
Remorse’s weight as a mitigator in assault cases (an odds ratio of 0.53) was very close to 
Maslen (2015a)’s odds ratio of 0.50. For burglary, remorse’s position as the least important 
of the 12 PMFs found to be significant predictors supports Irwin-Rogers and Perry’s (2015) 
study of domestic burglary only, which found remorse to be the 11th most important factor, 
out of 12 (the precise odds ratios of these two studies cannot be compared since they used 
different types of logistic regression models).  It appears that although remorse is the most 
frequently cited PMF in both assault and burglary cases (35.7% and 21.5% respectively), its 
impact on a case-by-case basis is generally limited. 
The results are inconsistent with Jacobson and Hough (2007), who found that “intense 
remorse” was rated by judges as relatively important, fourth out of 13 MFs. However, unlike 
the CCSS studies (Irwin-Rogers & Perry, 2015; Maslen, 2015a), Jacobson and Hough’s 
findings were based on self-report data. It should also be noted that “intense remorse” is a 
different variable from simple “remorse”, and so the findings could not properly be compared 
for that reason. 
 Rarely occurring MFs often had relatively stronger predictive power in both offence 
categories studied. For assault, although addressing addiction was the strongest predictor of a 
non-custodial sentence, the next four strongest predictors were all low frequency MFs (under 
5% of cases). For burglary, addressing addiction was also the strongest MF predictor, but the 
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next five strongest predictors were very low frequency MFs (under 2.5% of cases). For AFs, 
there was no general pattern of rarer AFs being stronger predictors. However, in both datasets 
the strongest AF predictors were very rare: for assault, attempt to conceal evidence (0.9%) 
was the strongest predictor, while for burglary, steps taken to prevent reporting (0.4%) was 
strongest. One explanation for the apparent association between rarity of occurrence and 
predictive power may be that it is an instance of vividness bias. Vividness bias is a product of 
the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and predicts that people give 
“inferential weight to information in proportion to its vividness” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 
62). In the present context, very rare sentencing factors are more vivid (i.e., stand out more) 
and are therefore given relatively more weight by sentencers than commonly occurring 
factors such as remorse or previous convictions. 
 The present study identified some interactions between the three character-based 
PMFs. No previous sentencing study has identified interactions between MFs. The results 
suggest that remorse and addressing addiction each have less impact when they occur 
together in both assault and burglary, and good character and addressing addiction have less 
impact when they co-occur in burglary. In other words, when these PMFs co-occur, 
sentencers tend to underweight each factor compared to the value given to that factor when it 
occurs alone.  The underweighting of multiple PMFs is particularly striking in burglary, 
where the presence of addressing addiction actually seems to reverse the mitigating effect of 
both remorse and good character. Somewhat surprisingly, some PMFs appeared to have a 
stronger mitigating effect for offenders with previous convictions. This may be because cases 
involving previous convictions are more likely to be on the threshold between custody and a 
non-custodial sentence, where PMFs have been observed to have a particularly strong 
influence in favour of a non-custodial sentence (Hough et al., 2003; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; 
Millie et al., 2007). 
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 There is evidence in the CCSS data for some differences in the weight sentencers give 
to PMFs in assault and burglary offences, notably the increased importance attached to 
addressing addiction and somewhat reduced effect of remorse in burglary cases, compared to 
assault cases. It could be, for example, that strongly felt remorse is more typical of violent 
offenders than burglars (viz. also the much higher prevalence of remorse in assault cases). 
The observed differences between assault and burglary could also relate in part to differences 
in the profile of “typical” assault offenders versus “typical” burglars. For example, burglary 
is viewed as often being a “professional” offence (Brookman, Maguire, Pierpoint, & Bennett, 
2010; Davies & Tyrer, 2003); if this is in fact correct, there are likely to be more career 
criminals involved in burglary than assault. This would explain the much higher frequency of 
previous convictions and much lower levels of remorse and good character amongst burglars 
than amongst assault offenders. It is less clear why an offender taking steps to deal with drug 
or alcohol addiction or other offending behaviour should matter more in the context of 
property crime. Sentencers may be more alert to burglars trying to deal with an addiction, 
since it is recognised that property crime is often related to drug dependency (Hayhurst et al., 
2013; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Pierce et al., 2015; Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010). 
Lastly, the findings for both assault and burglary support Maslen’s (2015a) finding of 
no interaction between remorse and previous convictions. It seems that, contrary to the 
intuitively appealing idea that an expression of remorse would be less plausible as a PMF for 
repeat offenders, the effect of remorse remains constant whether an offender has previous 
convictions or not. 
2.9.1. Implications 
 On the most basic level, the results confirm that almost all of the MFs and AFs 
specified in the guidelines for assault and burglary are used in the way intended by the 
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guidelines. MFs reduce the chance of an offender going to prison, while AFs increase the 
chance of that offender going to prison.  
 The present study adds to the body of empirical evidence about the use of PMFs (and 
other MFs and AFs) in current sentencing practice. Researchers such as Dhami (2013a, 
2013b), Roberts (2008, 2011) and Young and King (2011) have proposed moving beyond 
unweighted lists of MFs and AFs and towards guidance on the typical weight that each MF 
and AF might be given across different offences. Alternatively, Irwin-Rogers and Perry (2015) 
suggest that sentencing guidance could give examples of circumstances where each factor is 
likely to be particularly important or unimportant for sentencing. An example of this already 
exists in the new guideline for sexual offences, which states in relation to rape, that “in the 
context of this offence, previous good character/exemplary conduct should not normally be 
given any significant weight” (Sentencing Council, 2013c, p. 11). A final possible model is 
the recently introduced Chinese sentencing guidelines, which include proposed ranges for 
percentage reductions to be given if a certain mitigating factor is present (e.g., a reduction of 
up to 50% can be given for a confession, depending on the degree to which the offender 
expresses repentance – Roberts & Pei, 2016). 
 If the Sentencing Council does decide to produce guidance on the use of MFs and 
AFs in sentencing, the present study’s findings could be used to help ensure that the guidance 
properly reflects current sentencing practice. Alternatively, policy-makers may decide that 
aspects of current practice could or should be changed to improve the sentencing process.  
 More specifically, this study raises several questions that should be addressed as part 
of any guidance development process. For example, should AFs have a greater impact on 
sentences than MFs, on average? If an offender shows genuine remorse, should that only 
have a weak mitigating effect on his or her chances of going to prison, and should it matter 
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less than if he/she is taking steps to deal with a drug or alcohol addiction? Should good 
character be an MF at all, given that many sentencing experts view it as inappropriate moral 
accounting (e.g., Ashworth, 2010; Maslen & Roberts, 2013)? How might we reduce the risk 
that rarely occurring MFs and AFs may have an inappropriately strong effect on sentencing 
judgments?  
 Another interesting question stems from the underweighting that appears to occur 
when certain PMFs are present together in cases. This is at odds with the authority on 
sentencing law, David Thomas, who argued that the presence of one mitigating factor “will 
enhance the significance of another” and that “the weight of a combination of mitigating 
factors will usually be greater than the sum of their individual values (Thomas, 1979, p. 194). 
Psychological research suggests that underweighting of multiple PMFs is likely to be the 
result of sentencers taking a holistic rather than additive approach to personal mitigation, i.e., 
viewing an offender’s case in the round rather than identifying the individual PMFs present 
and then reducing the sentence by a certain amount for each factor.  
Tversky and Koehler (1994) observed that when making probability estimates, people 
tend to judge the probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of its constituent 
parts (the “subadditivity effect”). For example, participants in one study estimated the 
probability of death from heart attack in the USA as 22%, the probability of death from 
cancer as 18% and the probability of death from other natural causes as 33% (a total of 73%). 
However, participants asked to judge the probability of death from any natural cause 
estimated it at only 58%.  
A common application of the subadditivity effect to estimation of numeric amounts is 
the planning fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the time (and cost, if relevant) needed to 
complete a task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The planning fallacy can typically be reduced 
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by decomposing a task into sub-tasks and then estimating the time required for each sub-task 
(Kruger & Evans, 2004). Similarly, if judges consider an offender’s mitigation holistically, 
their valuation of that mitigation is likely to be lower than if they estimate a separate value 
for each PMF and then add them to generate an overall value. The notion of judges taking a 
holistic approach to personal mitigation is consistent with psychological theories of legal 
decision-making which propose that people construct a satisfying, consistent whole narrative 
for a case rather than focusing on the constituent parts (e.g., Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992; 
Lagnado, Fenton, & Neil, 2013; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004).  
The practical question that stems from the finding of underweighting is whether each 
individual PMF should have a set value (or range of values) and be combined additively with 
other PMFs to reach a total mitigation value. Or, could it be acceptable, or even preferable (in 
some or all circumstances), to view multiple related PMFs in the round, as part of a holistic 
assessment of the individual offender, and decide upon a fair overall valuation of personal 
mitigation for that case which may be lower (or higher) than the sum of the individual factors 
involved? If the goal is to avoid subadditivity, then a more structured approach to PMFs may 
be required. Systematic subadditivity could lead to offenders being imprisoned unfairly if 
their case lies on the borderline between custody and a community sentence and involves 
several PMFs. 
 More generally, the interactions found between PMFs and AFs supports the idea that 
judges’ use of sentencing factors is nuanced and context-dependent, rather than blandly, 
mechanistically additive. This study was focused on three particular PMFs, and so it only 
examined interactions between those three PMFs (plus previous convictions), out of the more 
than 50 total MFs and AFs contained in the CCSS data sets for assault and burglary. There 
are many other interactions that can be explored and interpreted within the CCSS data.  
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 Lastly, the present study suggests that the Sentencing Council should rethink the way 
that they present data from the CCSS. Several of their annual reports (e.g., Sentencing 
Council, 2014, 2015a) include descriptive statistics that associate particular MFs with certain 
imprisonment rates and average custodial sentence lengths. However, the picture painted by 
the logistic regressions carried out in this study is very different from the descriptive statistics 
(see Figures 2.9-2.10 and 2.18-2.19 in the present study). While the impact of remorse is 
relatively weak across both descriptive and inferential statistics, the logistic regression 
models reveal the actual importance of addressing addiction as an MF for both assault and 
burglary, while also showing that good character is a much less important MF than it would 
appear based on descriptive statistics alone. Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.14 and 2.15 in the present 
study suggest that the apparent importance of good character may be partly because it occurs 
very often without an AF and often with two or more other MFs. On the other hand, 
addressing addiction is the most likely of the three PMFs to occur with one or more AFs in 
both assault and burglary.  In summary, the contrast between the results of the logistic 
regression models and the descriptive imprisonment likelihood statistics suggests that 
existing Sentencing Council figures about the impact of AFs and MFs on sentence outcomes 
are inadequate and potentially misleading and should be revisited.  
2.9.2. Proposals for Future Research 
 The methodology used here for assault and burglary could be replicated to cover all of 
the offence categories covered by the CCSS data. It would then be possible to draw 
comprehensive conclusions about the use of PMFs (and AFs) in current sentencing practice, 
and also compare across a full range of offences.  It would also be interesting to explore 
further possible interactions between AFs and MFs in the datasets.  Additionally, the CCSS 
datasets could be used to examine whether the use of AFs and MFs in assault and burglary in 
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the Crown Court changed during the three years from the introduction of guidelines for those 
offence categories. 
 PMFs are complex variables and sentencing is a complex human process. The CCSS 
data can tell us how PMFs are used in sentencing, but it cannot tell us why – for example, 
why one PMF is more influential than another, why a PMF may matter more for one type of 
offence than another, or why two PMFs may each be less important when they occur together. 
In order to answer questions of this kind, it will be necessary to explore what each of the 
character-based PMFs means to sentencers; how they perceive and understand them, and how 
those perceptions contribute to the sentencing process. Study 2 in this thesis has been 
designed to investigate these issues further. 
2.9.3. Strengths and Limitations 
 There were some limitations to the present research. The study did not, and could not, 
include every potentially relevant factor that may affect Crown Court sentencing practice. For 
example, it only dealt with sentencing factors that are listed at step two of the England and 
Wales sentencing guidelines. In addition, the study could only take account of factors 
recorded in the CCSS datasets. Inevitably, there will have been other, unrecorded factors that 
may have influenced particular cases in one way or another. These unrecorded factors could 
not be included in the logistic regression models, which is likely to have reduced the accuracy 
of the resulting coefficients. Nevertheless, the models did correctly predict a high percentage 
of case outcomes overall: 80.8% of assault cases and 82.2% of burglary cases. In other words, 
the models represented the data relatively well. 
 The study also had to rely on the information that is recorded on the CCSS forms. 
CCSS forms are themselves self-report data, and as such may reflect the perception of the 
judge or judicial officer about each case, rather than recording the actual decision making 
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process. However, the CCSS forms only indicate which factors were considered in any given 
case, and the influence of those factors on sentencing outcomes was estimated statistically 
rather than relying on judges’ self-reported estimates of the weights given.  
Additionally, all three of the character-based PMFs studied are not entirely binary 
variables: in any given case, remorse could be relatively heartfelt or superficial, good 
character could involve a single incident or a lifetime of good works, and addressing 
addiction could be very preliminary or illustrate a significant commitment to behavioural 
change. The analysis carried out in this study therefore necessarily oversimplified the 
operation of these PMFs in practice by identifying simply whether they are present or absent 
in a case. Lastly, binary logistic regression is a correlational approach. As such, while it 
provides a good indication of the likely impact of sentencing factors on whether an offender 
receives immediate custody, it cannot confirm the presence of causal links. Differences in 
sentencing outcome predicted by the presence or absence of particular factors may be partly 
the result of other, unobserved variables.  
As well as addressing its limitations as described above, Study 1 also had several 
strengths. The study used statistical analysis of very large data sets across multiple years to 
generate new and interesting empirical findings about the weight given to the PMFs remorse, 
addressing addiction, and good character in current sentencing practice. Unlike past studies, 
the analysis controlled for all PMFs and AFs included in Step 2 of the guidelines, as well as 
two measures of offence seriousness. It was the first study to compare directly the effect of 
remorse, addressing addiction, and good character on sentencing outcomes, the first to 
explore interactions between PMFs, and the first to find evidence that underweighting of 
multiple co-occurring PMFs may be an issue for sentencers. 
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3. Study 2 
 
Sentencers’ Perceptions of Character-based PMFs 
3.1. Introduction 
Study 1 in this thesis examined the extent to which the three character-based PMFs, 
i.e., remorse, good character, and addressing addiction, predicted non-custodial sentences in 
the Crown Court (reported in full in Chapter 2). The study used logistic regression modelling 
to analyse data from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS) for 20,245 cases of assault 
and 11,285 cases of burglary. It was found that for both assault and burglary cases, when any 
of the three character-based PMFs was present, an offender was more likely to receive a 
community sentence or a fine and less likely to receive immediate custody.  Addressing 
addiction was a stronger predictor of non-custodial sentences than either remorse or good 
character. There was also some evidence that the PMFs interacted. For example, both 
remorse and addressing addiction were weaker predictors of non-custodial sentences when 
both were present together in a case, than when they were present individually.  
However, PMFs are complex, nuanced variables and sentencing is a complex 
cognitive and social process. The CCSS data can tell us the impact PMFs have on sentencing 
outcomes, but it cannot tell us why. Study 1’s findings do not tell us anything about how 
sentencers understand the three character-based PMFs: how do they decide whether they are 
present or not, and to what extent? In addition, there is only limited value in measuring a 
variable if you do not possess a reliable definition for that variable. For example, it is no good 
a researcher reporting that good character reduces the likelihood of a prison sentence if it is 
not clear what good character means – what it consists of – in practice. It is not self-evident.  
The current England and Wales guidelines leave PMFs undefined and therefore open to 
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judges’ subjective interpretation (Dhami, 2013a). Bagaric (2014) argues that “there is not 
even a loose consensus” regarding the interpretation of most mitigating and aggravating 
factors, and this view is supported by empirical findings of widespread inconsistency in 
sentencers’ treatment of personal mitigation (Raynard, Hebenton and Pease, 1994; Jacobson 
& Hough, 2007; Lock, 2015). In addition, Study 1 necessarily reduced the PMFs studied to 
binary variables, and so the complexity and subjectivity of these variables was lost as a result.  
3.1.1. Questions About PMF Use Raised or Unanswered by Study 1 
The following questions about the role of PMFs in sentencing judgments were either 
raised by Study 1’s findings, or left unanswered: 
1. What do the three character-based PMFs mean in practice? This includes exploring the 
kinds of evidence that judges look for when evaluating whether a given PMF is present or 
not. What counts as remorse, good character, or addressing addiction, and what does not?  
 
2. Why is addressing addiction such a powerful PMF, and why are remorse and good 
character relatively weak mitigators?  
 
3. Why do sentencers underweight PMFs such as remorse and addressing addiction when 
they co-occur with another PMF in the same case? 
 
4. What factors may influence the relationship between character-based PMFs and choice of 
sentence type – especially custody versus a community penalty? 
 
5. Why does the effect of PMFs on sentencing outcomes remain largely constant across 
violent and property offences – what might this tell us about the way that sentencers 
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approach PMFs? Do they simply have a uniform approach to personal mitigation, or are 
there other factors (not examined in Study 1) that are more of a focus for sentencers than 
offence type? 
3.1.2. Choice of Methodology 
Answering questions 1-5 above involves looking for previously un-examined 
variables of interest that may be involved in the process of personal mitigation. Such 
variables cannot be generated through quantitative research, and there is insufficient past 
research to identify variables for inclusion in quantitative designs. A pragmatic alternative is 
to learn more about the experiences of the people who make the sentencing judgments, in the 
hope of identifying possible explanations for the quantitative findings that can then be 
developed and tested in future research. In addition, gaining a deeper understanding of 
sentencers’ experiences of dealing with personal mitigation can help inform future guidance, 
for example by anticipating likely sources of resistance to guidance and designing materials 
in a way that sentencers will understand and find both accessible and useful. 
The present study therefore chose to use a qualitative methodology. Qualitative 
research can explore individuals’ perceptions and experiences – the meanings they give to 
objects and concepts – in a rich, nuanced way that quantitative research cannot (Willig, 2013).  
Using qualitative research as a follow-up to quantitative research has been described as a 
“sequential explanatory” approach (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hanson, Cresswell, 
Plano Clark, Petska, & Cresswell, 2005). The first step in sequential explanatory research is 
to collect and analyse a set of quantitative data. The quantitative findings are then used to 
guide subsequent qualitative research. The purpose of the qualitative research is to clarify the 
quantitative findings – adding context and depth to the findings – but also to critique them 
(Silverman, 2011; Trahan & Stewart, 2013; Yardley & Bishop, 2008). For example, the 
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qualitative findings may raise inconsistencies or highlight exceptions – qualifying, rather than 
just clarifying, the quantitative results.   
Two recent studies illustrate the benefits of a sequential explanatory approach to 
sentencing research. Jeffries and Bond’s (2009) statistical analysis of Australian sentencing 
outcomes found evidence that Indigenous offenders were less likely than their non-
Indigenous counterparts to be sentenced to prison. This finding was initially surprising given 
past research had found the opposite effect. However, Jeffries and Bond (2010) noted that the 
detail of offenders’ sentencing stories, for example of abuse or victimisation, was partially 
lost through being reduced to binary variables for quantitative analysis. The authors therefore 
followed up their statistical analysis with a qualitative study based on thematic analysis of 
sentencing transcripts. The study found that Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders’ 
sentencing stories differed in various ways that may explain the discrepancy in sentencing 
outcomes. For example, Indigenous offenders were more frequently identified as having 
suffered childhood trauma, which may have led to reduced evaluations of blameworthiness 
and therefore reduced sentences.  
Jeffries and Bond’s (2010) qualitative research therefore identified variables (such as 
childhood trauma) that were not included in their original study but it appears may influence 
sentencing outcomes. These variables could be included in future statistical analysis or tested 
experimentally to determine the extent to which they may account for the finding of leniency 
towards Indigenous offenders. The qualitative study also provided richer, fuller data about the 
nature of Indigenous childhood experiences and their relationship to offending that could be 
useful for other purposes. 
Stewart and Trahan (2012) carried out a logistic regression to estimate the relationship 
between the hostility of prosecution and defence lawyers, as perceived by US capital trial 
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jurors, and the likelihood of jurors giving life sentences. Perceived hostility was found to be 
counter-productive to both prosecution and defence lawyers. However, this finding was of 
limited value without an understanding of which actions might lead to perceptions of hostility. 
Stewart and Trahan (2012) therefore also carried out a thematic analysis of 1,198 juror 
interviews. They discovered, for example, that while jurors expected lawyers to be forceful in 
presenting their cases, when they engaged in personal attacks on opposing lawyers and/or 
their witnesses, this crossed the line into hostility and was perceived negatively.  
As with Jeffries and Bond (2010), Stewart and Trahan’s (2012) qualitative analysis 
revealed additional variables which could be used to help explore the quantitative findings 
further. Jurors’ expectations about lawyers’ behaviour and their response to personal attacks 
against opposing lawyers and/or their witnesses could be tested quantitatively to establish 
whether they influence jurors’ perceptions of hostility (which in turn affect their sentencing 
judgments). 
Another reason for supplementing quantitative research with qualitative research, i.e., 
using a “mixed methods” approach, stems from more practical considerations. The 
perspective on mixed methods research adopted by the present study is ultimately informed 
by the principles of pragmatism (Feilzer, 2010; Maxcy, 2003). From a pragmatic perspective, 
a research methodology should ultimately be evaluated in terms of its ability to achieve the 
researcher’s goal (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Trahan & Stewart, 2013; Yardley & 
Bishop, 2008). To quote Trahan and Stewart (2013, p. 59), “the divide between qualitative 
and quantitative research limits our ability to reach a cohesive understanding of crime and 
criminal justice in the 21st century. Mixed methods research can circumvent this impasse”. In 
the present case, combining quantitative and qualitative data can be justified on the basis that 
it will best allow this PhD research to achieve its ultimate research goal of understanding 
more about the influence of PMFs in criminal sentencing.  
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3.1.3. Past Research on Sentencers’ Perceptions of PMFs 
 To date, there has been very little qualitative research on sentencers’ perceptions of 
personal mitigation in general or character-based PMFs in particular. The following studies 
are all reviewed in more detail at pp. 38-50 of Chapter 1 but are summarised here for 
convenience. 
3.1.3.1. Remorse. Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003) and Millie, Tombs and Hough 
(2007) both reported that sentencers were generally sceptical about remorse, and concerned 
with distinguishing between “truly repentant” offenders and those who were just “sorry they 
were caught”.  Gelsthorpe and Loucks (1997) found that magistrates mostly stated they 
assessed remorse based on the appearance of the defendant in court and their own gut feeling, 
while Jacobson and Hough’s (2007) participants were reportedly more concerned with 
demonstrations of remorse such as a guilty plea (a claim of remorse “cannot logically proceed 
from a plea of not guilty” – Jacobson and Hough, 2007, p. 44)), letters to the court and/or 
reparation attempts. Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003) found that sentencers associated 
remorse with the perception that an offence was a one-off “moment of madness” that would 
not be repeated.  
3.1.3.2. Good character. Only Jacobson and Hough (2007) report any findings about 
good character.  The authors appear to use the term “good character” to mean no previous 
convictions – although they do not say this explicitly. They distinguish this from positive 
good character (also referred to elsewhere in the report as “has led a productive/ worthwhile 
life”). Jacobson and Hough mention positive good character only briefly, noting that it is 
“sometimes rewarded by the sentencer” (p. 31). Examples given of evidence for positive 
good character include having a military record or a good employment record. The authors 
argue that good character can make the difference between prison and a community sentence, 
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citing a typical example given by one judge of a man with no previous convictions and steady 
employment who goes out drinking and gets into a fight. In such a case, the offence is likely 
to be viewed as a “blip”, and a prison sentence would therefore be “counter-productive”.  
3.1.3.3. Addressing addiction. Jacobson and Hough (2007, p.33) – the only 
researchers to mention addressing addiction – conclude somewhat vaguely that it is “perhaps 
the most significant” of any mitigating factor but they provide very little qualitative evidence 
to support this assertion, other than noting that the factor is “often viewed as ‘taking a chance’ 
on a possibly deserving defendant”.  The authors also argue that addressing addiction only 
applies to decisions about sentence type, in particular custody versus non-custody. 
3.1.3.4. Other findings. Past research did not explore sentencers’ perceptions of the 
relationship between personal mitigation and offence type, although Hough, Jacobson, and 
Millie (2003), Jacobson and Hough (2007), and Millie, Tombs and Hough (2007) all 
identified a tendency among sentencers to emphasise the role of personal mitigation in 
offences that fall on the borderline between custody and community or suspended sentences 
(examples being relatively minor assaults or burglary). Jacobson and Hough (2007), however, 
do mention briefly the particular relevance of addressing addiction for property crime linked 
to drug dependency. Researchers found some evidence for sentencers perceiving personal 
mitigation as a holistic process involving an intuitive assessment of the whole offender, rather 
than adding individual factors together. Hough, Jacobson and Millie (2003, p. 39) concluded 
from their interviews that sentencers viewed mitigation as “as a value-laden process of 
constructing the narratives of the lives of the people in the dock”. Many of Jacobson and 
Hough’s (2007) participants referred to mitigation as “‘experience or feeling’ or ‘gut feeling’ 
rather than careful calculation” (Jacobson & Hough, 2007), which the authors viewed as 
“inevitable” given the subjectivity of PMFs such as remorse and addressing addiction. 
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Finally, both Raynard, Hebenton and Pease (1994) and Jacobson and Hough (2007) 
found evidence for substantial variation in the way that sentencers perceive PMFs.  In 
addition, Lock’s (2015) report for the Sentencing Council, evaluating the impact of the 
current sentencing guideline for assault offences, concluded that “some variation in approach 
remains. This seemed to be due to the wording and differing interpretation of certain factors” 
(Lock, 2015, p. 13). 
Overall, these studies provide some insights into what may be behind the impact of 
character-based PMFs on sentencing judgments, as well as raising some other relevant issues 
relating to sentencers’ approach to personal mitigation. However, past researchers have not 
dealt with those PMFs in any detail. The present study, in contrast, was a focused exploration 
of the three character-based PMFs, and was specifically designed to help explain and expand 
on the quantitative findings from Study 1. It is also the first piece of research to apply a 
sequential explanatory mixed methods approach to the study of personal mitigation, 
designing the qualitative research specifically to build on quantitative findings.  
The past qualitative research on PMFs was also methodologically limited in various 
ways. Shapland (1981) used only content analysis, i.e., counting mentions of different 
mitigating factors across counsels’ speeches in mitigation. This method lacks the richness of 
other forms of qualitative analysis and can risk becoming a proxy for quantitative research 
but without the benefit of being able to draw conclusions about cause-effect relationships. 
The other studies (Gelsthorpe & Loucks, 1997; Hough, Jacobson & Millie, 2003; 
Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Millie, Tombs & Hough, 2003) used thematic analysis – a well-
recognised method for locating patterns within qualitative data (see p. 141 and Appendix 7) – 
but their analyses had various methodological issues. First, none of the researchers 
acknowledged their underlying epistemology and its consequences. Instead, researchers 
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appear to have defaulted to what Guba and Lincoln (1994) call “naïve realism” (see also 
Braun & Clarke, 2006), i.e., assuming that participants’ talk about PMFs and their connection 
to sentencing outcomes could be taken as transparent representations of objective ‘truths’ 
about the sentencing process, rather than reflecting participants’ own subjective perceptions 
and/or experiences of sentencing. Taking an uncritical realist stance can cause researchers to 
draw invalid conclusions from their research.  Second, there were no descriptions of the 
analytic process, or even acknowledgment that there is a choice of methods and the choice 
will influence the kind of questions that can be answered. As a result, readers cannot evaluate 
the rigour applied to each analysis, e.g., how data were coded and themes developed, or 
whether the results presented were representative of the whole data set or were focused on 
responding to particular research questions. Third, some studies made insufficient use of 
verbatim extracts, which can make it very difficult to evaluate whether the conclusions drawn 
are adequately supported by the data. 
Jacobson and Hough’s (2007) study arguably illustrates several of the methodological 
limitations found in past qualitative studies of personal mitigation. The authors report 
qualitative findings from both observations of sentencing hearings and interviews with 
sentencers. However, the study contains no discussion of epistemology, choice of analytic 
methods, or description of the analytic process. Consequently, there is no way to evaluate the 
process used. Further, Jacobson and Hough’s conclusions infer cause-effect relationships 
between PMFs and sentencing judgments that cannot be justified on the basis of a qualitative 
study. The authors state, for example, that “it is clear that the severity of a sentence tends to 
be reduced if an offender has no previous convictions at all” (p. 31); and “from both our 
observations and our interviews we have concluded that mitigating issues relating to the 
defendant’s present and future tend to play the greatest part in sentencing decisions” (p. 33). 
Lastly, Jacobson and Hough (2007) made very limited use of verbatim extracts, preferring to 
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paraphrase rather than quote (there may have been practical reasons for this, but if so, it 
would have been helpful to state these explicitly). If participants’ responses are paraphrased, 
there is a far greater risk that results will be shaped to fit the researchers’ assumptions, 
perspectives, etc. The researchers should have acknowledged that they were not mere 
recorders of fact but were actively involved in generating the study’s conclusions, and should 
have taken proper account of this when preparing their analysis.  
  Psychology has a rich tradition of detailed, rigorous qualitative research within the 
criminal justice domain (for recent examples, see Ben-David, 2016; Livingston, Crocker, 
Nicholls, & Seto, 2016; Naughton, O’Donnell, Greenwood, & Muldoon, 2015; Marzano, 
Ciclitira, & Adler, 2016), as well as helpful guidance regarding steps that can be taken to 
ensure qualitative research is as rigorous as possible (e.g., Braun & Clarke, 2006; Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Silverman, 2011; Trahan & Stewart, 2013; Yardley & Bishop, 2008; 
Willig, 2013). Some criminologists have also embraced a more rigorous approach to 
qualitative research, such as Jeffries and Bond (2010) and Stewart and Trahan (2012). The 
present study aimed to approach the exploration of character-based PMFs with the level of 
rigour shown in qualitative psychological research. 
3.2. Aims and Objectives of the Present Study 
The study’s overall aim was to use appropriately rigorous qualitative methods to 
explore how judges perceive character-based PMFs, in order to provide possible explanations 
for the unanswered questions raised by Study. The objectives were: 
1. To examine how judges define, identify the presence of, and interpret character-based 
PMFs (remorse, addressing drug/alcohol addiction, and good character). 
2. To investigate judges’ perceptions of: 
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a. How character-based PMFs influence each other, when they appear together in 
cases. 
b. The relationship between character-based PMFs and choice of sentence type 
(custody, community sentence, or fine). 
c. Whether the presence of character-based PMFs affects sentencing decisions 
differently across different offence types (especially violent versus property 
offences). 
It is important to note that unlike past qualitative studies of PMFs in sentencing, the 
present study did not aim to draw any conclusions about causal relationships between PMFs 
and judges’ sentencing judgments. This thesis adopts the position set out at pp. 31-32 of 
Chapter 1 that it is unlikely sentencers can provide veridical accounts of their own sentencing 
strategies. Study 2’s aims relate very specifically to sentencers’ perceptions of PMFs. Those 
perceptions were analysed in order to explore possible explanations for the unanswered 
questions raised by Study 1, to develop a fuller picture of the process of personal mitigation, 
and to generate ideas for future research. 
3.3. Method  
3.3.1. Participants 
Participants were seven England and Wales Crown Court judges, recruited through 
the researcher’s existing contacts in the legal community. Six of the participants were male; 
one was female. Participants had a mean of 21.43 years’ sentencing experience (SD = 4.59). 
3.3.2. Design 
   Data were collected using semi-structured interviews. This made it possible to ask 
each participant a specific set of questions to each participant, but also provided the 
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flexibility to probe interesting areas as they arose, and follow the participants’ interests or 
concerns (Smith & Osborn, 2008).   
The semi-structured interviews were based on the question script at Appendix 6, 
which was developed based on the study’s research aims and the quantitative findings from 
Study 1. The first group of questions, “General questions about the PMFs”, were intended to 
explore sentencers’ understanding of the PMFs – what they mean, and how the judges 
determine whether a given PMF is present in a case or not. The second group of questions, 
“Questions about my empirical findings”, were designed to explore issues arising from Study 
1’s quantitative findings. Lastly, “Questions about guidance” were intended to explore 
sentencers’ responses to the possibility of guidance on PMFs, as well as the relevance of 
public opinion to sentencing guidance. 
3.3.3. Procedure 
Participants were interviewed one-to-one either in their chambers at court (five judges) 
or at home (two judges). Each judge was asked the questions on the script at Appendix 6, 
along with various other relevant questions that emerged organically during the interview 
process. The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and 1 ½ hours. Interviews were audio 
recorded with the prior verbal consent of the interviewees.  One interviewee did not give 
consent and so detailed notes were taken instead, verbatim wherever possible. Each interview 
recording was anonymised and transcribed verbatim.  
3.3.4. Ethical Considerations 
Before commencing data collection, ethical approval for the study was obtained from 
the Middlesex University Psychology Research Ethics Committee (REF: PG069-2016). 
Participants were interviewed in their place of work, i.e. in chambers, with the exception of 
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two judges who were previously known to the researcher, who were interviewed in their 
homes. The ethics application therefore included an Independent Field/Location Work Risk 
Assessment. Participants were given an information sheet and provided informed consent 
prior to each interview, then received a full debrief afterwards. Other potential 
ethical/analytical implications of the procedure used are discussed further in the reflective 
statement included in Section 3.6.5, at pp. 174-175. 
3.4. Analysis 
This section summarises the analysis that was carried out on the data collected. 
Further details of the analysis process are included at Appendix 7. The transcripts were 
analysed using thematic analysis. The present author carried out the coding and analysis 
alone as it was not practicable to enlist the help of a second coder. It is acknowledged that the 
analysis process and findings will therefore have been more influenced by the author’s 
individual perspective than would otherwise have been the case.  
Thematic analysis made it possible to search for, recognise and organise patterns in 
the data, in order to identify themes that are important to the understanding of the 
phenomenon studied (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Willig, 2013). 
Thematic analysis is an extremely flexible method that is not attached to any particular 
theoretical perspective. However, every qualitative analysis carries with it many assumptions 
about the nature of the data analysed and how they relate to the ‘the world’ and ‘reality’. All 
too often, underlying assumptions can be left unspoken, which typically results in a naïve 
realist account of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A realist perspective may often be 
appropriate, but this should be properly justified by reference to the research question(s) and 
the nature of the data analysed. It is therefore crucial that qualitative researchers make their 
epistemological and other assumptions explicit and describe how they carried out their 
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analysis in detail (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Holloway & Todres, 2003). 
Otherwise, it is very hard to evaluate the quality of research and to compare or synthesise it 
effectively with other studies (Attride-Stirling, 2001).  
The epistemology behind the present study is closest to what Willig (2013) calls 
“critical realism”.  The study’s perspective is influenced by the phenomenological emphasis 
on subjective individual perceptions and experiences, rather than objective external “truths”. 
It also acknowledges that the data gathered will have limitations, as they will reflect not only 
judges’ subjective, flexible, interpretations of the phenomenon of sentencing and their 
strategic goals, but also the interviewer’s own world view, knowledge, and assumptions. To 
that extent, the research acknowledges the “double hermeneutic” that is central to 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith & Osborn, 2008): participants try to make 
sense of the world, while the researcher tries to make sense of the participants trying to make 
sense of the world.  Nevertheless, the goal of the study is to use the exploration of judges’ 
perceptions and experience of PMFs to support conclusions about what those PMFs mean in 
practice and how they are used in the sentencing process. Consequently, the study adopts the 
realist position that qualitative data can be used to provide information about the world, 
“about how things really are” (Willig, 2013, p. 11); there is a single concrete reality and we 
can learn about it, to a degree, using appropriate methods (Samsi, 2012). 
The process of thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six major steps 
and was very much recursive and iterative rather than purely linear. First, transcripts were 
read and re-read carefully. Second, the data were coded using preliminary codes based on the 
study’s research questions, plus some inductively generated codes, and extracts for each code 
collated into separate documents. Third, themes were identified from the preliminary codes. 
Fourth, those themes were reviewed to ensure that they were adequately supported by the 
extracts relating to that theme. Fifth, each theme was given a name designed to give an 
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immediate sense of its meaning. Lastly, extracts were selected to best illustrate each theme 
and the final report was written. 
3.5. Findings 
The following section presents the findings of the thematic analysis. These are 
presented by topic and theme and structured by reference to the study’s research objectives. 
Appendix 8 contains a table summarising the final topics and themes identified in the data. 
Selected verbatim extracts from judges’ interview transcripts are included to illustrate each 
theme. In each case (unless otherwise specified), the selected extracts are representative of a 
larger pool of extracts that supported the theme in question.  
3.5.1. Judges’ Interpretations of Character-based PMFs 
3.5.1.1. Topic 1: Remorse 
 Is it genuine or not? Sentencers’ perceptions of remorse as a PMF turned on the 
question of whether any remorse expressed was genuine or not: “once you’re satisfied that 
it’s genuine, then it does have a big impact” (Judge 1). Concerning the meaning of remorse, 
judges highlighted the difficulty of distinguishing between an offender who is genuinely 
remorseful, i.e., feels guilt and regret at having harmed the victim, and one who is sorry he or 
she was caught, in which case “they’re crocodile tears, really”:  
You don’t get people coming into the police station saying, “you’ve never caught me, but actually 
I’ve brought 100 kilograms of cocaine into the country, and I’d like to have a clear slate”. So when 
they claim remorse, it’s not so. It’s that someone’s told them, you get 20 years for this. And they 
now, if they’ve got young children and all the rest of it, are deeply upset about it. But they wanted 
to make their million pounds (Judge 3). 
145 
 
 An apology is not enough. Most of the judges stated that they did not find a simple 
apology to be convincing evidence of remorse. Just saying “oh I’m terribly sorry” is “not 
very impressive”, because “that doesn’t prove anything”.  
I think letters in writing to the judge from the defendant are viewed with a certain degree of 
scepticism. If they’ve been in custody, you see the same hackneyed phrases appear and the 
suspicion is that it’s been written for them by the prison scribe. And I find letters, again, I’m 
generalising, but I find a lot of letters written by defendants to the judge are exculpatory as well as 
expressing deep remorse, and they set out a catalogue of rather flimsy excuses for their offending. 
(Judge 2). 
Objective evidence is best. Rather than just an apology, judges spoke of looking for 
objective evidence of remorse in the form of the offender’s actions: “remorse is far more 
likely to be effective in the judge’s mind if someone has demonstrated – namely by recovery 
of the goods, or naming of others who were involved – something which shows that they are 
[remorseful]”. Almost all the judges described a (preferably early) guilty plea as important – 
“the best evidence of remorse, really” – because “if somebody does feel guilty about what 
they’ve done, more likely than not they’re going to plead guilty”.  
For it to be of any real weight, it needs to be the sort of case in which having done whatever it is 
they have done, they regret it pretty well immediately – although there’s no direct temporal test – 
so it may be the following morning or whatever, I’m not suggesting it can’t be, and I’m not 
suggesting you can’t be genuinely remorseful if there’s more delay than that (Judge 3). 
Conversely, pleading not guilty and/or changing your plea late on in the case was perceived 
by some judges as disingenuous and indicative of a lack of remorse: 
I think the timing of the expression of remorse is important. I think that’s very important… I mean 
often you get these expressions of remorse and regret, and sackcloth and ashes from a defendant 
who’s pleaded guilty at trial when he’s, not until he’s certain that the prosecution witnesses are 
going to turn up, and I say to these... I mean counsel do say, “Well he’s very remorseful” and I say, 
“Well, he’s not, I don’t accept that because if he’d been remorseful he’d have admitted it to the 
police or at the very least pleaded guilty at an early stage” (Judge 2). 
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The fact he pleaded not guilty and changed his defence when the DNA evidence came up, that was 
another major factor, really. Right, well you’d have thought now they’ve got the DNA evidence, 
the game is up, he’s going to plead guilty. Not a bit of it. And then fabricated his defence and put 
all the blame onto the girl for egging him on, which was patently not true (Judge 4). 
Other actions taken to be evidence of remorse included offenders’ response to their arrest or 
conviction, such as an addict signing up for a drug rehabilitation course and reparation, e.g., 
repayment of money stolen from the victim: 
Inevitably you’ve got a gap between the commission of the offence and the sentencing, so you can 
actually see what somebody’s done. So that if, for example, somebody’s remanded in custody, and 
they committed the offence because of a drug or alcohol problem, and if they’ve gone on intensive 
programmes to try and address that, you’ll quite often get input from the prison itself. And that, 
you know, so there you’ve got very clear evidence of remorse and determination to reform (Judge 
1). 
You would have to demonstrate, for me to give you credit for remorse, something that goes 
beyond simply stating [that you are sorry] such as returning the goods, taking the police to where 
you’d hidden the goods or the fence to whom you’d supplied the goods, and a positive effort to get 
them back because you realise that it was an elderly person and the sentimental value would be 
considerable (Judge 6). 
However, the relationship between remorse and reparation can be complicated, as “it’s 
incredibly difficult to judge whether that is simply being done for mitigation purposes, or 
whether there is genuine contrition”.  
 Behaviour in court can matter, too. Despite the dominant focus on evidence that can 
be determined objectively as a matter of fact, there was also evidence that judges may assess 
the validity of remorse subjectively, based on a face-to-face evaluation of the offender’s 
behaviour in court: 
Where someone has been on trial and has been found guilty, you have seen how they’ve behaved 
in the dock, you have seen how they’ve behaved when they gave evidence, if they gave evidence – 
which quite often people do, if they’re pleading not guilty – and you can form your own judgment 
about it. Because that’s what it boils down to. In the case of that… rapist, he sat in the dock 
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absolutely blank faced. He didn’t say anything, he didn’t do anything, he simply sat there, and he 
watched this girl… give evidence, and relive her ordeal… He didn’t bat an eyelid… And so when I 
had his barrister saying how much he was covered in shame, and how full of contrition and 
remorse he was, I didn’t believe a word of it (Judge 4). 
3.5.1.2. Topic 2: Good character 
 Positive good character vs. no previous convictions. The interviews revealed 
widespread inconsistency regarding the definition of good character. Strictly speaking in 
terms of the language used in the current sentencing guidelines, it is incorrect to refer to a 
lack of previous convictions as good character. This is because “no previous convictions” is 
listed as a separate PMF in the guidelines, and so ought to be dealt with separately. However, 
all but one of the judges interviewed used the term “good character” to refer to both positive 
good character and no previous convictions. 
So good character: one, no previous convictions, but two you’ve got the much more positive part 
of good character, where somebody is really a very good, kind person (Judge 1). 
I mean it’s very important, particularly if it’s positive good character, rather than just an absence of 
convictions (Judge 2).  
It can be no previous. It can also be he’s been running the local…  youth football team for ten 
years, and he’s a fine upstanding member of the community. Or he is aged 18, he is very keen on 
football, he’s very good at it, he’s been playing in the local first team for years, it would be a 
terrible shame to take him away from that. Good works (Judge 5). 
Only one judge was clear that the PMF good character refers only to positive good character: 
Most guidelines are structured on the basis that the recommendation is for someone of good 
character, so that means that good character mitigation means positive good character. Which 
means making a significant contribution to society, that type of thing. Not just the norm (Judge 3). 
Several judges expressed the (incorrect) view that good character could consist of no 
previous convictions alone: 
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Good character means that this is the first time that someone has been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to an offence (Judge 6). 
Good character is influential because it is a fact: it means that someone has never been in trouble 
before (Judge 7). 
Lastly, one judge suggested that an offender could not get credit for positive good character 
unless (s)he also had no previous convictions: 
I think really good character comes in two stages, one are you dealing with someone with no 
previous convictions? If so, that can be built on so you can develop a positive case that this is a 
very, very good person who’s had for whatever reason a lapse in an otherwise very good life… Of 
course you’ve only got it once, you often say to someone, “I take into account your good character 
but you’ll realise of course you’ve lost that now. That’s a point that’ll never be available to you 
again” (Judge 1). 
 The importance of character references. It was generally agreed that positive good 
character was typically established through character references, e.g., “there may be character 
references from a range of people, some of whom may be very impressive”; “you 
occasionally get letters from the local scout leader or the local church or whatever… it makes 
a difference”. As regards the weight that should be given to character references, opinion was 
divided. Most sentencers’ comments suggested that a good set of references could change 
their impression of the case entirely, although it ultimately “depends what it is and the 
context of the case”: 
Half a dozen good character references, and then all of a sudden you’re just… you’re dealing with 
not just with somebody of good character in the sense of no previous convictions, but a really good 
person… So that’s hugely important, and I always find things like that letter from somebody who’s 
employed somebody for a decade in a position of trust and responsibility, a letter from even a 
mother or a father or other close family member, somebody perhaps who’s the secretary of a club 
that knows them – people that know them well – it can often carry more weight than a pre-
sentence report prepared by a professional who’s met them once or twice (Judge 1). 
One judge, on the other hand, was more sceptical: 
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The impression I get and my experience at the bar is that you, five minutes before you’re due to go 
into court you get handed this sheaf of letters, which you rather apologetically hand up firstly 
because you know they’re not going to make much difference and secondly you think it’s going to 
irritate the judge that’s got a busy list, that he’s got piles of letters from mothers, sisters, aunts and 
uncles saying what a really nice guy this fellow with ten previous convictions for violence or 
burglary, so but I mean, as I say, these are generalisations. There are cases where a letter can be 
moving and sometimes you know, often you get a defendant who actually does, there’s a very 
contrasting side to his nature, or his or her nature, and they do good works in the community and 
they look after disabled relatives, and there’s that side to it. And that does have an impact (Judge 
2).  
A stable employment record was also frequently cited as a basis for inferring positive good 
character: 
Normally somebody like that would be in good employment, or… and you know the best thing 
you can have is… that they’ve got a good job and they’re highly regarded by their employers and 
by family members (Judge 1). 
 Good character is not exemplary conduct. Only one judge mentioned anything about 
the one-off “exemplary conduct” sense of good character, rather than the more common, 
everyday sense of good works/reputation in the community.  
It is jumping into the Thames and saving a child. Sometimes you do get them, rather surprisingly, 
but you do. You do get them, I’ve had them… Not actually jumping into the Thames but I’ve had 
life-saving. Yeah. Burning building is one I remember… you know you can get away with 
knocking six months off by saying, “you are not really entitled to this but you are someone of 
positive good character, there is a clearly demonstrated other side to your personality. You are 
capable of altruistic bravery and I’ll recognise that and I’ll reduce the sentence… But that’s 
obviously an exceptional case, and quite rare (Judge 3).  
The lack of mentions of exemplary conduct is perhaps surprising, since it is the only sense of 
good character that is typically mentioned in sentencing textbooks and discussed by 
academics (e.g., Ashworth, 2015; Banks & Harris, 2012; Roberts, Padfield, & Harris, 2017). 
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 Good character and “one-off” offences. The interviews provided some insight into 
why sentencers may see good character as a PMF; it seemed to be linked to their perceptions 
about whether the offender’s behaviour was a one-off ‘lapse’ or was indicative of their 
having an overall criminal character: “is this a blemish in an otherwise law-abiding life, or is 
he a ne’er-do-well?”  
An offence often is committed on the spur of the moment. For example, stabbing someone only 
takes a second. Maybe there’s a build-up or a plan to it but the whole incident may be over within 
the day – the planning of the offence and putting it into execution. Good character is something 
that can be built up over many years, and therefore that may demonstrate better the nature of the 
person with whom you’re dealing, far better than the one-off incident which may truly be an 
aberration. (Judge 6). 
Four of the judges repeated a similar narrative of a typical case where positive good character 
is particularly relevant: a young man getting into a drunken bar fight. 
I was dealing with a group of young men who were scaffolders, and they were working away from 
home, and after work they had a few drinks, they go into the local town, they have a fight with 
some of the local boys, they were big tough lads these scaffolders, so they won the fight and won it 
handsomely. So they end up in the dock, the other guys end up as prosecution witnesses. And they 
all had good jobs, in fact they were all of clean character, and that was a case really where good 
character and good references saying, you know, “this young man can earn 500 quid a week or 
something as a scaffolder. If he loses his liberty, he loses his job, he goes into prison, there’s a risk 
then of him mixing with people who will damage his character”. So you look, you look to give 
people like that a chance (Judge 1).  
The presence of this kind of a typical narrative (which echoes the “typical” one-off case type 
reported by Jacobson & Hough, 2007) raises a potential issue. Positive good character is 
clearly a subjective factor. If judges are particularly inclined to think of a drunken assault as 
being a one-off lapse, then they may be more influenced by positive good character in this 
kind of case than in one that is less stereotypical in nature. In some of the accounts there was 
almost a sense of legitimisation of the criminal behaviour: “good youngsters go out, drink, I 
mean I think typical is group violence, because whoever wins the fight ends up in the dock 
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and the losers end up as the prosecution witnesses. It could so easily be the other way 
around”; “it’s just one of those things”. One judge even observed that “certainly in my 
younger days as a barrister, there was an element of “well, what do you expect in the pubs the 
steelworkers go to?” Further research would be required to explore this question in more 
detail. The judges did not cite any typical case of remorse or addressing addiction in an 
equivalent way.  
3.5.1.3. Topic 3: Addressing addiction  
 It deals with the cause of offending. Some judges perceived addressing addiction as 
important because it deals with the cause of the offending, i.e., many offenders commit 
crimes because they are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or in order to fund their 
addiction. Comments included “it’s the addiction that causes the offending”; “if you can 
break the drug offending, then that person may no longer offend”; and “it’s cheaper in the 
long run if you can break this habit”.  
If you know what the cause of offending is, which is pretty obvious if you’ve got a drug addict 
who needs more drugs, and so you can identify what the problem is... If there is a plan put forward, 
a realistic plan, to address the problem, any judge is going to be easily persuaded to go down it 
(Judge 4). 
 A cusp PMF – treatment requires a community sentence. Judges also appeared to 
view addressing addiction as very much a ‘cusp’ PMF, i.e., a factor that “tends to kick in in 
relation to offences where you might have a real choice about whether to send someone to 
prison or not”. 
I mean you may be looking at somebody in their thirties with a history of petty crime and more 
serious crime like burglary over many years, or because they’ve been a heroin addict for the last 
twelve years and suddenly they’re on a programme, and somebody who’s running the programme 
says they’re making a real effort, they’re on methadone, they’re gradually reducing the methadone, 
there’s a real chance of success, and then you think if you send somebody like that to prison, you 
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may be knocking them right back if they’re doing it on the outside… I mean, if it’s three strikes 
and you’re out with a burglary... then that’s different, but if it’s not then you would look for a 
way… (Judge 1). 
The natural consequence of a judge determining that an offender is addressing his or her 
addiction is that (s)he should be given the chance to continue that process. Participation in 
some kind of drug or alcohol treatment programme typically takes place in the community, 
and the majority of judges shared the perception that such programmes are rarely available in 
prison (which may make them less likely to consider it as an option): 
There are obviously programmes in prison as well… And part of the problem as well, is that it’s 
often very difficult to get on these programmes, I’m told (Judge 1). 
The probation report is likely to be going on about courses that are available in the community. 
And you know that if you pass a custodial sentence, the probability is that these things aren’t going 
to be available (Judge 3). 
However, one judge did express the opposite opinion, stating that “offenders can get 
treatment in prison as well, and so dealing with addiction can still be a relevant mitigating 
factor where a prison sentence is necessarily involved”.  
 Therapeutic jurisprudence. One other pattern identified in the data was that some of 
the judges seemed to get a real sense of satisfaction from giving an addict a chance to recover 
from their addiction, and this encouraged them to take account of an addict’s attempts to 
address their addiction if at all possible. This approach echoes the perspective of researchers 
who have highlighted the therapeutic potential of the legal system, especially in the context 
of drug rehabilitation (e.g., Kaiser & Holtfreter, 2015; Nolan, 2001; Wexler, 2000; Wexler & 
Winick, 1996; Winick & Wexler, 2015).  
There’s a… Drug Rehabilitation Requirement, which I used to, well I think all of us used to use 
quite a bit, at least, it involved… them coming back every month, hopefully in front of the judge 
who passed the sentence, and you review their progress. You know, and when you do get, you get 
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to know them really, and on the odd occasion that you get one that succeeds with it, it’s really 
quite a joy, because you don’t much, you don’t get much joy in the job (Judge 2). 
I had one chap who was the most amazing young man… And he had a drug problem, and when 
you give people a community sentence or send them to a drug rehabilitation unit residential, you 
can have reviews and ask to see them every day or every week or every month. Which is 
something I like to do because I think it helps that they know that they’ve got to come back and 
face the judge and tell him what they’ve been up to… And certainly in this man’s case, I saw him 
for, I don’t know nine months or something like that, and by the time I’d got to the end of this 
process – it might’ve been longer – he’d found himself a job, he’d got himself on a number of 
courses, and I really felt that, you know, he’d done everything he possibly could to stop the whole... 
and he’s never been back (Judge 4). 
 No second, third, fourth, etc. chances. Judges’ comments on addressing addiction 
highlighted that the PMF is not available indefinitely to repeat offenders. If an addict pleads 
“the same mitigation that was last year, then it’s not going to work”, and any rehabilitation 
plan is subject to “how many times has this been tried in the past”.  
The time comes when everything thing’s been tried two or three times and every time it’s failed, 
and sometimes you hold up your hands as it were in despair, and say, “you know, there just is no 
point”. You can’t set somebody up to fail, that’s cruel, you know and really, really unfair. So if 
you think there really is no chance, look I’m going to... my temptation in those cases is to pass as 
long a sentence as I feel like I properly can, in the sense, that, you know, “I’ve just given you nine 
years in prison, you’re going to be four-and-a-half years in prison. That gives you ample time to sit 
back and think about your addiction, and use whatever facilities are available in the prison to do 
something about it when you come out (Judge 4).  
3.5.2. Judges’ Perceptions of Interactions Between Character-based PMFs  
Study 1 found that PMFs in general, and character-based PMFs in particular, 
frequently occur together (see Chapter 2, pp. 80-83 and 101-104). Study 1 also found that the 
effects of PMFs on sentencing outcomes were not purely additive. Specifically, remorse and 
addressing addiction were each underweighted when they occurred together in both assault 
and burglary cases, and good character and addressing addiction were each underweighted 
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when they occurred together in burglary cases.  The present study generated various possible 
explanations for this apparent underweighting of multiple PMFs. 
3.5.2.1. Topic 4: Underweighting of multiple PMFs 
PMFs seen as two sides of the same coin. Judges’ comments often suggested a 
conceptual link between remorse and addressing addiction. In particular, addressing addiction 
was seen as evidence of remorse: 
If, for example, somebody’s remanded in custody, and they committed the offence because of a 
drug or alcohol problem, and if they’ve gone on intensive programmes to try and address that, 
you’ll quite often get input from the prison itself. And that, you know, so there you’ve got very 
clear evidence of remorse and determination to reform, so it’s all part of addressing a problem and 
trying to reform, so remorse again is part of the story there (Judge 1). 
They’re two sides of the same coin, in a way… because they might say “well, I’ve realised now 
that I’ve committed this offence and I realise that I wouldn’t have done it if it hadn’t been for the 
addiction and I’m going to do something about it” (Judge 2). 
No judges described any inter-relationship between good character and addressing addiction.  
Personal mitigation is assessed holistically. As well as perceiving a particular inter-
relationship between remorse and addressing addiction, several judges’ comments suggested 
that they viewed personal mitigation more generally as a holistic process – intuitively 
assessing all of an offender’s circumstances – their personal narrative – in the round rather 
than totting up individual factors: “it’s a combination of all the mitigating factors”, based on 
“a package of good mitigation”, or “the total picture of the background”. Rather than adding 
individual factors, “you’re looking at the whole offender”; “you have to sort of lump them 
together”.  
Something which is very difficult to rationalise is the sort of circumstances and background of the 
offender. So if you take it to one extreme you’ve got girl who’s been away to university, dropped 
out of the course because of being introduced to drugs, gone off the rails completely, now commits 
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burglary. Familial support, offers of courses etc. I would think 19 out of 20 of us are not going to 
send that person to prison. If at the other end of the scale you’ve got a chap who’s been off the 
rails for years, he’s committed burglaries in the past, it is said he is going to address it but you’re a 
bit sceptical, you will investigate and consider it because it’s cheaper in the long run if you can 
break this habit. But of course, if it’s the same mitigation that was last year, then it’s not going to 
work (Judge 3). 
Judge 5 was an interesting case, because on the one hand they expressed a belief in 
experience-based, holistic sentencing: 
 You can’t just go on adding five percent here and there… It’s not, it’s an art and not a science. It’s 
not mechanistic… I think if you’ve been doing crime as long as we have… you get a feel… I can 
look at a case, if a sentence comes in front of me I can get – you can tweak it and tinker with it, but 
the moment you’ve looked at it you think this is within a range (Judge 5). 
On the other hand, however, Judge 5 repeatedly spoke about mitigation in a way that 
suggested their approach was actually highly numerical in character. For example: 
Alright then, you’re one of a gang of four armed robbers robbing a bank with guns, and they’ve all 
done it before... And you haven’t, of course they’ve done it before, and that is the aggravating 
feature, so they’re going to get sixteen years, and you’re going to get ten to twelve… If you take a 
starting point of twelve, mine comes down to ten, because I’m of good character; theirs goes up to 
sixteen because they’ve done it before (Judge 5). 
Judge 1 also made one comment that suggested they thought about mitigation as a numerical 
or additive process: 
You’d say here are the aggravating features, the starting point would be say 18 years, you’ve got 
the fact that you were in a group of four, the fact that it was unnecessarily prolonged violence, 
something like that, that takes it up a scale, and then your good character will bring it down, so I 
will remain at 18 years, for example (Judge 1). 
Judges’ justifications for underweighting. Several judges argued that PMFs could not 
simply be additive because the total mitigation available in any case was limited by the need 
for the final sentence to reflect the overall seriousness of the offence; “the combined effect of 
all the mitigation is unlikely to drive it down below the sort of irreducible seriousness thing”. 
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From this perspective, an element of underweighting when multiple PMFs were present in a 
case was viewed as inevitable. 
I don’t think you weight to a nicety. The weight you give to each of them is the combined weight 
of all the mitigation… Because otherwise, if you were to give X percentage reduction for each 
mitigating factor, you’d end up by saying “well, you’ve now got six months in credit to the next 
offence...” (Judge 4). 
Well, there’s a limit. You can’t add 10% for each of ten mitigating factors, or you’d end up with 
no sentence at all… You’ve got to end up with a sentence that reflects, that does justice to both 
sides – does justice to the defendant for all the good things about his mitigation, but also does 
justice to the public and the victim. So, it’s quite difficult to get mitigation to affect the sentence by 
more than, say, 40%... Once you’ve given him 40% off for his going to the police station the next 
day and admitting it, and any other bits and pieces, to get it beyond 40% is pushing it… (Judge 5). 
Judge 3 made two additional points that suggest other possible explanations for the 
underweighting of multiple PMFs. First, they noted that reduction of a sentence for PMFs 
was limited by the relatively narrow sentencing ranges specified by the current guidelines: 
Well, there’s a law of diminishing returns because of the effect of the guidelines. It’s a brave 
sentencer who steps outside of the guidelines because of the combination of mitigating factors that 
you’ve got… before the guidelines, if you had a full hand of mitigating factors, you could get an 
exceptional result. In theory, you should still be able to do so, but in practice the effect of the 
guidelines has been to harden it up… What I have a problem with is the salami slicing of little 
bands of sentencing, which are the enemy of personal mitigation (Judge 3). 
Second, they perceived that there was pressure put on judges to avoid sentences that could be 
viewed as overly lenient: 
There are a lot of factors at work here. You have the introduction and then expansion of the 
prosecution’s right of appeal. That has had an un-looked for consequence in meaning that judges 
who were inclined to be merciful are cautious… they used to publish a sort of hall of shame from 
the point of view of the Daily Mail readers of the judges who’d had their sentences increased more 
than anybody else…this has a pernicious effect because people don’t like being pilloried as being 
woolly liberals (Judge 3). 
3.5.3. Relationship Between Character-based PMFs and Choice of Sentence Type 
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3.5.3.1. Topic 5: PMFs and borderline cases  
 PMFs matter most in borderline cases. There were no particular patterns found in the 
data to suggest that judges viewed PMFs differently in a case that necessarily involved a 
community sentence from one that required immediate custody. Judges’ comments focused 
instead on the relationship between PMFs and cases lying on the borderline between 
immediate custody and a community or suspended sentence. Past research has identified a 
perception amongst sentencers that personal mitigation is particularly important for pulling 
borderline cases back from immediate custody (Hough, Jacobson, & Millie, 2003; Millie, 
Tombs, & Hough, 2007). This perception was supported by the findings of Study 1 that 
almost all PMFs listed in the guidelines are associated with a reduced likelihood of 
immediate custody (see Chapter 2). The judges in the present study also perceived a link 
between the PMFs studied and the choice between custody and not for borderline cases. 
Some comments related to personal mitigation in general: 
A suspended sentence is up to a maximum of two years, and so again it’s a huge point where 
remorse, good character, addressing an addiction, can pull something back beyond the two years. I 
mean quite often a lot of speeches in mitigation are aimed at trying to persuade the judge that it’s 
less than two years so you have the option of suspending (Judge 1).  
Other comments dealt specifically with remorse… 
If defence counsel can demonstrate genuine remorse, however, by whatever means, then I, it can 
make the judge’s job very difficult, because it can turn a case from being three years imprisonment, 
to “oh dear, do I have to send him inside?” (Judge 5).  
…good character… 
You do get references that they work for saying he’s a good lad, and you know is a staunch 
member of the football team, and he trains the mini, you know the mini footballs and things like 
that, you know somebody like that, you’re very hesitant, you don’t want to send to prison if you 
can find a way, and so that’s the beauty of the suspended sentence, really (Judge 2). 
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…and addressing addiction… 
If we have, for example, someone who’s committed a relatively minor, by which I mean up to and 
including subsection 20 woundings, offence of violence, and there is good quality material from 
the probation service that is linked to addiction which he is a good subject for such schemes as are 
available to deal with it... And if it’s good stuff, that may well make the difference between 
immediate custody and not (Judge 3). 
 If there is a chance, take it. The concept of personal mitigation as giving an offender 
a chance, or taking a chance with him or her, recurred frequently throughout the data set, in 
phrases such as “you look to give people like that a chance”, “if there is a chance, take it”, 
and “you want to try and give someone a chance”.  
And the number of times you say, “I’m going to take a risk with you. Don’t let me down, I’m 
going to give you a suspended sentence” (Judge 5). 
It may be that when judges have to deal with borderline cases, PMFs such as remorse or good 
character influence their perception of the offender, creating the impression that he or she is 
the kind of person who should not or need not be sent to prison. In other words, PMFs may 
cause judges to focus on rehabilitative aspects of sentencing, as opposed to e.g., deterrence or 
public protection. It is notable that one of the offence types where the judges agreed personal 
mitigation was not persuasive (see Theme 6 below) was drug offences, the current sentencing 
of which emphasises deterrence over the other purposes of sentencing.  
3.5.4. Does Offence Type Moderate the Effect of Character-based PMFs on Sentencing? 
3.5.4.1. Topic 6: PMFs and offence type/seriousness 
 Addiction linked to burglary. Study 1 found that the effects of remorse and good 
character varied little between assault and burglary. The qualitative data supported this 
finding to the extent that judges did not identify any differences in their perception of PMFs 
between those two offence types. However, Study 1 also found that addressing addiction had 
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a larger mitigating effect on burglary cases than assault cases. None of the judges were able 
to offer any direct insight into this finding.  
However, some respondents did refer to a perceived endemic link between addiction and 
burglary: 
I mean, huge numbers of burglaries and thefts occur because somebody’s got a drug habit...they’ve 
got to find £100 a day, and the only way they can do that unless they’ve got a bloody good job is 
to go out and commit burglaries and things and frauds and things like that (Judge 1). 
The majority of burglary offences are domestic burglaries, seem to be people who are drug addicts, 
acquisitive criminals or drunks who sort of... you know somebody looking for quick money (Judge 
2). 
The presence of this perception suggests one reason why addressing addiction may have 
more impact on sentencing for burglary than for assault. If addiction and burglary are 
strongly linked in judges’ minds, they may see a stronger possibility that addressing an 
offender’s addiction will reduce the chance of future offending in burglary cases than in cases 
of assault. 
When asked whether their use of PMFs depends on offence type, judges tended to identify 
exceptions, certain specific offence types where they believed personal mitigation was less 
relevant than in other cases. Three distinct themes emerged in relation to those exceptions.  
 PMFs matter less for long-term offences. First, judges perceived PMFs as 
unimportant in cases involving a pattern of behaviour over an extended period, such as 
historic sex abuse or long-term fraud. 
Obviously historic sex abuse cases, where they’ve abused people over a long period of time, it’s an 
artificial idea that they’re of good character, because they were committing offences all the time it 
just hasn’t been discovered (Judge 3). 
If you’ve committed a Ponzi fraud… And you’ve done it over several years, and you’ve taken 
millions of pounds off victims who’ve been left either having lost huge amounts of money or 
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penniless, and all the consequences of that, then however much remorse you’ve shown, and 
however good your good character is, in my book would make no difference at all (Judge 4). 
 PMFs matter less in offences that are not about rehabilitation. Second, PMFs may 
be irrelevant because of the purposes of sentencing that are paramount for a particular offence. 
For example, sentencing for drug trafficking is about deterrence, punishment and protection 
of the public, rather than rehabilitation. 
A vast number of people deal in drugs in order to fund their own habit, and depending on their role 
and depending on the type of drugs, certainly if it’s class A, you’re thinking about fairly significant 
prison terms. Because the perception is you’ve got to protect the public, you’ve got to punish them, 
and that’s the dominant feature more than the tragedy of an addiction (Judge 1).  
There are one or two offences where [good character] doesn’t wash. They include large-scale drug 
trafficking, where there is authority in the Court of Appeal and on this occasion, with which I 
agree, that because this is all about deterrence, you simply can’t. Because the aim of it is to deter 
people, and so it doesn’t work for that reason (Judge 3).  
 PMFs matter less in offences where custody is guaranteed. Third, PMFs may have 
less impact because the offence is so serious that a custodial sentence is almost guaranteed. 
From the way judges tended to describe such cases, it seems that they primarily viewed PMFs 
as relevant for pulling offenders back from custody in borderline cases (discussed under Aim 
2b above). As a result, where custody is unavoidable, the issue of personal mitigation is 
perceived to fall away somewhat: 
I had to sentence three really decent young blokes… they followed this guy out of the pub, pursued 
him down the road and beat him up, they knocked him to the ground and they all put the boot in. 
And… he had a broken jaw and fracture around the eye there, so it was clearly a section 18, they 
all pleaded to section 18. None of them had ever been in trouble, they all came from good families, 
there must have been 100 people sitting in the public gallery, all their family and friends and 
supporters, and you know you could feel this wall of, of willpower trying to persuade me not to 
send them to prison, but the advocates all accepted as they had to that it was a minimum of three 
years (Judge 1). 
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In a really serious case, let’s say there’s a young lad, 24, never been in trouble before, goes out on 
a Saturday night, has a skinful of booze, gets into an argument, and then knocks somebody to the 
floor and kicks them around the head, causing them serious injury. Now, that, a good character 
doesn’t obviously save him from immediate custody because that is a custodial case (Judge 2). 
3.5.5. Other Topics Identified in the Data 
Two additional topics were identified in the data which, although not directly responsive to 
the research questions for Study 2, were nevertheless relevant to the wider research 
programme and so they were included in this analysis. 
3.5.5.1. Topic 7 – inconsistency of approach 
The qualitative data provided substantial evidence of inconsistencies in judges’ approach to 
personal mitigation. While there were clear patterns in the data, and it is important not to 
overemphasise the extent of variation between judges, “deviant” views were expressed on 
most of the themes identified. The presence of a degree of inconsistency is not surprising 
given the inherent subjectivity of the three character-based PMFs and the breadth of 
discretion that sentencers are currently given to determine the weight to be given to them. 
 Remorse. There was general agreement about the importance of actions rather than 
words: a simple apology is not enough. This is consistent with Rachlinski, Guthrie and 
Wistrich’s (2013) experimental findings for US Federal court judges, but not US State court 
judges or Canadian judges. The judges were also generally consistent in looking for objective 
evidence of an offender’s remorse, in particular a guilty plea. However, one judge took a 
more extreme position, stating that the only good evidence of remorse was an almost 
immediate confession/guilty plea: “it’s got to really be something that’s not after you’re 
caught for it to count proper remorse weight.” This is strikingly different from the judge who 
argued that if an offender attended a drug rehabilitation programme while remanded in 
custody that would be “very clear evidence of remorse and determination to reform”.  In 
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addition, a few judges did appear to value a face-to-face approach based on an intuitive 
evaluation of the offender’s character. For example, “he didn’t say anything, he didn’t do 
anything, he simply sat there… He didn’t bat an eyelid… And so when I had his barrister 
saying how much he was covered in shame and how full of contrition and remorse he was, I 
didn’t believe a word of it”.  
 Good character. Most judges interpreted good character as some combination of no 
previous convictions and positive good character. However, one judge specified that for the 
purposes of the guidelines, it was limited to positive good character. There were varied 
attitudes to the weight that should be given to character references, with one judge in 
particular expressing scepticism about their value:  
“it’s going to irritate the judge that’s got a busy list, that he’s got piles of letters from mothers, 
sisters, aunts and uncles saying what a really nice guy this fellow with ten previous convictions for 
violence or burglary” (Judge 2). 
Another judge criticised what they perceived as a practice of, in effect, treating “being 
middle-class” as a mitigating factor: 
You have the problem that arises from the fact that someone being from a middle-class 
background, or professional background, or something like that, seems to be regarded in some 
situations as being a mitigating factor, when to someone like me who’s perhaps not from that 
background, I don’t see the logic of it all… I don’t regard it as an aggravating feature but I don’t 
regard it as being anything other than neutral (Judge 3). 
One judge even argued that good character could be an aggravating factor in certain 
circumstances: 
What might be a huge mitigating factor for one person, might be almost an aggravating factor to 
another. For example, you know, the sixty-odd-year-old man who’s led a blameless life, who over 
several months has been burgling people around his home left, right and centre. It makes it worse 
that he’s of good character (Judge 4). 
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Addressing addiction. While most judges perceived that this PMF was more relevant 
to the choice between custody and not, since accepting it as a factor generally meant allowing 
the offender to receive treatment in the community, again there was a dissenting voice: 
Offenders can get treatment in prison as well, and so dealing with addiction can still be a relevant 
mitigating factor where a prison sentence is necessarily involved (Judge 7).  
 Holistic approach not taken by all. Five judges appeared to have a holistic perception 
of personal mitigation: “you have to sort of lump them all together”.  However, both Judge 5 
and Judge 1 made comments that suggested their thought processes in relation to mitigation 
may be more numerical/additive: “if you take a starting point of twelve, mine comes down to 
ten, because I’m of good character”; “the starting point would be say 18 years, you’ve got the 
fact that you were in a group of four, the fact that it was unnecessarily prolonged violence, 
something like that, that takes it up a scale, and then your good character will bring it down”.  
3.5.5.2. Topic 8: Reluctance to accept guidance on personal mitigation 
It was decided to investigate the likely challenges that would be faced by any attempt to 
introduce guidance on the use of personal mitigation in sentencing. Each judge was therefore 
asked for their response to the possibility of guidance in that area. Their responses were 
almost exclusively negative, and could be classified into five themes. 
 It’s too difficult – every case is different. First, some judges argued that guidance 
would be too difficult to produce (“I think it would be very difficult to devise a system like 
that”) because every case is different – this is the argument so often cited in defence of the 
need for judicial discretion in sentencing (see my discussion at pp. 254-255 of Chapter 6): 
I don’t think that’s a useful exercise, because again it depends on the facts of the case. Because 
what might be a huge mitigating factor for one person might be almost an aggravating factor to 
another (Judge 4). 
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The trouble with people who commit offences is that the offences they commit are all different, the 
aggravating and mitigating features are all different, and they’re all different. They’ve all got 
different families… the circumstances are infinitely variable, and it becomes a matter of feel 
(Judge 5). 
Judge 5 also argued that they had developed a “feel” for sentencing based on their experience 
– “I can look at a case, if a sentence comes in front of me I can get… you can tweak it and 
tinker with it, but the moment you’ve looked at it you think this is within a range” – an 
argument that is fundamentally inconsistent with the assertion that every case is different. 
 Guidance is not needed. Second, a few judges thought guidance was simply not 
needed and/or would “unnecessarily complicate and confuse” the process of personal 
mitigation: 
I’m not keen on that idea. I think you don’t want to over-complicate it. You know, you don’t want 
to say that for example location and timing of the offence is worth six months... or anything like 
that (Judge 1).  
I’ve never felt that the guidelines needed any expanding on what the factors mean, because I think 
they’re self-evident in a particular case, and I think any further assistance from the Sentencing 
Council will just be a waste of words, really (Judge 4). 
 It’s best dealt with by experience. The third argument was that personal mitigation is 
best dealt with by the sentencers’ judgment and experience: 
You’ve got to leave it to the judge… You’ve got to trust the judge, his judgment and discretion 
(Judge 4).  
It’s a matter of feel… No substitute for doing it… The answer… I’m afraid, is experienced 
criminal barristers becoming criminal judges (Judge 5). 
 That’s what our training is for. Lastly, it was proposed that the training received by 
judges and magistrates provided sufficient guidance on dealing with personal mitigation – 
“that’s why we go on courses”: 
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There’s the judicial college, and the training provided to judges is superb, really superb. I don’t 
know how good it is for magistrates but I would imagine it’s as good as for professional people… I 
don’t know that it’s really possible to do much more than has been done (Judge 1). 
 Support for guidance. Only Judge 3 had any positive suggestions about guidance on 
the use of PMFs in sentencing: 
Well, I think in the modern world, having deprecated them throughout, it’s probably going to have 
a structure somewhat similar to the Sentencing Guidelines, because that’s what people are now 
used to looking at… I think a discursive/philosophical type of thing is not going to work, now… I 
suppose if I was doing it, you first of all do have to define what the aims of sentencing are. And 
then why is it that sentencing should be moderated. And you have to do it by logic, rather than gut 
reaction. So, it’s that logically, if your aims are X, Y and Z, then these are mitigating factors. Why 
is having a disadvantaged background, potentially in some cases a mitigating factor? [I]n its most 
acute example, if you’ve got someone who was sexually abused as a child, and you know that, and 
this is a cycle of abuse case, is that relevant mitigation? Now I would say it is, but what weight can 
you give it? Well, you move to the next, and so on… I think the only logic would be to do it by 
reference to aims. I think otherwise, all you’re doing is taking a snap-shot in time as to people’s 
collections of preferences and prejudices (Judge 3). 
3.6. Discussion 
3.6.1. Judges’ Perceptions of Character-based PMFs 
The qualitative results for the themes of remorse, good character and addressing 
addiction illustrate two important general points about judges’ perceptions of character-based 
PMFs. First, there is an important prior step in the process of personal mitigation that has 
never been explored in any detail. The vast majority of past sentencing research has focused 
on how much weight sentencers give to particular sentencing factors. However, there has 
been little or no research into the factors that determine how much weight sentencers give to 
one factor or another. Before sentencers decide what impact mitigation should have on an 
offender’s final sentence, they must first decide whether a given PMF is present or not, and 
what (if any) weight it should be given (see Figure 3.1 below). Process A is the influence of 
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various items of evidence on the evaluation of each PMF. Process B is the effect of each PMF 
on the final sentence outcome). Sentencers may not agree on what each PMF means in 
practice and may also vary substantially in the types of evidence they look for and rely on 
when evaluating a PMF. Statistical analyses of sentencing outcomes (such as those 
summarised at pp. 4-9 of Chapter 1 and Study 1 in this thesis) cannot provide any insight into 
this important, highly subjective prior step in the sentencing process. Qualitative research can 
provide assistance by suggesting tentative explanations itself and also by identifying areas 
where future quantitative research could provide more answers. 
 
Figure 3.1. Diagram illustrating the two processes involved in PMFs’ effect on a final 
sentence. 
Second, there are clear patterns in the data regarding how PMFs are perceived by 
sentencers (e.g. how they are understood, what evidence is considered relevant), which could 
realistically be used to assist the development of sentencing guidance. This general finding 
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challenges the argument made by sentencers in this study and elsewhere that PMFs are so 
infinitely varied that no generalisation is possible. At the same time, there is also enough 
inconsistency between the approaches taken by individual judges to suggest that clarification 
of various elements of the PMFs would be helpful. In other words, the data suggests that 
guidance could be both feasible and useful.  
The analysis also identified various specific patterns in judges’ perceptions of the 
individual PMFs studied. Judges’ comments on remorse suggested a large amount of 
scepticism about the genuineness of apologies, and (partly because of that scepticism) a focus 
on objective evidence where possible: actions rather than words. An early guilty plea may be 
of key importance. These findings echo the scepticism reported by Hough, Jacobson and 
Millie (2003) and Millie, Tombs and Hough (2007); the focus on objective evidence is 
consistent with the judges interviewed by Jacobson and Hough (2007) but conflicts somewhat 
with Gelsthorpe and Loucks’ (1997) magistrates, who were more concerned with evaluating 
the offender’s demeanour.  
Judges’ discussion of good character revealed a general unawareness of the 
distinction made in the sentencing guidelines between no previous convictions and good 
character/exemplary conduct. The results also provide a sense of how good character may 
mitigate sentences by encouraging judges to view an offence as a one-off lapse of judgment.  
Jacobson and Hough (2007) found a comparable connection between good character and 
assumptions about behaviour being a one-off “blip” rather than the sign of a criminal 
character. If an offender’s criminal behaviour is out of character, rather than indicative of it, 
then it suggests they are less likely to reoffend. This ties good character as a PMF to several 
of the purposes of sentencing, including rehabilitation – the offender is more likely to learn 
the lesson of his/her ways – and both deterrence and protection of the public, neither of which 
is relevant to a one-off “moment of madness”. In addition, this finding supports the argument, 
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proposed at p. 20 of Chapter 1 based on the theories of perceptual shorthand and focal 
concerns (Albonetti, 1987; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998), that character-based 
PMFs may act by altering sentencers’ causal attributions regarding offenders’ need for 
punishment and openness to rehabilitation. 
The qualitative data on addressing addiction also provides an insight into how and 
why this PMF may reduce the likelihood of a custodial sentence. The results support 
Jacobson and Hough’s (2007) finding that judges very much associate addressing addiction 
with the choice between custody and not. However, the present study goes a step further in 
identifying that one of the reasons why judges may tend to opt for a community sentence is a 
pragmatic one: they perceive there to be limited availability of drug treatment in prison. 
Judges also seem to value the opportunity to play a therapeutic role by giving addicts a 
chance to reform themselves. 
3.6.2. Implications for Understanding the CCSS Data 
The thematic analysis of the qualitative data helped to explain several of Study 1’s 
specific quantitative findings, and suggest answers to the questions that Study 1 raised or left 
unanswered. A range of issues were identified that shed further light on the personal 
mitigation process and could be developed into testable hypotheses for future quantitative 
research. 
First, two findings from the study suggest reasons why Study 1 may have found 
addressing addiction to be such a strong PMF. Judges perceived addressing addiction as 
important because, unlike the other two PMFs studied, it deals with the cause of the 
offending. In addition, addressing addiction almost inevitably raises the possibility of a 
community sentence rather than immediate custody, and judges like to give addicts a chance 
to recover where possible. Conversely, scepticism or caution amongst judges about the 
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genuineness of remorse may partially explain the relatively minor impact that the factor was 
found to have on the likelihood of imprisonment. 
Second, judges’ perceptions of personal mitigation suggested two elements that may 
interact to explain the underweighting of multiple PMFs (remorse and addressing addiction, 
and good character and addressing addiction) found in Study 1. In the first place, judges 
appeared to conceptualise personal mitigation as a holistic process. Psychological research 
suggests that a holistic, intuitive approach to a phenomenon is likely to lead to 
underweighting of the individual elements involved, a.k.a. “subadditivity” (Tversky and 
Koehler, 1994 - for a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Chapter 2, pp. 124-
125). Additionally, several practical constraints may influence judges’ approach to cases 
involving multiple PMFs. The possible constraints cited were structural (the restrictions 
generated by sentencing guideline ranges), motivational (the perceived need to reflect the 
overall seriousness of a case), and socio-political (pressure to avoid appearing lenient).  
Third, several of the themes identified in the data suggest that judges conceptualise 
character-based PMFs in ways that may help to explain the link between PMFs and the 
choice of a community sentence rather than custody. First, PMFs are seen as particularly 
relevant to borderline cases and relatively unimportant in cases where custody is unavoidable. 
Second, PMFs may create the impression amongst sentencers that an offender is someone 
worth taking a chance on, or giving a chance to. Third, PMFs (particularly good character) 
may promote the idea of an offence being a one-off lapse in judgment. Lastly, addressing 
addiction is a special case that judges may perceive requires treatment in the community. 
Lastly, the themes identified in relation to Topic 6, PMFs and offence 
type/seriousness broadly supported Study 1’s finding that the effect of remorse and good 
character did not differ substantially between assault and burglary cases. When talking about 
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the relationship between PMFs and offence type, sentencers tended to focus on certain 
categories of offence that were, for one reason or another, perceived as less amenable to 
personal mitigation, rather than expressing the view that PMFs necessarily varied from one 
offence to another as a matter of course. The results did suggest a perceived link between 
addiction and burglary that may be linked to addressing addiction’s greater impact on 
sentencing for burglary than for assault. 
3.6.3. Potential Practical and Methodological Implications 
The present study has potential practical and methodological implications. From a 
practical perspective, the current personal mitigation process in England and Wales lacks 
guidance not only as regards how PMFs should be weighted in different contexts but also 
which kinds of evidence should be used to evaluate them, and how. The present study 
showed how complex the evaluation process can be and uncovered a range of relevant topics 
that could form part of future guidance or assist in the development of a more structured 
personal mitigation system.  
The inconsistency of approach described in Topic 7 is typical of the kind of issues 
likely to arise from a discretionary approach to personal mitigation (see e.g., Chapter 1, pp. 6-
9). All three character-based PMFs are irreducibly subjective and there is currently no 
guidance on how to interpret them, and so it is hardly surprising that perceptions of the PMFs 
vary from one sentencer to another. This finding strengthens the argument that guidance is 
needed on the use of PMFs in sentencing.  
For remorse in particular, there was some evidence of inconsistency in judges’ 
approach to determining the genuineness of remorse, between those who claimed to rely 
purely on objective evidence and those who preferred a face-to-face, intuitive approach. It 
may, therefore, be necessary to specify in future whether remorse should ever be assessed 
171 
 
subjectively (especially given that the psychological literature suggests most people are 
relatively poor lie-detectors), or should be inferred only from offenders’ behaviour, such as a 
confession, an early guilty plea, or attempts at reparation. 
The confusion between positive good character and no previous convictions found in 
the data reflects the lack of clarity between these two terms in the literature on good character 
(see Chapter 1, pp. 48-49). It also suggests a problem for the interpretation of the results for 
good character from Study 1. Judges marking the box “good character/exemplary conduct” 
on the Crown Court Sentencing Survey forms may have sometimes had in mind “no previous 
convictions”, or some combination of that and positive good character. Consequently, the 
findings for good character should be treated with care, as should any conclusions drawn 
about differences between sentencing practice and public opinion on good character as a 
PMF as found in Studies 2 and 3 (since both studies operationalised good character as 
positive good character rather than no previous convictions). The likelihood of inappropriate 
conflation of positive good character and no previous convictions could be reduced by 
changing the wording of the PMF listed in Step Two of the current sentencing guidelines 
from “good character and/or exemplary conduct” to “positive good character and/or 
exemplary conduct”. A footnote could be added to clarify that no previous convictions and 
positive good character should be treated as separate PMFs.  
The themes identified under Topic 8 (reluctance to accept guidance on PMFs) show 
that any attempt to develop guidance on the use of PMFs in sentencing is highly likely to face 
strong resistance from the judiciary.  As a result, it will be particularly important to engage 
with sentencers from the earliest possible stage and to be prepared for the kind of arguments 
they are likely to raise, such as those highlighted in the present study. 
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Methodologically, the present study illustrates the potential benefits of combining 
quantitative and qualitative research in an appropriately structured and rigorous way: it 
enables a virtuous circle of complementary research. Quantitative research identifies cause-
effect or correlational relationships between variables but cannot always explain them. 
Qualitative data suggests possible explanations. Additional quantitative research can then 
explore the qualitative findings further, developing hypotheses and testing to see whether the 
data support them (or, strictly speaking, whether they can be falsified by the data). This 
iterative process generates a progressively deeper and richer understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest.  
Quantitative and qualitative research – especially used in tandem – contribute in 
different ways to the advance of knowledge. While quantitative research is focused on 
drawing conclusions about causal relationships, qualitative research – particularly within a 
sequential explanatory approach – is more about generating ideas and possible interpretations. 
The difference can be likened to the distinction made in creativity research (e.g., Baer, 2014; 
Guilford, 1967; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2015) between 
convergent thinking – a linear process aimed at generating a single, correct answer (“does X 
cause Y or not?”), and divergent thinking – which promotes the generation of many new 
ideas (“what factors are involved in the process that produces Y?”). It is arguable that 
quantitative research promotes convergent thinking, while qualitative research promotes 
divergent thinking. Ultimately, both types of thinking are useful for researchers aiming to 
gain deeper insight into a phenomenon of interest. 
3.6.4. Proposals for Future Research  
One of the very useful outcomes of the thematic analysis was that it identified a 
number of interesting issues that would benefit from further research. In each case, variables 
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suggested by the present study could be developed into hypotheses for testing in future 
quantitative studies.  
1. Sentencing research to date has been focused on the relationship between sentencing 
factors and sentence outcomes. There needs to be a change of emphasis towards 
examining sentencers’ use of evidence when determining whether a PMF is present in 
a particular case, and the weight it should be given, (i.e., process A rather than process 
B in Figure 3.1, p. 164). It is arguably just as important to know how and why 
sentencers decide to give credit for PMFs as it is to know how that decision affects 
sentence outcomes. For example, future research could: 
a. test the impact of different types of evidence (individually or in combination) 
on the weight given to remorse in sentencing, e.g., a guilty plea, an apology 
(written or oral) or reparation; 
b. explore possible interactions between remorse and the earliness of a guilty 
plea in reducing the likelihood of immediate custody;  
c. examine the effect of different types of character reference on the impact of 
good character on sentencing outcomes; and/or 
d. examine how many failed attempts at addressing addiction are sufficient to 
negate the mitigating effect of that PMF. 
2. Future research should explore whether the relationship between PMFs and 
sentencing outcomes is different for offences perceived to be less receptive to 
personal mitigation, such as sex and/or drug offences, compared to assault or burglary. 
3. Future studies should test the two possible explanations (psychological and practical) 
for the underweighting of multiple PMFs found in Study 1. 
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4. Researchers should examine how the weight sentencers give to good character may be 
affected by the extent to which a case confirms to certain stereotypical narratives of 
offending (e.g., a young man getting into a drunken brawl).  
3.6.5. Strengths and Limitations 
For thematic analysis in particular, Braun and Clarke note that it is vital to go beyond 
generic, passive statements about themes “emerging” from the data and recognise the active 
role that the researcher always plays in collecting data and identifying, selecting and 
interpreting themes (see also Ely, Vinz, Downing & Anzul, 1997; Taylor & Ussher, 2001). 
The following reflexive statement is intended to acknowledge the researcher’s relationship 
with the topic and the impact that it will have had on the study’s findings.  
I was a solicitor in a large, well-known London law firm for more than six years. 
Although I was not involved in criminal cases, I was a litigator and had regular exposure to 
the judiciary. Judges’ perception of me as a fellow lawyer not only helped me gain access to 
them in situ but also made it relatively easy to establish rapport and some degree of mutual 
respect with my interviewees. That rapport facilitated full and honest dialogue and greatly 
reduced the risk of receiving defensive or strategic/diplomatic responses from individuals 
who may otherwise have been wary of a social scientist investigating their decision-making 
practices. My knowledge of law and legal procedure was also useful for managing the 
interviews, in particular interpreting judges’ comments and directing follow-up questions.  
My legal experience has no doubt also given me many preconceptions about judges, 
including huge respect for their intellectual abilities and achievements and for the difficulty 
of their job.  My awareness of judges as authority figures within the legal profession made it 
harder to probe, ask difficult questions and challenge my interviewees on contentious issues. 
However, I am also a psychology researcher with an interest in improving sentencing through 
175 
 
potentially increasing structure and limiting discretion, a position that puts me at odds with 
many of the views about sentencing typically expressed by the judiciary. I believe that my 
academic perspective on the sentencing process should hopefully have counterbalanced the 
influence of my legal background to some degree. Overall, my background and my current 
research will undoubtedly have affected my conduct of the interviews, how the interviewees 
responded to me, and my interpretation of the interview data. 
Using a mixed-methods approach to research creates challenges. For example, it can 
be difficult to reconcile the very different kind of data that quantitative and qualitative 
research generates, and the potentially conflicting epistemologies involved. However, mixed 
quantitative and qualitative research also benefits from the complementary strengths and non-
overlapping weaknesses of the two methods, such as the generalisability of quantitative 
findings and the rich, contextualised nature of qualitative findings (Green & Caracelli, 2003; 
Johnson & Turner, 2003). 
Adding the present qualitative study to the quantitative analysis carried out in Study 1 
produced numerous benefits. First, the qualitative data produced several findings that helped 
to elaborate and/or clarify the quantitative findings. Second, the present study’s findings 
suggested various interesting avenues for future research that may not otherwise have been 
identified. Third, this study and Study 1 taken together provide a fuller, richer answer to the 
wider research question at the heart of this PhD, i.e., “what role do PMFs play in criminal 
sentencing?” than could be obtained from Study 1 alone. Fourth, the present findings also 
identified several issues that can help to inform possible future guidance on PMFs in 
sentencing, for example by highlighting where further clarification is needed on the definition 
of certain PMFs and their evidential requirements. 
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In common with many other qualitative studies, my sample size was small (n =7). 
This was, to some extent a necessary result of the challenges involved in gaining access to 
members of the judiciary.  However, the aim of the study was not to collect comprehensively 
representative data that would be generalizable across the population of sentencers as a whole. 
Rather, the aim was to obtain an in-depth sense of how a particular group of judges perceive 
PMFs in practice, as well as an insight into the richness of personal mitigation as a 
phenomenon within the sentencing process. Individual judges’ perceptions may not be 
representative of the profession as a whole. However, they helped clarify or explain Study 1’s 
quantitative findings, illustrated the complexity of the personal mitigation judgment process, 
and identified variables for further study that may not have occurred or been apparent to them 
otherwise, as well as identifying areas for future research.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) note that the aim of qualitative research is not 
generalisability, it is transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; see also e.g., Anney, 2014; 
Kuper, Reeves, & Levinson, 2008; Samsi, 2012). It has been argued that focusing on 
generalizability “strips away the context that imbues a qualitative study with credibility” 
(Padget, 2008, p. 182). Transferability involves asking whether the research describes the 
phenomenon in sufficient detail to allow readers to evaluate the extent to which the 
conclusions drawn are transferrable to other times, contexts, and people. The process can be 
viewed as a collaborative exercise between researcher and reader (Polit & Beck, 2010) and 
for that reason is sometimes referred to as “reader generalizability” (e.g., Misco, 2007).  
Researchers can facilitate judgments about transferability through purposive sampling 
and thick description (Bitsch, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Purposive sampling involves 
focusing on key respondents with particular knowledge of the research topic (Charmaz, 2003; 
Schutt, 2006) and aims for sample “adequacy” rather than “size”, indicated by depth as well 
as breadth of information (Bowen, 2008). In the present study, the sample was a group of 
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experienced Crown Court judges from four different circuits across England and Wales. 
Another concept relevant to the sampling process is theoretical saturation. In grounded theory 
research, data collection may be ended when the theoretical categories found to be emerging 
from the data are sufficiently “saturated” (Bowen, 2008).  Saturation is reached when “the 
researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being 
added… no new themes are identified, and no issues arise regarding a category of data” 
(Bowen, 2008, p. 139; see also Breckenridge, 2009; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Sampling for the present study was not explicitly carried out with the goal of 
theoretical saturation. However, while each participant clearly had a unique perspective, 
through the data collection and analysis process it became apparent that the same themes 
were emerging repeatedly and there was definitely a sense that the latter one to two 
participants were providing very little in the way of novel information. This insight gives 
some basis for confidence that a level of saturation was achieved in the study. 
The aim of thick description is to provide sufficient information about participants, 
researcher, and researcher-participant relationships to enable the reader to judge how well the 
findings may transfer (Misco, 2007; Morrow, 2005). Studies should include extensive details 
about methods used and sufficient data to evaluate properly the conclusions reached from 
those data (Guba, 1981; Li, 2004; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The present study provided in-
depth descriptions of the analytical process used and supported its findings with extensive 
verbatim interview extracts that give a rich flavour of the themes identified. The reflexive 
statement explores researcher-participant dynamics and their implications for the results 
produced. Overall, it is proposed that the present study had several features that suggest its 
findings should be transferable to other related contexts, in particular other Crown Court 
judges in England and Wales courts. 
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The qualitative nature of the analysis carried out also precluded drawing any 
conclusions about causal relationships between judges’ perceptions of PMFs and their actual 
sentencing judgments (e.g. Guba & Lincoln, 1989). However, as discussed above, that was 
never the purpose of Study 2. Study 1 was designed to examine the relationship between 
PMFs and sentencing judgments. The aim of Study 2 was to enhance and illuminate Study 
1’s quantitative results, and suggest answers to several important questions that Study 1 could 
not address. It is proposed that Study 2 has achieved that aim.
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4. Study 3 
 
The Effect of Personal Mitigating Factors on Public Judgments of Sentence 
Fairness 
4.1. Introduction 
Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis provided valuable insights into the role played by 
character-based PMF in current sentencing practice. However, sentencers’ judgments are not 
the whole story. It is also generally recognised that sentencers – and sentencing policy – 
ought to take some account of public opinion, for several reasons. First, democratic 
governments are accountable to their electorate through the sentencing policy they implement 
(Green, 1996; Hough & Kirby, 2013). Second, it has been argued that society’s approach to 
punishment should reflect shared cultural values (Robinson & Darley, 2007; Ryberg & 
Roberts, 2014). Most importantly, however, public trust in the criminal justice system – a 
crucial element in the rule of law – will be damaged if sentencing is seen as unfair (Bingham, 
2000; Henham, 2012; Hough & Kirby, 2013; Lord Carloway, 2013). For this reason, one of 
the stated goals of the Sentencing Council of England and Wales is “increasing public 
understanding of and confidence in sentencing and the criminal justice system” (Sentencing 
Council, 2016a, “Additional functions”). These arguments are addressed in greater depth in 
Chapter 1, pp. 26-28. 
 There is conflicting evidence about whether public opinion on sentencing outcomes 
differs from sentencing practice. Data from public surveys suggest that the majority of people 
judged criminal sentences to be too lenient (Dawes et al., 2011; Hough et al., 2013), and 
consider overly lenient sentencing the equal most important crime issue in Britain today 
(Ipsos MORI, 2010). However, studies suggest that if people are given detailed case facts 
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(via hypothetical vignettes or by acting as real jurors), their sentencing judgments may be at 
least as lenient as real sentencers (e.g., Hutton, 2005; Lovegrove, 2007; Ministry of Justice, 
2013; Warner & Davis, 2012; Warner et al., 2016). 
 Research has found that public satisfaction with the criminal justice system may 
depend on perceptions of procedural justice, i.e., the fairness of the process, at least as much 
as distributive justice, i.e., the fairness of the outcome (e.g., Casper et al., 1988; Hough et al., 
2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & Huo, 2002). One of the key elements required for 
procedural justice is neutrality, the expectation that legal principles will be applied 
consistently, that decision makers will be unbiased and that there will be transparency about 
how decisions are made (Tyler, 2006a). Sentencers’ use of PMFs is an important part of the 
sentencing process; if it is to be perceived as fair, it should therefore correspond to some 
degree with public judgments about personal mitigation (Roberts, 2008). It follows that 
exploring public judgments about PMFs is important and can help inform the discussion 
about how those factors should be used in the sentencing process (Dhami, 2013b). 
Several past qualitative studies have found only limited public support for the role of 
PMFs in sentencing domestic burglary (Russell & Morgan, 2001), causing death by driving 
(Hough et al., 2008), and sexual offences (Clarke et al., 2002; McNaughton Nicholls et al., 
2012). Conversely, out of 13 factors tested, Hough et al.’s (2009) focus groups gave “high” 
significance to three PMFs (single parent, treated for depression, and youth), and “moderate” 
significance to four other PMFs (genuine remorse, under pressure from uncle, in drug 
treatment, and abused as a child).  
Hough et al.’s (2009) conjoint analysis asked participants to decide whether offenders 
in four hypothetical property and four violent offence scenarios should receive a custodial 
sentence. For property offences, the four PMFs tested reduced the percentage of participants 
181 
 
choosing custody (43%) by the following amounts (approximately; precise figures were not 
given in the study): reparation = seven percent, drug treatment = five percent, in debt = four 
percent, abuse history = three percent, family pressure = two percent. For violent offences, 
the four PMFs tested reduced the percentage of participants choosing custody (38%) by the 
following amounts: mentally ill, remorse, job at risk all = four percent; abuse history = three 
percent. Hough et al. (2009) found no interactions between the PMFs tested, and concluded 
that the public evaluated PMFs independently from one another.  
Hough et al. (2009) is the only study to date that has produced quantitative findings 
on public judgments about PMFs. Unfortunately, the study had several limitations (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 1, pp. 55-56).  In summary, different PMFs were tested across the two 
offence types (property and violent), preventing any meaningful comparisons; insufficient 
detail was given regarding the methodology used; no tests of statistical significance were 
reported; no results were reported for the (lack of) interactions found between PMFs; and the 
study did not provide any useful comparative findings on the three character-based PMFs that 
are the subject of this thesis, since remorse was only tested for violent offences, addressing 
addiction was only tested for property offences, and good character was not tested at all.   
The present study chose to examine public judgments about the same three PMFs that 
were examined in Study 1, namely remorse, addressing drug or alcohol addiction, and good 
character. (A detailed discussion of these PMFs can be found in Chapter 1, at pp. 19-21 and 
45-50). Examining the same three PMFs allowed the findings of this Study (and those of 
Study 4) to be compared directly with Study 1, in order to evaluate whether public judgments 
about those PMFs are consistent with current sentencing practice. 
The present study also examined a fourth PMF, assisting the prosecution, which 
arguably also relates to the offender’s character. Assisting the prosecution is a statutory PMF 
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that allows the court to pass a reduced sentence to take account of assistance that the offender 
has given or agreed to give to a prosecutor or investigator in relation to his/her offence or any 
other offence (Serious Organised Crime and Police Act, 2005, (SOCPA 2005),  s. 73). Legal 
precedent provides that an offender’s sentence reduction should be considerable given the 
risks to which such offenders are exposed (R v. P and Blackburn, 2008) and substantial 
reductions are given in practice (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2012).  
Psychological research suggests that individuals cannot accurately describe their own 
judgment policies and/or that traditional post-facto self-assessment approaches are ineffective 
for this purpose (Galotti, Tandler, & Wiener, 2014; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wegner, 2002, 2004; Wilson, 2002).  Interview- or survey-based data are also 
susceptible to method biases, which may render them unreliable or invalid (Paulhus, 1991; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012). Further, studies have found that people’s 
experimentally captured judgment strategies predict their judgments significantly better than 
their self-reported strategies (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Konečni 
& Ebbesen, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).  
The present study therefore used an experimental approach to measure the effect of 
character-based PMFs on people’s sentencing judgments, rather than using the self-
assessment approach commonly taken by sentencing researchers in the UK (e.g., Hough et 
al., 2009; Jacobson & Hough, 2007). The study design was based on that used in other 
published research on variables influencing legal decisions generally (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 
2001) and sentencing decisions in particular (e.g., Corwin, Cramer, Griffin, & Brodsky, 
2012; Forsterlee, Forsterlee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Higgins, Heath, & Grannemann, 2007; 
Loeffler & Lawson, 2002; Mueller-Johnson & Dhami, 2010).  
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One other variable that may affect people’s judgments regarding the importance of 
PMFs in sentencing is the sentence type that the offender is due to receive, for example a 
fine, a community sentence, or a prison term. Von Helversen and Rieskamp (2009) used a 
Bayesian modelling methodology to analyse the effect of various sentencing factors on 
German prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations, based on data collected from the trial 
records of a single German court. Prosecutors were more influenced by AFs when giving 
fines but more influenced by MFs in general and remorse in particular when giving custodial 
sentences. This finding suggests that it is worth investigating whether the effect of the four 
character-based PMFs on people’s sentencing judgments is influenced by the category of 
sentence that the offender in question received. 
 A novel behavioural approach to measuring public judgments about PMFs is to ask 
people to judge the fairness of sentence outcomes when different PMFs are present or absent 
in a case. Fairness judgments should reflect people’s perceptions of distributive justice – the 
fairness of sentencing outcomes – and also procedural justice (e.g., Tyler, 2006a) – in terms 
of whether a given sentence can be justified in a case involving one PMF or another.  
Judging the fairness of pre-existing sentences also reflects the relationship between 
the public and the sentencing process. Most people’s experience of sentencing is limited to 
reading or hearing and reacting to media reports of sentences given (Green, 1996). 
Understanding how people respond to sentences can therefore help inform policy regarding 
how best to improve public awareness of sentencing and increase confidence in the 
sentencing process (in line with the goals of the Sentencing Council referred to above). No 
study to date has explored the effect of PMFs on public judgments of sentence fairness.  
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4.2. Aims and Objectives of the Present Study 
 The main aim of this study was to investigate whether people’s judgments about the 
role of PMFs in sentencing align with how those factors are currently used in the criminal 
justice system. The study focused on three character-based PMFs, i.e., remorse, good 
character and addressing addiction. The PMF assisting the prosecution was also included in 
the study since it is arguably also character-based. The objectives were: 
1. To examine the effect of individual PMFs on people’s judgments of the fairness of 
criminal sentences, in terms of whether they are too harsh or too lenient. 
2. To explore whether the effect of PMFs on sentence fairness judgments varies 
depending on the type of sentence involved, namely custody, a community sentence 
or a fine. 
3. To compare people’s experimentally captured judgments of the effect of PMFs on 
sentencing fairness against their stated views on the influence that those PMFs should 
have. 
4.2.1. Hypotheses 
 There is very little empirical evidence on which to base a hypothesis about the relative 
effects of the four character-based PMFs on people’s sentencing judgments. The findings 
from Hough et al. (2009), the only study to explore public judgments about the role of PMFs 
in sentencing, do not allow comparison between the four PMFs. The present study therefore 
was unable to make a priori predictions about the relative effects of the chosen PMFs on 
public judgments regarding sentence fairness. There was, therefore, only a general prediction 
made that all four PMFs would have a mitigating effect on judgments regarding sentence 
fairness. 
Hypothesis 1 was, therefore: 
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Participants will be significantly more likely to judge sentences as too harsh and less likely to 
judge sentences as too lenient when a PMF is present than when no personal mitigating 
factor is present.25  
 As regards the relationship between PMFs and sentence type, von Helversen and 
Rieskamp (2009) found that prosecutors were more influenced by remorse when giving 
custodial sentences. However, this was a study of prosecutors not the general public and it 
did not examine the other three character-based PMFs and so it does not provide reliable 
evidence on which to base a hypothesis for the present study. It was, therefore, decided to 
make only a general prediction that the effect of PMFs on fairness judgments would vary 
depending on the sentence type involved. 
Hypothesis 2 was, therefore: 
The effect of PMFs on participants’ sentence fairness judgments will differ depending on the 
sentence type involved, i.e., custody, community sentence or fine. 
 As discussed above, there is extensive evidence that people’s self-reported judgment 
policies tend to differ from the judgment policies that can be calculated from the actual 
judgments they make (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Konečni & Ebbesen, 
1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). For this reason, it 
was hypothesised that there would be a difference between participants’ self-reported 
judgments about the importance of PMFs and the actual measured effect of PMFs on their 
fairness judgments. 
Hypothesis 3 was, therefore: 
                                                            
25 A one-tailed hypothesis was used here because all existing research on the chosen PMFs has found that they 
have a mitigating effect on sentencing judgments. 
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The effect of PMFs on participants’ judgments of sentencing fairness will differ from 
participants’ own stated views on the influence that those PMFs should have on sentencing. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Participants 
 Participants were 45 Middlesex University students, recruited using the psychology 
department’s online participant recruitment system. A power calculation using G*Power 
3.1.3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) found that a sample size of 42 would achieve 
a power of 0.95 to detect a small-to-medium-sized effect (0.15) with an alpha of 0.05.  
All but two of the sample were female26. The sample’s mean age was 19.91 (SD = 
3.07). Some past research suggests that women may have more lenient attitudes to sentencing 
in general (Hough et al., 2013). However, there is no evidence that gender affects people’s 
judgments about the importance of mitigation in sentencing (Hough et al., 2009, found no 
gender effect). Participants were 37.8% (n = 17) white, 28.9% (13) Asian, 17.8% (8) black, 
13.3% (6) mixed ethnicity and 2.2% (1) other. Their political preferences were 55.6% (25) 
Labour, 11.1% (5) Liberal Democrat and 33.3% (15) other. 77.8% (35) said they had no 
experience of the criminal justice system, while 11.1% (5) had been a victim, 4.4% (2) had 
been a witness, and 6.6% (3) were otherwise involved.  
4.3.2. Design 
 The study used a within-subjects, factorial design. This design was chosen because it 
has increased power to detect effects compared to a between-subjects design.  Within-
subjects designs are more powerful because they remove between-subjects variation; each 
participant is his or her own control. One downside of within-subjects designs is the potential 
                                                            
26 The data was re-analysed with the two male participants removed and no significant differences were found in 
the results. 
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for carry-over effects (i.e. the response one condition may affect responses to subsequent 
conditions). To address this issue, the conditions in the present study were presented to 
participants in a random order.  
There were two independent variables. The first, PMF had five levels: showing 
remorse, addressing drug/alcohol addiction, assisting the prosecution, good character, and 
none. The second independent variable, sentence type, had three levels: custody, community 
order and fine). This resulted in 15 experimental conditions. 
4.3.3. Stimuli  
 Participants were presented with 15 short scenarios, each of which described an 
individual being convicted of non-domestic burglary and receiving a sentence. In each case, 
one (or none) of the PMFs was mentioned. A full copy of the stimuli is attached at Appendix 
9.  
 A pre-test involving 12 participants was conducted to evaluate possible 
operationalisations of the PMFs and to obtain general feedback on the structure and content 
of the stimuli. Participants were asked to match each of eight possible operationalisations 
with one of the four PMFs. The four operationalisations that the pre-test participants matched 
with their associated PMFs most accurately were chosen for the study, as follows: 
• Showing remorse – “[X] wrote a sincere letter of apology to the [victim].” 
• Addressing drug/alcohol addiction – “[X] is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme.” 
• Assisting the prosecution – “[X] assisted the police by giving them evidence about 
other offenders”. 
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• Good character - “[X] has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter.”27 
• None – No mention made of mitigating behaviour. 
 Three sentence types were used because they are the three options listed in the 
England and Wales sentencing guideline for burglary (Sentencing Council, 2011b). The 
operationalisations of each sentence type were chosen so that each was a plausible outcome 
for a mid-level case of non-domestic burglary, based on the current burglary guideline 
(Sentencing Council, 2011b). The three operationalisations were: 
• Custody – “[X] received 12 weeks’ imprisonment.” 
• Community order – “[X] received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid 
work.” 
• Fine – “[X] was fined 1½ times his weekly income.” 
4.3.4. Measures 
 It was decided to measure fairness judgments rather than ask participants to actually 
choose sentences because this measure better reflects the public’s role in sentencing, i.e., 
responding to media reports of sentences given rather than deciding the sentences themselves. 
The dependent variable was participants’ judgments regarding the fairness of the sentence on 
a bipolar 7-point numerical rating scale, with -3 labelled “too lenient”, 0 labelled “just right” 
and 3 labelled “too harsh”. Research suggests that scales with 7 or more points produce more 
reliable and valid results (Preston & Coleman, 2000) but more than 7 points may place too 
many demands on respondents’ cognitive abilities (Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert, 
2010). In addition, having an odd number of points provides a neutral midpoint, which 
provides an option for participants who genuinely judge a given sentence to be “just right”.  
                                                            
27 This operationalisation was chosen to best reflect the everyday reality of good character as a PMF (and 
distinct from no previous convictions), rather than a one-off exceptional act (see Chapter 1, pp. 48-50). 
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 Participants were also asked how much influence each of the four PMFs should have 
on a criminal sentence. Responses were provided on a 7-point unipolar scale, with 1 labelled 
“no influence” and 7 labelled “a major influence”. 
 A question was also included to check whether participants perceived the 
operationalisations of the mitigating factors as they were intended to, i.e., as representing the 
PMFs that the study was designed to manipulate. No manipulation check question was 
required for the sentence type variable because each operationalisation actually included the 
name of the sentence type in its wording.  
 Finally, participants were asked to provide some demographic information: their age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, political preference, and whether they had any prior experience of the 
criminal justice system (as a victim, an offender, a witness, or otherwise).  
4.3.5. Procedure 
 The study was presented to participants as an online survey, using 
www.surveygizmo.com. The scenarios were presented to participants in a random order to 
minimise any order effects. The dependent variable was measured after each scenario by 
asking “How fair is this sentence?” After all 15 scenarios, participants were presented with 
the manipulation check item, the self-report measure and the demographic questions. 
Participants took approximately 20 minutes, on average, to complete the study and received 
no monetary or other compensation for taking part. 
4.3.6. Ethical Considerations 
Before commencing data collection, ethical approval for the study was obtained from 
the Middlesex University Psychology Research Ethics Committee (REF: PG2014-101214). 
The first page of the survey included a brief introduction to the study, confirmation of 
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participants’ right to withdraw from the study at any time, assurance of anonymity and 
clarification regarding the use of any data collected. The second page requested consent from 
each participant. After taking part, participants were debriefed with a brief description of the 
aims and design of the study and were encouraged to contact the researcher if they had any 
questions or concerns. 
4.4. Results 
 Descriptive statistics are provided below, followed by the findings in relation to each 
of the study’s three hypotheses. Regression models are typically used to analyse data 
collected using policy capturing methodology. However, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was chosen for this study as the study design had too few cases (i.e., scenarios) and too many 
predictor variables for a regression to be able to detect even a very large effect28. The data 
were reviewed to establish whether they were suitable for analysis using an ANOVA. 
Normality was considered unlikely to be an issue given that the sample size was over 30 
(Field, 2013). No statistical outliers were detected in the data29. A 5x3 within-subjects 
ANOVA was therefore performed with PMF and sentence type as the independent variables 
and fairness score as the dependent variable.  
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for fairness ratings by each mitigating factor 
and sentence type.  
 
 
                                                            
28 For a design with eight predictors (five mitigating factor levels and three sentence levels), Field (2013) states 
that approximately 110 cases are needed to detect a medium-sized effect with a power of 0.828, or roughly 14 
cases per predictor. However, the present study had eight predictors and only 15 cases, i.e. 1.88 cases per 
predictor. 
29 Following Field (2013), z scores were reviewed with a score of 3.29 or more considered an outlier. 
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Table 4.1  
Means, standard errors and 95% confidence intervals for mitigating factor and sentencing 
type by fairness rating. 
Independent variable Mean fairness 
(Std error) 
95% CI 
[Low, high] 
Mitigating factor   
 Remorse -0.58 (0.14) -0.86, -0.29 
Addressing drug/alcohol 
addiction 
-0.30 (0.12) -0.54, -0.05 
 Assisting prosecution -0.81 (0.14) -1.08, -0.54 
 Good character -0.19 (0.11) -0.41, 0.04 
 No PMF -0.78 (0.12) -1.03, -0.53 
Sentence type   
 Custody -0.24 (0.15) -0.54, 0.06 
 Community order -0.72 (0.11) -0.95, -0.50 
 Fine -0.62 (0.14)  -0.89, -0.35 
 
4.4.2. Tests of Hypotheses 
 
 Hypothesis 1. It was hypothesised that participants would be significantly more likely 
to judge sentences as too harsh and less likely to judge sentences as too lenient when a PMF 
was present than when no PMF was present. 
 Significance levels were adjusted to reflect a one-tailed test. There was a significant 
main effect of mitigating factor on fairness ratings, F (4, 176) = 14.33, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .246. 
Planned contrasts were performed to compare each PMF to no PMF. The contrasts showed 
that addressing drug/alcohol addiction, F(1, 44) = 19.76, p <.001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .31, good character, 
F(1, 44) = 36.86, p <.001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .46, and remorse, F(1, 44) = 3.66, p = .03 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .077, 
produced significantly less negative fairness scores, i.e. away from “too lenient” and towards 
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“too harsh”, than cases involving no PMF. There was no significant difference between no 
PMF and assisting the prosecution, F(1, 44) = .08, p = .22, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .00).  See Figure 4.1. The 
results therefore supported Hypothesis 1, with the exception of assisting the prosecution. It is 
noticeable that although addressing drug/alcohol addiction, good character, and remorse all 
had a significant mitigating effect, the effects of addressing drug/alcohol addiction and good 
character were much larger (4-6 times greater) than the effect of remorse. In addition, had 
hypothesis 1 been two-tailed rather than one-tailed, the effect of remorse would not have 
been significant. 
 
Figure 4.1. Mean fairness ratings by PMF. A mean fairness rating of -3 = “far too lenient”; 0 
= “just right”; 3 = “far too harsh”. Error bars represent estimated 95% confidence intervals of 
the within-subjects variance only, following Cousineau (2005). 
 
Hypothesis 2. It was hypothesised that the effect of PMFs on individuals’ sentence fairness 
ratings would differ depending on the sentence type involved, i.e., fine, community sentence 
or custody. 
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 Hypothesis 2 was tested by examining the interaction between PMF and sentence type 
to determine whether the effects of PMFs on fairness judgments differed depending on the 
sentence type present in the scenario30. There was a significant interaction effect of PMF by 
sentence type, F(5.98, 287.21) = 6.68, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .12. Planned contrasts were performed 
to compare custody to community order and then fine. The contrasts revealed that the effect 
of addressing drug/alcohol addiction on fairness scores (compared to no mitigating factor) 
was significantly greater in the community order condition than in the custody condition, F(1, 
44) = 10.26, p = .003, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .19, but did not differ significantly between custody and fine 
conditions, F(1, 44) = 2.50, p = .121, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .054. The interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 
4.2. The effect of good character on fairness scores (compared to no mitigating factor) was 
significantly greater in the fine condition than in the custody condition, F(1, 44) = 13.06, p 
=.001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .23, but did not differ between custody and community order conditions, F(1, 44) 
= .66, p = .42, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .02. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Lastly, the effect of 
assisting the prosecution (compared to no PMF) was negative in the custody condition but 
positive in the community order condition, F(1, 44) = 4.53, p = .039, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .09.  The 
interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Hypothesis 2 was therefore also supported by the 
results but only to a limited extent. 
                                                            
30 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for the interaction effect (χ2 (35) 
= 62.48, p = .003). Degrees of freedom were therefore corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .75).  
194 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean fairness ratings by PMF and sentence type: addressing drug/alcohol 
addiction versus none. Error bars represent estimated 95% confidence intervals of the within-
subjects variance only, following Cousineau (2005). 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean fairness ratings by PMF and sentence type: good character versus none. 
Error bars represent estimated 95% confidence intervals of the within-subjects variance only, 
following Cousineau (2005). 
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Figure 4.4. Mean fairness ratings by PMF and sentence type: assisting the prosecution versus 
none. Error bars are estimated 95% confidence intervals of the within-subjects variance only, 
following Cousineau (2005). 
 
Hypothesis 3. It was hypothesised that the effect of PMFs on participants’ judgments of 
sentencing fairness would differ from their own stated views on the influence that those 
PMFs should have on criminal sentencing. 
 Two steps were required to test hypothesis 3. First, an analysis of participants’ 
responses to the self-report question regarding the influence that each of remorse, addressing 
drug/alcohol addiction, assisting the prosecution, and good character should have on a 
criminal sentence. Second, a comparison of the self-report data with the data obtained from 
the experimental manipulations.    
 On average, participants stated that all four mitigating factors should have some 
influence on criminal sentences. Means and standard deviations for each mitigating factor are 
presented in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2  
Means and standard deviations for PMF influence ratings (out of a possible 7) 
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Mitigating factor Mean 
influence 
rating (SD) 
Remorse 4.07 (1.72) 
Addressing drug/alcohol 
addiction 
4.62 (1.67) 
Assisting the prosecution 3.67 (1.77) 
Good character 3.07 (1.89) 
  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed with PMF as the within-
subjects factor and participants’ rating of the influence the mitigating factor should have on 
sentences as the dependent measure. The results showed that mitigating factor had a 
significant effect on influence rating, F(3, 132) = 9.23, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .173. Post hoc tests 
were performed with Holm-Bonferroni sequential corrections (using Gaetano’s 2013 
calculator) as this approach controls for familywise Type I errors in a less conservative 
manner than ordinary Bonferroni corrections31. The tests revealed that addressing 
drug/alcohol addiction was rated significantly more influential than assisting the prosecution, 
t(44) = 3.16, p = .003, d = .66, 95% CI[.17, 1.18], and good character, t(44) = 4.91, p < .001, 
d = 1.03, 95% CI[.54, 1.58]. However, addressing drug/alcohol addiction was not 
significantly different from remorse, t(44) = 2.04, p = 0.48, d = .42, 95% CI[-.06, .93]. 
Remorse was rated more influential than good character, t(44) = 3.11, p = .003, d = .66, 95% 
CI[.16, 1.21] but no different from assisting the prosecution, t(44) = 1.44, p = .157, d = .30, 
95% CI[-.20, 0.82]. Influence scores for assisting the prosecution and good character were 
not significantly different, t(44) = 1.79, p = .081, d = .38, 95% CI[-0.14, 0.93].  
                                                            
31 Holm’s (1979) sequential procedure ranks p values from lowest to highest and then applies a decreasing series 
of Bonferroni corrections. E.g., imagine a set of four p-values, p1= .005, p2=.01, p3=.03, and p4=.04, with an 
alpha of .05. p1 is tested first at .05/4 = .0125, giving a significant result. p2 is then tested at .05/3 = .0167 - also 
significant.  p3 is tested at .05/2 = .025 – the result was non-significant using the adjusted p value and so we can 
stop testing and conclude that p4 is also non-significant.  
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 A comparison of the self-report results with the fairness judgment results from the 
experimental study shows that the effect of PMFs on participants’ judgments of sentence 
fairness did not correspond at all with participants’ stated views on the influence that each 
PMF should have on sentencing. Table 4.3 shows a comparison of the rank order of PMF 
influence statistically derived from participants’ fairness judgments and the rank order based 
on their self-report responses. A Kendall’s tau-b correlation was computed between the two 
rank orders in order to test the level of similarity between them. Kendall’s tau-b is a non-
parametric test that estimates the relationship between two sets of ranked data. It is 
particularly useful for small data sets and there is evidence that it produces better correlation 
estimates than the more commonly used Spearman’s rho (Field, 2013). There was a non-
significant correlation of .000, p = 1.00.  
 Participants’ self-report responses ranked remorse second and assisting the 
prosecution third in terms of the influence they should have on sentencing but the statistical 
analysis of participants’ fairness judgments ranked remorse third and assisting the 
prosecution last, and the latter did not have a significant mitigating effect on participants’ 
judgments of sentence fairness. Good character had the largest mitigating effect on fairness 
judgments but was ranked fourth most important (i.e., last) in participants’ self-reports. 
Finally, addressing drug/alcohol addiction was ranked first in the self-report responses but 
had the second-largest effect on fairness judgments. Therefore, hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Table 4.3  
Rank order of PMF influence – statistically derived rank order versus self-reported rank 
order 
Mitigating factor Rank order 
(statistically 
derived) 
Rank order 
(self-
report) 
Remorse 3 2 
Addressing drug/alcohol 2 1 
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addiction 
Assisting the prosecution 4 3 
Good character 1 4 
 
4.5. Discussion 
 This study examined how PMFs influence people’s judgments of sentence fairness. 
Participants were asked to judge whether sentences passed across a set of burglary cases were 
too harsh, too lenient, or just right. Good character, addressing drug/alcohol addiction, and 
remorse all had a mitigating effect on people’s judgments, i.e., made people more likely to 
judge sentences as too harsh and less likely to judge them as too lenient compared to cases 
where no PMF was present. Assisting the prosecution had no effect on fairness judgments. In 
addition, good character and addressing addiction had much stronger mitigating effects than 
remorse. 
 As predicted, addressing drug/alcohol addiction had a mitigating effect on 
participants’ fairness judgments. The large effect found32 (𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .31) is consistent with 
previous research into public perceptions of the importance of PMFs (Hough et al., 2009), as 
well as current Crown Court sentencing practice (Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Sentencing 
Council, 2014; see also Study 1 in this thesis, which found addressing addiction to be the 
strongest predictor of non-custodial sentences for both assault and burglary).  The result is 
also consistent with Jacobson and Hough’s (2007) finding that sentencers view addressing 
addiction as a particularly important factor for property crime, since such crime is often 
committed to fund drug dependency (see also Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010).  
 Good character also had a significant mitigating effect on participants’ judgments of 
sentence fairness, as predicted. The effect size was large (𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .46). Public judgments about 
                                                            
32 The effect size descriptions used in this section are based on Cohen’s (1988) designations. 
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good character have not been examined before, and so this is an interesting result given the 
controversial nature of good character as a PMF. Unlike many sentencing commentators 
(e.g., Ashworth, 2010, 2015; Maslen & Roberts, 2013; Murphy, 2006), participants in the 
present study clearly did consider it to be an acceptable PMF, and this is consistent with its 
frequent use by sentencers (e.g., Sentencing Council, 2014; Jacobson & Hough, 2007).  
However, good character had a much stronger mitigating effect in the present study than it 
appears to have in current sentencing practice (Sentencing Council, 2014; see also Study 1 in 
this thesis).  
 Remorse was found to be a significant mitigator but its effect (𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .03) was small, 
much smaller than either good character or addressing drug/alcohol addiction. This finding 
conflicts with past studies of the public which have found that remorse was considered to be 
an important PMF (Hough et al., 2009; see also Maslen & Roberts, 2013). However, the 
results for remorse in the present study are consistent with those qualitative studies of public 
opinion that found only limited support for remorse as a PMF (Russell & Morgan, 2001; 
Clarke et al., 2002; Hough et al., 2008; McNaughton Nicholls et al., 2012). The results for 
remorse are also well-aligned with current Crown Court sentencing practice (Sentencing 
Council, 2014; see also Study 1 in this thesis, which found that remorse was amongst the 
weakest predictors of non-custodial sentences for both assault and burglary).   
 It could be that the weak effect of remorse in the present study reflected participants’ 
scepticism about the sincerity of the offenders’ remorse – the same issue was identified by 
Hough et al. (2008) in the context of causing death by driving. In fact, feedback received 
from pre-test participants suggested that believability of the offender’s apology might be an 
issue and resulted in the final operationalisation of remorse in the study referring to a 
“sincere” apology. However, this may not have been enough to assuage participants’ doubts 
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about the authenticity of the offenders’ remorse. Alternatively, if participants were sceptical 
about remorse, this can be viewed as an accurate reflection of what is a problematic feature of 
remorse as a PMF. Obviously, remorse can only be relevant if it is sincere, and this involves a 
subjective judgment by sentencers that may be challenging in many cases. The judges 
interviewed by Jacobson and Hough (2007) and the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s (2010) 
Advice on Overarching Principles of Sentencing both emphasised the importance of 
behaviour indicative of remorse (e.g., a letter of apology or attempts at reparation), rather 
than just words. This sincerity problem may also be part of the reason why remorse is not an 
influential factor in Crown Court sentencing practice (see Study 1 of this thesis).  Lastly, 
some participants in the present study may have taken the view that remorse should not be a 
PMF at all. Bagaric and others have argued that since minimum standards of human decency 
require offenders to be contrite when they break the law, displaying that contrition should not 
result in a reduced sentence (e.g., Bagaric, 2014; Bagaric & Amarasekara, 2002; Lippke, 
2008; Tudor, 2008).  
 Assisting the prosecution had no significant mitigating effect on participants’ 
judgments of sentence fairness. On the contrary, there was actually a (non-significant) trend 
towards aggravation. People were more likely to judge a sentence “too lenient” and less 
likely to judge it “too harsh” when assisting the prosecution was present than when it was 
absent. There is no empirical research to compare this finding to but it is clearly inconsistent 
with the current provisions of the England and Wales criminal justice system, specifically 
SOCPA 2005.  
 One possible explanation for the lack of effect found for assisting the prosecution is 
that participants could have judged assisting the prosecution (or the specific 
operationalisation of “[X] assisted the police by giving them evidence about other offenders”) 
to be morally questionable, and therefore not deserving of mitigation, as it involves betraying 
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friends or accomplices for one’s own gain. The reality is that although assisting the 
prosecution can be viewed as moral in principle because it involves “doing the right thing” by 
cooperating with the authorities, in practice it is a mitigating factor based on pragmatism 
rather than legal or ethical principles. It is primarily designed to save the police and the courts 
time and money by acquiring evidence on other offences and/or offenders. Participants in the 
present study may not have been sufficiently aware of or valued this PMF’s benefit to the 
criminal justice system. However, participants’ self-reports suggested that they viewed 
assisting the prosecution as an acceptable PMF. This inconsistency may be related to the 
demand characteristics of the self-report method (Paulhus, 1991), in that participants may 
have felt they should rate assisting the prosecution as a PMF but did not actually rate it as 
important when judging sentence fairness. 
 The effect of PMFs on fairness judgments only differed according to sentence type in 
two particular contexts. First, addressing drug/alcohol addiction had relatively more impact 
on judgments of sentence fairness where a community order was involved compared to other 
sentences. This could indicate a connection in participants’ minds between actions such as 
participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme and a decreased need for other forms 
of rehabilitative sentence such as unpaid community work. Hough et al. (2009) found that the 
public were particularly receptive to community penalties such as drug or alcohol treatment 
that are “specifically rehabilitative in orientation” (Hough et al., 2009, p. 12). Second, good 
character had relatively more effect on judgments of sentence fairness when a fine was 
involved compared to other sentences, perhaps because participants viewed it as a mitigating 
factor that was more relevant to cases involving relatively minor sentences. This latter result 
is a novel finding, as public judgments about good character have not been studied before. 
 Finally, participants’ statistically-modelled judgments showing the influence of PMFs 
on sentencing fairness conflicted with their own stated views on the influence that those 
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PMFs should have. This finding adds to the considerable body of research confirming that 
people have difficulty accurately reporting their own judgment policies (e.g., Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Newell & Shanks, 2014). It also supports past research (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 
2001; Dhami & Harries, Konečni & Ebbesen, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allegier, 1996; von 
Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009) which has shown that a behavioural approach to measuring 
judgments can reveal the judgment policies involved in legal decision making more 
accurately than using survey- or questionnaire-based studies.  
4.5.1. Potential Implications 
 The present findings have potential implications for legal policy-makers, since some 
discrepancies seem to exist between the public’s view of sentencing and current sentencing 
practice. Remorse, addressing addiction, assisting the prosecution and good character are all 
mitigating factors included in the England and Wales guideline for burglary offences 
(Sentencing Council, 2011b) and are used regularly as PMFs in the Crown Court (Jacobson 
& Hough, 2007; Sentencing Council, 2014; see also Study 1 in this thesis). However, only 
three of the four PMFs had a mitigating effect on people’s judgments about sentence fairness.  
The study’s findings in relation to addressing addiction and remorse are relatively 
reassuring, since they are both broadly consistent with current sentencing practice. The 
findings for remorse do, however, contradict some past research on public opinion (Hough et 
al., 2009) and so further investigation would be useful.  Based on the present findings for 
good character, policy makers might wish to consider whether more notice should be taken of 
an offender’s positive contributions to society. Even Ashworth, a notable critic of good 
character as a PMF, acknowledges that “if the public expects account to be taken of positive 
social contributions, it will have less respect for a system that refuses to do so” (Ashworth, 
2005, p. 183).  
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 Participants’ failure to accept assisting the prosecution as a PMF is a concern, given 
its status as a statutory MF that often results in substantially reduced sentences. Future 
research to explore this finding is suggested below.  
 Areas of disagreement identified between the public and sentencers can be used to 
inform the debate about future guidance on the use of PMFs in sentencing. For example, if 
the public believe that offenders with positive good character should have substantially 
reduced sentences, then the courts could consider emphasising that PMF more than is 
currently the case. The differences found in the effect of certain PMFs depending on the 
sentence type involved suggest that guidance on the use of PMFs should perhaps consider 
whether certain PMFs ought to be applied differently depending on the type of sentence being 
considered. 
 4.5.2. Proposals for Future Research  
 Both remorse and good character are particularly complex factors whose impact may 
depend substantially on the specific factual details of each case. More in-depth research is 
therefore required to understand how the public and sentencers interpret these two PMFs and 
to appreciate whether any substantial discrepancies really exist. For example, research could 
explore to what extent the effects of remorse and/or good character vary depending on the 
form these factors take in practice (for example, a verbal apology in court versus a letter of 
apology to the victim; being generally respected in a community through e.g., charity work 
versus a decorated military career).  
Future research could also explore further the public’s perception of assisting the 
prosecution as a mitigating factor. If there really is substantial public resistance to reducing 
sentences for those who collaborate with the authorities, that might require either a rethink of 
the legislation or a campaign to improve public awareness of the value of obtaining evidence 
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from offenders on other offenders’ activities, particularly in the context of serious organised 
crime (which is the focus of SOCPA 2005). 
 Research could potentially also examine the relationship between PMFs and sentence 
type in more detail. For instance, it would interesting to learn more about whether the public 
view PMFs differently depending on, for example, whether the sentence is likely to be a fine 
or a period in prison. It would also be useful to explore whether sentencers differ in their 
approach depending on the sentence involved. Unfortunately, the CCSS data used in Study 1 
of this thesis could not be used to answer the latter question, as it does not provide enough 
detail on the length of community penalties or size of fines issued to analyse the impact of 
PMFs on those sentence types. 
 Lastly, the Sentencing Council is committed to improving public understanding of 
sentencing and increasing confidence in the sentencing process (Sentencing Council, 2016a). 
In order to achieve these goals, the Council needs to take account of discrepancies between 
public opinion and sentencing practice of the kind identified in the present study, so that 
those discrepancies can be reduced. There are two obvious steps required: first, we need to 
learn more about why the public may value certain PMFs differently from sentencers, and 
secondly we need to learn more about why sentencers use the PMFs in the way that they 
currently do. This knowledge can then be combined to identify areas of public concern and 
assuage those concerns by improving people’s understanding of how and why PMFs are 
applied in sentencing cases. 
4.5.3. Strengths and Limitations 
 The present study had some limitations. The use of a student sample is often criticised 
as limiting the generalisability of results to the wider population. However, most social 
psychological research into the effects of legal or extra-legal variables on sentencing 
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outcomes has also used student samples. In addition, the sample was diverse in terms of 
ethnicity, political preference, and experience of the criminal justice system.  
 The present study design involved isolating individual mitigating factors. This 
approach was purposely chosen to allow for accurate estimation of the effect of each PMF on 
the dependent variable of sentence fairness, and does reflect real-world sentencing where 
PMFs often occur separately. However, it is also true that multiple PMFs and/or AFs often 
occur together in one case, which was not represented in the present design; the findings may 
have less external validity as a result (see Dhami, Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2004). Thus, there is a 
need to study PMFs in the context of other PMFs and AFs. This limitation was addressed in 
Study 4. 
 Despite these limitations, the present study also had many strengths that make it a 
useful contribution to research on public judgments about the role of PMFs in sentencing. 
First, the study used statistically powerful, within-subjects factorial experimental design, and 
provided full experimental results including significance tests, confidence intervals and 
measures of effect size. Second, the study provided a direct comparison of four PMFs that are 
central to the mitigation process. Lastly, the study used a dependent variable that reflects 
people’s every-day experience of sentencing, i.e., rating sentence fairness based on brief 
summaries of sentencing outcomes.  
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5. Study 4 
 
The Effect of Personal Mitigating Factors on Public Judgments of Sentence 
Length 
5.1. Introduction 
Study 3 in this thesis used an experimental approach to examine the independent 
effect on public sentencing judgments of the three character-based PMFs that are the focus of 
this thesis, as well as a fourth PMF, assisting the prosecution. Study 3 had limitations: each 
PMF was tested in isolation, and the data were analysed from a nomothetic perspective, i.e., 
aggregating the results across all participants. The present study aimed to build on the 
findings from Study 3 and also address the limitations of that Study. 
Study 3’s orthogonal design did not take account of the fact that multiple PMFs 
and/or AFs factors frequently occur together in sentencing cases (Sentencing Council, 2015a; 
see also the results of Study 1). As a result, Study 3 was relatively low on external validity as 
regards the structure of the task environment (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). The 
present study aimed to use a design that was more representative of the real-world sentencing 
environment, by examining the influence of PMFs on sentencing judgments in the context of 
other PMFs and also Aggravating Factors (AFs). The PMFs used in the present study were 
the same three character-based PMFs that were studied in Study 1 and Study 2, namely 
remorse, good character, and addressing addiction. Study 3 also included the PMF assisting 
the prosecution, but since that study found it to have no effect on public sentencing 
judgments (and it was, in any case, necessarily excluded from Study 1 since it is not recorded 
in the CCSS), it was not included in the present study. 
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The AFs selected for inclusion in the present Study were previous relevant 
convictions, being under the influence of alcohol/drugs at the time of the offence, and being 
on bail at the time of the offence. Previous convictions is a particularly important AF because 
it is so prevalent (e.g., it was present in 70% of domestic burglary cases in England and 
Wales in 2014 – Sentencing Council, 2015a). In addition, research suggests that sentencers 
view mitigation as less important for a frequent re-offender than for someone with no 
criminal history (Maslen, 2015a; Roberts & Pina-Sanchez, 2014). 
Being under the influence of drugs/alcohol was included in the design because it is a 
common and also controversial AF. There is some academic debate about whether it should 
properly be considered an AF or a PMF (e.g., Padfield, 2011). While the England and Wales 
sentencing guidelines (e.g., Sentencing Council, 2011a, 2011b) list under the influence as an 
AF, there is evidence that some sentencers and some of the public may view it as a PMF 
(Irwin-Rogers & Perry, 2015; Lovegrove, 2011; but see Lightowlers & Pina-Sanchez, 2017). 
Finally, being on bail was included as a third AF. It was chosen because it was judged to be 
the most widely understood of three related and frequently occurring AFs: being on bail at 
the time of the offence, being on licence at the time of the offence, and failure to comply with 
current court orders. Being on bail therefore represents a category of AFs where the offender 
is subject to pre-existing court sanctions designed to prevent him or her committing an 
offence. 
The present study (like Study 3) used an experimental methodology to measure the 
effect of character-based PMFs on people’s sentencing judgments, rather than using survey, 
questionnaire or interview methods. This methodology deals with the well-recognised 
research findings that individuals cannot describe accurately their own judgment policies 
(Galotti et al., 2014; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner, 2002, 2004; 
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Wilson, 2002), and are susceptible to social desirability response bias when answering 
surveys or questionnaires (Paulhus, 1991; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012).   
Unlike Study 3, however, the present study used a person-by-person or “idiographic” 
methodology derived from social judgment theory (e.g., Cooksey, 1996; Doherty & Kurtz, 
1996; Hammond et al., 1975 – for a fuller description, see Chapter 1, pp. 34-36). The 
idiographic designs used in social judgment theory (usually referred to as “policy capturing”) 
involve asking participants to make a series of judgments across a large number of scenarios, 
while systematically varying the variables (in this case PMFs and AFs) present in the 
scenarios. Those judgments can then be used to make a statistical model of how the variables 
tested influenced each individual participant’s judgments (that person’s “judgment policy”).  
Using an idiographic design provides much richer data on the judgments made by a 
sample of individuals than can be obtained if data is only aggregated across the group. As 
well as illustrating the spread of judgment policies across the group, it is also possible to 
evaluate the level of agreement or disagreement between different individuals. Further, 
individual judgment policies can be compared with the judgments of the group as a whole. 
Finally, an idiographic approach allows for comparisons between people’s statistically 
derived judgment policies and their explicit self-reports about the relative importance of 
PMFs and AFs. Research shows that people’s statistically estimated judgment policies not 
only differ from their self-reports but also predict their judgments better, including in legal 
decision-making contexts (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Konečni & Ebbesen, 1982, 1984; 
Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009).   
The ability to examine individual differences in judgments about PMFs is particularly 
useful for the present study. First, research suggests that individual sentencers’ approaches to 
mitigation vary considerably. The interview and focus group studies carried out by Davies 
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and Tyrer (2003), Hough et al. (2003), Jacobson & Hough (2007), and Raynard, Hebenton 
and Pease (1994) all found substantial variation in judges’ approaches to aggravating and 
mitigating factors. It is reasonable to expect that public judgments about the use of PMFs in 
sentencing may also vary considerably from individual to individual, but this has never been 
tested empirically. The present study’s design makes it possible to do so. 
In addition to the improvements described above, the present study also used a 
different measure of sentencing judgment from Study 3, namely participants’ choice of 
custodial sentence lengths (in months). This was chosen as an alternative to the fairness 
measure used in Study 3. The measure used in Study 3 can be justified on the basis that it 
reflects the public’s actual experience of sentencing. In comparison to Study 3, the present 
study’s measure sacrifices a certain amount of external validity – the public do not have to 
make sentencing judgments – for a more direct measure of judgment that is more directly 
comparable with the findings on sentencers’ judgments from Study 1 and previous research.  
Overall, the measures used in Studies 3 and 4 have different advantages and 
disadvantages. The appeal of using both is that the results from the two studies can then be 
triangulated to produce a fuller picture of the public’s judgment about the role of PMFs in 
sentencing than could be obtained by using either measure in isolation. 
5.2. Aims and Objectives of the Present Study 
The main aim of the study was to explore whether the public’s judgments about the 
role of PMFs in sentencing are in line with current sentencing practice, by comparing the 
effect that the three PMFs of interest have on people’s sentencing judgments. The study was 
focused on the three character-based PMFs, namely remorse, addressing drug/alcohol 
addiction, and good character. Four additional objectives were: 
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1. To compare the relative weight given by people to PMFs and to AFs when making 
sentencing judgments. 
2. To measure the level of agreement or disagreement between different people’s judgments 
about PMFs made on the same set of sentencing cases.  
3. To compare the weight given by the public to PMFs and AFs in their statistically derived 
sentencing judgments with their self-reports about the relative importance of those same 
PMFs and AFs.  
4. To explore possible interactions between the three PMFs of interest and/or between the 
PMFs and AFs. 
5.2.1. Hypotheses 
The present study’s main aim and objectives were advanced through four specific 
hypotheses. Objective 4 (exploring possible interactions) did not have a specific hypothesis 
attached to it.  
First, it was predicted Based on Hough et al.’s (2009) findings and the results of 
Study 3 in this thesis that addressing addiction, remorse, and good character would all have a 
mitigating effect on people’s judgment of custodial sentence length. Given the conflicting 
evidence from Hough et al. (2009) and Study 3, it was not possible to make a prediction 
about the relative weight that would be given to each PMF. 
Hypothesis 1 was, therefore: 
Participants will choose significantly shorter custodial sentence lengths when a PMF is 
present in a case than when no PMF is present. 
 
Second, it was predicted that the aggravating effect of AFs would be stronger than the 
mitigating effect of PMFs. The psychological phenomenon of negativity bias (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001) predicts that negative information will have a stronger effect on judgment 
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than positive information, and Hough et al.’s (2009) results support this prediction. On 
average across all 15 AFs studied, 56% of Hough et al.’s participants judged that AFs always 
increases seriousness; 18% judged that AFs often increase seriousness; 11% judged that AFs 
sometimes increase seriousness; and 15% judged that AFs never increase seriousness or make 
no difference. By contrast, only 17% of Hough et al.’s participants judged that PMFs should 
result in a more lenient sentence in all cases; 51% judged that PMFs should result in a more 
lenient sentence in some cases; and 30% judged that PMFs should never reduce sentences (2% 
answered “don’t know”). It is frustrating that different measures were used for AFs and MFs, 
and so the results are not directly comparable. However, there appears to be a trend towards 
people judging AFs to be more important than PMFs. In the conjoint analysis, for both 
offence types tested the AFs used had more influence than the PMFs on sentence lengths 
chosen. 
Hypothesis 2 was, therefore: 
PMFs will have significantly less effect on custodial sentence length than AFs. 
 
 It was also predicted that there would be substantial variation between people in terms 
of the relative importance of the three character-based PMFs and their importance relative to 
AFs. Variability in judgment about sentencing has been observed in qualitative studies of 
both the general public (Hough et al., 2009) and sentencers (Davies & Tyrer, 2003; Jacobson 
& Hough, 2007; Raynard et al., 1994; see also Study 2) but it has never before been assessed 
quantitatively, as in the present study. 
Hypothesis 3 was, therefore: 
There will be significant disagreement between participants’ judgments about the influence 
of PMFs and AFs. 
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 As discussed above, there is extensive evidence that people’s self-reported judgment 
policies tend to differ from the judgment policies that can be calculated from the actual 
judgments they make (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Konečni & Ebbesen, 
1982, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). For this reason, 
it was hypothesised that there would be a difference between participants’ self-reported 
judgments about the importance of PMFs and the actual measured effect of PMFs on their 
fairness judgments. In particular, it was predicted that people would have fewer PMFs in their 
statistically derived judgment policies than in their self-reports. 
Hypothesis 4 was, therefore: 
Participants’ weighting of PMFs and AFs as measured by their statistically derived 
sentencing judgments will differ from their self-reports on the relative importance of PMFs 
and AFs.  
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Participants 
 Participants were 40 members of the public. Eighteen were female. The mean age of 
the sample was 40.50 (SD = 15.08). A review of 74 studies that used a social judgment theory 
approach found the median sample size to be 38 (Dhami et al., 2004). Participants were 
recruited using a snowball technique, starting with friends and acquaintances and working 
outwards, as well as through advertisements on social media.  
 All participants described themselves as White. 35% (n = 14) had an annual 
household income of up to £29,999, 30% (12) between £30,000 and £49,000 and 35% (14) 
above £49,000. 60% (24) had a Masters or PhD, 35% (14) had a Bachelor’s degree or 
equivalent, and 5% (2) had A-levels or equivalent. Their political preferences were 27.5% (11) 
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labour, 25% (10) conservative, 25% (10) liberal democrat, 12.5% (5) green, and 10% (4) 
other. 20 participants had no experience of the criminal justice system; five had been a victim, 
five a witness, and two an offender; six were lawyers (not necessarily criminal lawyers), two 
worked (or had worked) for the police, and nine had had other experiences (including a 
probation officer and a former forensic psychology student)33. 
5.3.2. Design 
 The study used a within-subjects design. A within-subjects design was necessary for 
this study because of the idiographic approach used, with each participant’s data being 
analysed separately. Other benefits of within-subjects designs are discussed in Chapter 4.  
 There were six predictor variables: three personal mitigating factors (remorse, taking 
steps to deal with drug/alcohol addiction and good character and three aggravating factors 
(previous relevant convictions, offence committed while on bail, and being under the 
influence of drugs/alcohol). The three mitigating factors were chosen from those used in the 
author’s previous studies to allow for comparison of results with those studies.  
 In order to test the independent effect of six predictor variables, the optimum 
approach would be a full factorial design, i.e., presenting participants with every possible 
combination of the six variables. However, this design would have required 64 (26) 
combinations of variables. Past studies have found that participants find it difficult to 
maintain concentration across more than approximately 40 cases (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). 
The present study therefore used a fractional factorial design, i.e., a proportion of the full 64 
cases that is designed to retain a balanced, or orthogonal, distribution of variables across the 
stimuli. 32 cases were generated using the SPSS orthogonal design function (see Appendix 
10). This is referred to as a 26-1 design (32 = 25; Mee, 2009). Fractional factorial designs 
                                                            
33 The figures for criminal justice experience do not add up to 40 as several of the participants had had 
experience of the criminal justice system in more than one context. 
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reduce a study’s ability to separate out the individual effect of each variable, which can be an 
issue if too small a fraction of the full factorial design is used. However, the present study’s 
26-1 design had a ‘level VI resolution’ (Mee, 2009), which means that the study was able to 
estimate the effects required to test the study’s hypotheses, i.e., the main effects of all 
predictor variables as well as interactions between any two of the variables. 
5.3.3. Stimuli  
 Participants were given the background facts of a hypothetical case of inflicting 
grievous bodily harm (GBH) and then 32 different cases containing different combinations of 
the PMFs and AFs (following the fractional factorial design in Appendix 10). For full details 
of the stimuli, see Appendix 11. The cases were presented in a random order, to prevent order 
effects from influencing the results. The variables were presented in the same order (when 
present) in each case, for ease of reading. 
 Different possible operationalisations of the PMFs were tested as part of a pilot for 
Study 1. Operationalisations of the AFs were not pre-tested as the variables were considered 
to be self-explanatory. The variables were operationalised as follows: 
Aggravating factors (AFs) 
• Being under the influence of drugs/alcohol – “[The offender] was drunk when he 
committed the offence”. 
• Previous relevant convictions – “[The offender] has two previous convictions for 
assault.”34 
• Offence committed while on bail – “[The offender] was on bail at the time of the 
offence.” 
                                                            
34 The number of previous convictions was set at two because it is the mid-point of one to three previous 
convictions, which the most common category listed in the 2013 Crown Court Sentencing Survey Report 
(Sentencing Council, 2014). Hough et al. (2009) also used two previous convictions as their middle category. 
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Personal mitigating factors (PMFs) 
• Remorse – “[The offender] wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim.” 
• Taking steps to address drug/alcohol addiction – “[The offender] is now participating 
in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme.” 
• Good character – “[The offender] has volunteered for many years at a local homeless 
shelter.” 
5.3.4. Measures 
 After reading each case, participants were asked to choose a custodial sentence length 
in years and/or months. Custodial sentence length is a well-recognised outcome measure 
across the sentencing literature (e.g., Anderson & Spohn, 2010; Pina-Sánchez & Linacre, 
2013; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). The CCSS data analysed in Study 2 used a binary outcome 
variable of immediate custodial sentence or not. Including multiple different sentence types 
to choose from as well as or instead of sentence length would have made the design overly 
complex and potentially confusing for participants who, after all, do not have expert 
knowledge about the pros and cons and options available across different sentence types. It is 
hard to make a decision between custody and a non-custodial sentence without a 
comprehensive knowledge of the different non-custodial options available and how they 
operate in practice. Further, since custodial sentence length is a scale variable, it is amenable 
to multiple linear regression analysis. A binary variable such as custodial sentence or not 
would have to be analysed using logistic regression, which does not permit comparison of 
one regression model with another. The comparison of participants’ judgment policies is a 
key part of the methodology used in the present study as it is essential for evaluating variation 
among participants’ judgments.  
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 Participants’ self-reports on the relative influence that each of the six aggravating and 
mitigating factors should have on sentence length were measured using a seven-point bipolar 
numerical rating scale with verbal labels on the end- and mid-points of the scale (- 3 = 
“should significantly reduce the sentence”, 0 = “should not affect the sentence”, and 3 = 
“should significantly increase the sentence”). Research suggests that scales with 7 or more 
points produce more reliable and valid results (Preston & Coleman, 2000) but more than 7 
points may place too many demands on respondents’ cognitive abilities (Weijters, Cabooter 
& Schillewaert, 2010). Participants were also asked several demographic questions, namely 
their age, gender, ethnicity, political preference, highest level of education, household income, 
and whether they had any prior experience of the criminal justice system. 
5.3.5. Procedure 
 The stimuli were presented to participants as an online survey, using Qualtrics survey 
software (www.qualtrics.com). The survey first showed the background facts of the GBH 
case with no additional aggravating or mitigating factors present. Underneath the case facts 
was a question: “How long a prison sentence should John receive?” followed by two drop-
down boxes, one for years and one for months, so that participants could choose a sentence 
length. The following 31 pages displayed the cases with different combinations of AFs and 
PMFs specified by the fractional factorial design, one to each page. Each case was followed 
by the same drop-down boxes for sentence years and months.  Participants had to choose a 
sentence length for each case before they could move onto the next page. The cases were 
presented in a different random order for each participant. After participants had chosen a 
sentence length for all 32 cases, they provided self-reports on the importance of the AFs and 
PMFs and answered the demographic questions.  
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5.3.6. Ethical Considerations 
Before commencing data collection, ethical approval for the study was obtained from 
the Middlesex University Psychology Research Ethics Committee (REF: PG033-2015). The 
first page of the survey contained information equivalent to an information sheet and the 
second page requested consent from each participant. The last page of the survey contained a 
thorough written debrief and encouraged participants to contact the researcher if they had any 
questions or concerns. 
 
5.4. Results 
Three participants gave the same answer for all 32 cases. Their data were therefore 
excluded from the analysis.  
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 The grand mean custodial sentence length (in months) chosen across the 37 remaining 
participants over the 32 cases was 30 (SD = 5.96). Figure 5.1 presents the mean custodial 
sentence length for each participant, along with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5.1. Mean custodial sentence length (months) by participant. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. 
5.4.2. Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Participants will choose significantly shorter custodial sentence lengths when 
a PMF is present in a case than when none are present. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested and the present study’s main aim was explored more 
generally by computing separate multiple linear regressions for each participant. The 
outcome variable was length of custodial sentence in months and the six predictor variables 
were: being under the influence of alcohol/drugs, previous relevant convictions, offence 
committed while on bail, remorse, taking steps to address drug/alcohol addiction, and good 
character. Where one or more sentencing factors produced statistically non-significant 
regression coefficients in a particular participant’s regression model, those non-significant 
factors were retained in the final model. It can be argued that these should be removed and 
the regressions re-run without them. However, there were good theoretical reasons for 
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including all six factors in the models to begin with, i.e. they are recognised and commonly 
used aggravating and mitigating factors.  
In addition, the aim of the experiment was to examine the effects of each of the three 
PMFs in the context of the other two PMFs and all three AFs, and the fractional factorial 
design was prepared for this purpose. Removing non-significant variables and re-running the 
analysis would mean estimating the effects of the other, significant, variables in the absence 
of non-significant variables. This approach is likely to cause the coefficients for the 
significant variables to change, but we want to know the effects of the significant variables 
when the non-significant variables are also present in the model. Consequently, it was 
considered appropriate to retain all factors in the models. 
 The R2 value, p value, and b-weights (with 95% confidence intervals) for each 
individual regression analysis are set out in Appendix 12. Statistically significant regression 
models were obtained for 31 out of 40 participants. Only significant models were included in 
the following analyses. The set of significant factors contained in a given participant’s 
regression model was taken to represent his or her judgment policy. It is acknowledged that 
deciding whether a given factor is part of an individual’s judgment policy on the basis of 
whether its regression coefficient is significant in the individual’s regression model is an 
imperfect way of representing individuals’ cue use and comparing cue use across different 
individuals’ judgment policies35 (Beckstead, 2007). However, significance testing still 
provides a clear and well-recognised cut-off point for assessing which factors were more 
important to participants and which were less important and it remains a useful measure, 
                                                            
35 If a given factor is statistically significant, it is reasonable to conclude that it is important to the judge and 
forms part of his or her judgment strategy but the converse does not necessarily apply. Significance tests of 
regression coefficients require different values to return a significant result across different individuals’ 
regression models, since the R2 figure for each model affects the calculation of significance (Beckstead, 2007). 
As a result, individuals’ models can have varying power to detect significant results and so comparison between 
models can be misleading. 
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provided its limitations are recognised and it is combined with other approaches such as the 
graphical representation of participants’ judgment policies contained in Figures 5.3a and 5.3b.  
 5.4.2.1. Aggregated results. On average across all participants, the predictor 
variables explained 66% of the variability in participants’ choice of sentence length (mean R2 
= .66, SD = .15). Table 5.1 shows mean, minimum and maximum b-weights and standard 
deviation for each sentencing factor produced by the individual multiple linear regressions, 
aggregated across all participants. The b-weight for each sentencing factor represents the 
number of months’ difference in custodial sentence length that the presence of that factor 
predicts. Table 5.1 shows that all three PMFs were associated with reduced custodial 
sentence lengths (i.e. they had a mitigating effect). Paired sample t-tests found that the 
difference between the mean b-weights of addressing addiction and remorse (-.64, BCa 95% 
CI36 [-.1.54, .21]) was not significant, t(30) = -1.40, p = .172. The difference between 
remorse and good character (-.64, BCa 95% CI [-1.51, .27]) was not significant either, t(30) = 
-1.36, p = .184. However, addressing addiction had a significantly larger mean b-weight than 
good character (difference = -1.28, BCa 95% CI [-2.07, -.53], t(30) = -3.16, p = .004). All 
three AFs were associated with increased custodial sentence lengths (although under the 
influence was a fairly weak predictor).  
 None of the PMFs was a significant predictor for more than 50% of participants: 
PMFs were significant predictors for 48.39% (Addressing drug/alcohol addiction), 45.16% 
(remorse), and 25.81% (good character) of participants, respectively. Conversely, 77.42% of 
participants’ models included previous convictions as a significant predictor, and 51.61% 
included on bail. Under the influence was only a significant predictor for 9.68% of 
participants, and its effect did not reach significance. Figure 5.2 presents graphically the 
                                                            
36 Bias corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals were calculated for all t-tests, using 1000 bootstrap 
samples (Field, 2013). 
221 
 
mean b-weights for each of the AFs and PMFs, in terms of the difference in custodial 
sentence length associated with them. AFs are in red and PMFs are in blue.  
Table 5.1 
Summary of multiple linear regression analyses across 31 participants who had statistically 
significant regression models  
 % (no.) for 
whom 
factor was 
significant 
Mean b 
(SD) 
Range  
From, to 
t p 
Aggravating factors      
 Under the influence 9.68 (3) 0.29 (1.92) -3.75, 4.13 0.85 .400 
       Previous convictions 77.42 (24) 5.51 (5.21) -0.813, 21.94 5.89 <.001 
       On bail 51.61 (16) 4.36 (5.77) -1.06, 29.94 4.21 <.001 
Personal mitigating factors      
      Remorse 45.16 (14) -2.20 (1.69) -5.88, 1.19 -7.23 <.001 
      Addressing drug/ 
 alcohol addiction 
48.39 (15) -2.84 (2.16) -8.25, 0.69 -7.33 <.001 
 Good character 25.81 (8) -1.56 (1.89) -7.75, 1.13 -4.59 <.001 
Note: The figures given are for the unstandardised coefficient b, as this describes the amount of 
difference, in months, that the presence of each sentencing factor made to the sentence length chosen. 
The standardised coefficient was not needed because every factor is binary (present/absent) and so 
they are directly comparable with one another. t scores and p values are for a one-sample t-test of 
mean b compared to 0, following Lorch and Myers (1990).  
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Figure 5.2. Mean b-weights by sentencing factor, aggregated across all participants with a 
significant regression model for the sentencing factors. Error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 Overall, the aggregated data from the regression analysis supported Hypothesis 1, 
because all three PMFs predicted reduced sentence lengths. However, the data also provided 
a clear indication that support for the PMFs was not universal across participants. This 
finding was explored further using the regression models calculated for each individual 
participant. 
5.4.2.2. Regression results for individual participants. Figures 5.3a and 5.3b show 
the b-weights for each of the MFs and AFs for each participant’s regression model. The data 
for participants 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 20, 21, 29, and 39 do not appear in the figures, since their 
regression models were not significant. 
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Figure 5.3a. Distribution of b-weights for each PMF and AF for participants 4 to 23. Only participants whose regression models were significant are shown.  
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Figure 5.3b. Distribution of b-weights for each PMF and AF for participants 24 to 40. Only participants whose regression models were significant are shown.  
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 The study next examined the number of statistically significant sentencing factors 
contained in participants’ judgment policies, in order to explore participants’ use of the 
different factors in their sentencing judgments. Between one and six significant sentencing 
factors were included in participants’ regression models (mean = 2.58). The mean number of 
PMFs included was 1.19; the mean number of AFs was 1.39. A paired samples t-test found 
that the difference between the two means (-.20, BCa CI [-.61, .26]) was not significant, t(30) 
= -.88, p = .385. The number of factors used across all participants is shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4. Number of personal mitigating factors and aggravating factors included in 
participants’ judgment policies. 
 Participants’ use of PMFs was analysed in more detail, in order to explore which 
PMFs were more or less commonly used and in what combinations. For nine participants, 
none of the PMFs were significant predictors of custodial sentence length. Across the 
remaining 22 participants, where PMFs did predict sentence length they were always 
associated with shorter sentence lengths, i.e., had a mitigating effect. For 11 participants, only 
one PMF was a significant predictor. Addressing drug/alcohol addiction was the most 
common sole predictor (five participants), followed by remorse (four participants) and good 
character (two participants). Remorse and taking steps to address drug/alcohol addiction were 
both significant predictors for five participants; remorse and good character were both 
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predictors for one participant; and addressing drug/alcohol addiction and good character were 
both predictors for one participant. Lastly, there were four participants for whom all three 
PMFs predicted a reduced custodial sentence length.  
 Finally, a two-step cluster analysis was carried out using SPSS (following Mooi & 
Sarstedt, 2011) to determine whether participants could be classified into groups based on 
their choice of PMFs and/or AFs and the weights given to those factors. Four distinct clusters 
of participants were found in the data. Cluster 1 (“AF-dominant, weakly influenced”) 
comprised 11 people for whom bail and previous convictions had a slightly weaker than 
average aggravating effect, and under the influence was a (very weak) mitigator. Addressing 
addiction and remorse were much weaker than average, while good character was only 
slightly below average. Cluster 2 (“PMF-dominant”) comprised 10 people for whom, like 
Cluster 1, bail and previous convictions were slightly weaker than average and under the 
influence was a weak mitigator. For Cluster 2, however, remorse was a little stronger than 
average, and addressing addiction and good character were much stronger than average. 
Cluster 3 (“balanced, all factors strong”) contained eight people who judged bail and previous 
convictions to be a little stronger than average, while under the influence was a weak AF. For 
Cluster 3, remorse had an average effect, good character was a little stronger than average, 
and addressing addiction was much stronger. Lastly, the two people in Cluster 4 (“AF-
dominant, strongly influenced”) judged all three AFs to be very strong aggravators indeed. 
Remorse was also very strong and good character stronger than average, but addressing 
addiction was weaker than average. Overall, Cluster 4 judged AFs to be much more 
important than PMFs. 
 Another pattern that emerged from the cluster analysis concerns the relationship 
between the AF under the influence and the PMF addressing addiction. Two clusters (21 
people) judged under the influence to be a (weak or very weak) MF. These people were 
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divided into those who were also largely uninfluenced by the offender’s attempts to address 
his addiction (Cluster 1), and those who saw that as an important MF (Cluster 2). For the 
other two clusters (10 people), under the influence was an AF. For Cluster 3, the aggravating 
effect was weak and addressing addiction had a strong balancing impact, while for Cluster 4, 
the aggravating effect was strong and addressing addiction had relatively little impact. 
 The data from individual participants shows that only four participants (out of 31) had 
judgment policies that included all three PMFs, and nine participants had no PMFs in their 
judgment policies at all. In addition, none of the three PMFs was included in more than 50% 
of participants’ judgment policies. The most that can be said is that some of the PMFs 
reduced some people’s chosen sentence lengths some of the time. Therefore, the idiographic 
data only support Hypothesis 1 to a limited extent. 
Hypothesis 2: PMFs will have significantly less effect on custodial sentence length than AFs. 
 The effects of the three PMFs and three AFs on sentence length were compared by 
carrying out paired sample t-tests on the regression coefficients aggregated across all 
participants. The negative sign of the personal mitigating factor coefficients was reversed to 
facilitate the comparison. The aggravating effect of previous convictions on sentence length 
was significantly greater than the mitigating effect of remorse (difference = 3.17, BCa 95% 
CI [1.66, 4.96], t(30) =3.59, p = .001), addressing drug/alcohol addiction, (difference = 2.61, 
BCa 95% CI [.66, 4.59], t(30) = 2.60, p = .014), or good character (difference = 3.76, BCa 95% 
CI [2.13, 5.72], t(30) = 4.20, p < .001). The aggravating effect of an offender being on bail 
was also greater than the mitigating effect of remorse (difference = 2.02, BCa 95% CI [.30, 
4.26], t(30) =2.09, p = .045), or good character (difference = 2.62, BCa 95% CI [.84, 4.70], 
t(30) =2.63, p = .013), but was not significantly different from addressing drug/alcohol 
addiction (difference = 1.46,  BCa 95% CI [-.44, 3.78],  t(30) = 1.29, p = .207). However, all 
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three PMFs had greater mitigating effects than the aggravating effect of being under the 
influence (remorse – difference = -2.04, BCa 95% CI [-2.82, -1.30], t(30) =-5.09, p < .001; 
addressing addiction – difference = -2.61, BCa 95% CI [-3.71, -1.69], t(30) = -5.24, p < .001; 
good character – difference = -1.45, BCa 95% CI [-2.36, -.58], t(30) =-3.08, p = .004). 
Hypothesis 2 was therefore partially supported. All three PMFs had weaker effects than 
previous convictions, and remorse and good character had a weaker effect than on bail. 
However, all three PMFs had stronger effects than under the influence. 
 Participants did not include significantly more AFs than PMFs in their judgment 
policies. However, the two factors most likely to be included were both AFs, namely 
previous convictions (77.42% of policies) and on bail (51.61% of policies). The cluster 
analysis showed that one cluster (eight people) was relatively balanced between AFs and 
PMFs, two clusters (13 people) emphasised AFs over PMFs, and one cluster (ten people) 
emphasised PMFs over AFs. 
Hypothesis 3: There will be significant disagreement between participants’ judgments about 
the influence of PMFs and AFs. 
 The findings supported hypothesis 3. Participants’ judgment policies varied widely in 
both the number and choice of PMFs and AFs that they contained. The disagreement amongst 
participants is clearly illustrated in figures 5.3a and 5.3b.  
Hypothesis 4: Participants’ weighting of PMFs and AFs as measured by their statistically 
derived sentencing judgments will differ from their self-reports on the relative importance of 
PMFs and AFs. 
 The mean rank orders participants gave to each PMF and AF were calculated, based 
firstly on participants’ statistically derived judgment policies and secondly on their self-
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reports. Figure 5.5 shows that participants’ statistically-modelled ranks differed more from 
their self-reports for AFs than for PMFs. 
 
Figure 5.5. Relative influence of AFs and MFs on custodial sentence length based on mean 
rank order from statistically-modelled judgment policies and self-reports. Error bars are 95% 
bias-corrected accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals.  
 Kendall’s tau-b correlations were also calculated between the rank order given to the 
PMFs and AFs by each participant (based on the coefficients in his/her linear regression 
model) and the rank order of factors given in that participant’s self-report (see Dhami & 
Ayton, 2001). Factors in the regression model were ranked based on their coefficients’ 
distance from zero, in order to compare AFs (which have positive coefficients) and PMFs 
(which have negative coefficients). The resulting correlations between participants’ 
regression models and self-reports ranged from -.73 (a large negative correlation) to 1 (a 
perfect positive correlation); the mean correlation value was = .41 (a medium-sized positive 
correlation), with a standard deviation of .47. There were nine significant correlations out of 
31 (all positive).   
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 In addition, a paired-samples t-test was used to compare the number of PMFs and AFs 
included in participants’ statistically-derived judgment policies with the number of PMFs and 
AFs that participants stated in their self-reports should influence sentences. On average, 
participants included fewer sentencing factors in their judgment policies (mean = 2.61, SD = 
1.38) than in their self-reports (mean = 4.81, SD = .98). The difference, -2.19, BCa 95% CI [-
2.74, -1.65], was significant, t(30) = -7.95, p < .001.  
 In conclusion, the aggregated results show a medium-sized correlation between the 
relative importance given to PMFs and AFs in participants’ statistically derived judgment 
policies and in their self-reports. However, participants included fewer PMFs and AFs in 
their judgment policies than those they rated as valid PMFs and AFs in their self-reports. In 
addition, when the individual results are examined, it is clear that participants varied widely 
in the correlation between their self-reports and their judgments as calculated using a 
regression model. This finding partially supports hypothesis 4, and suggests that there are 
substantial individual differences in people’s ability to report their own judgment policies. 
5.4.3. Interactions Between PMFs and Other PMFs/AFs 
 Further regression analysis was used to identify interactions between the variables, i.e., 
determine whether the effect of any of the PMFs and/or AFs in participants’ judgment 
policies was influenced by the presence of any other PMF or AF. The presence or absence of 
each two-way interaction was determined based on an F-test of whether a participant’s 
regression model including the interaction between two specified predictor variables (coded 
using four dummy variables) had significantly better predictive power than the model 
containing only the main effects of the six predictor variables. The results for each participant 
are recorded in Appendix 13. 
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 Thirteen participants (41.9%) had one or more significant interactions in their 
regression model. Six participants (19.4%) had two or more interactions (three had two 
interactions, one had three interactions, and two had four interactions). Participants varied 
widely regarding which variables interacted in their model. The most commonly occurring 
interactions were a positive interaction between remorse and addressing addiction, and a 
positive interaction between good character and under the influence, each of which occurred 
three times. This means that for three participants, remorse had a weaker affect when it was 
present alongside addressing addiction, and vice versa (interactions in regression analysis are 
symmetrical). For three other participants, good character had a weaker effect when it was 
present alongside under the influence, and vice versa. 
5.4.4. Relationships Between Demographic Variables and PMF Judgments 
 Exploratory bivariate regression analyses were carried out to examine whether any of 
the demographic variables recorded in the study significantly predicted the importance given 
to the three PMFs of interest in participants’ sentencing judgments. This means that each of 
gender, annual household income, level of education, and political preference was regressed 
separately against the mean beta-weight for each PMF. Bivariate regression was used because 
the ratio of predictor variables to cases was too high to include all of the demographic 
variables in one multiple linear regression model. Bivariate regression can only provide a 
preliminary indication of a possible relationship between two variables. In the event, the 
analysis found no significant relationships between any of the demographic variables and the 
mean b-weights of any of the three PMFs tested. Chi-square tests were carried out to explore 
whether there was any relationship between demographic variables and participants’ 
membership of the clusters identified via cluster analysis. No significant relationships were 
found between gender, income, education level or politics and cluster membership. 
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5.5. Discussion 
It is generally agreed that public opinion is relevant to criminal sentencing (e.g., 
Bingham, 2000; Hough & Kirby, 2013). One important aspect of sentencing is personal 
mitigation, and there is currently a dearth of research on public opinion regarding the role of 
PMFs in sentencing (e.g., Roberts, 2008). The only existing empirical study of public opinion 
in relation to specific PMFs (Hough et al., 2009) had many limitations and did not focus on 
the three character-based PMFs that are central to this thesis, namely remorse, addressing 
addiction, and good character. Study 3 in this thesis addressed several limitations of Hough et 
al. (2009) and did focus on character-based PMFs. However, each PMF was tested in 
isolation, the study used a student sample, and the research took a nomothetic approach, 
producing aggregated data only.  
The present study had a demographically diverse non-student sample and used an 
idiographic experimental approach to examine the relationship between the three character-
based PMFs and people’s choice of custodial sentence length. The study explored the effect 
of the three PMFs when they occur with each other and/or with three common AFs, namely 
previous convictions, being on bail at the time of the offence, and being under the influence 
at the time of the offence. The study also examined each participant’s data separately and 
explored variations amongst participants’ judgments and between participants’ statistically 
derived judgment policies and their self-reported judgments. 
 The study first calculated the weight of the PMFs as predictors of reduced sentence 
length judgments, aggregated across all participants’ judgment policies. The aggregated 
results for addressing addiction are consistent with past research on public judgments (Hough 
et al., 2009; Study 3 in this thesis), as well as current sentencing practice (Jacobson & Hough, 
2007; Study 1 in this thesis). Both the public and sentencers judge addressing addiction to be 
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an important factor in sentencing.  The aggregated results for good character suggested a 
relatively weak mitigating effect. This finding is also consistent with the findings of Study 1 
in this thesis and Jacobson and Hough (2007) regarding sentencing practice. However, it 
conflicts somewhat with Study 3 in this thesis, where good character was found to have a 
large effect on people’s judgments about sentencing fairness. Nevertheless, the present results 
re-confirm that the public judge good character to be an acceptable PMF, despite the 
arguments for its exclusion put forward by commentators such as Ashworth (2010, 2015), 
Maslen and Roberts (2013), and Murphy (2006). 
 The present study’s aggregated results for remorse were also at odds with Study 3, 
which found only a very small mitigating effect for remorse. In addition, the aggregated 
findings suggest that the public may judge remorse to be a more important factor than 
sentencers do: remorse was as strong a predictor of a reduced sentence as addressing 
addiction, and was a stronger predictor than good character. Conversely, Study 1 found 
remorse to be a much weaker predictor of non-custodial sentences in the Crown Court than 
addressing addiction, and very similar to good character. 
The interactions found between PMFs challenge Hough et al.’s (2009) conclusions 
that the public’s model of aggravation and mitigation is essentially additive. The present 
study suggests that the public’s approach is actually rather more like the approach taken by 
sentencers (based on the results of Study 1), namely, the presence of one PMF can influence 
the effect of another. However, people’s judgments about which PMFs should affect one 
another and how were found to vary widely.  
The finding that all three PMFs predicted a reduced sentence less strongly than the 
AFs previous convictions and on bail predicted an increased sentence reflects previous 
research on both the public and sentencers (Hough et al., 2009; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; see 
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also Study 1). The exception to this AF dominance was under the influence; its mean 
predictive weight was negligible and participants were divided as to whether it should be an 
AF or a PMF. Participants’ ambivalence to under the influence is at odds with current 
sentencing principles and practice for assault, which treat under the influence as an AF 
(Lightowlers & Pina-Sanchez, 2017; Sentencing Council, 2011a).  
 The idiographic analysis of individual participants’ judgment policies told a very 
different story from the aggregated data, and suggested that there may be a substantial level 
of divergence between public judgments and sentencing policy/practice. All three PMFs 
tested, i.e., remorse, addressing addiction, and good character, are listed as mitigating factors 
in the assault guideline (Sentencing Council, 2011a). Additionally, Study 1 found that all 
three PMFs reduced the likelihood of an offender receiving a custodial sentence. However, 
the present study found that for each PMF the majority of people judged that it should not 
reduce sentence length. 48.4% of participants included addressing addiction in their judgment 
policies, 45.2% included remorse, and only 25.8% included good character. In addition, 65% 
of people had one or no PMFs in their judgment model, versus 52% for AFs. In other words, 
rather than everyone judging that all of the PMFs mattered somewhat (as the aggregated 
results suggest), people varied greatly in terms of which PMFs they considered important but 
tended to agree that only one or two of them should result in a reduced sentence.  
The idiographic findings thus challenge Lovegrove’s (2010, 2011) conclusion that 
personal mitigation may matter more to the public than to sentencers. The striking variation 
found among participants’ judgments about PMFs is consistent with Hough et al.’s (2009) 
qualitative results regarding the different approaches taken to personal mitigation by different 
members of the public.  
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 The overall correlation between participants’ statistically derived judgment policies 
and self-reported judgment policies was moderate (.41), but correlations between the two 
policies varied widely across individual participants, all the way from 1 (a perfect positive 
correlation) through to -.73 (a large negative correlation). This suggests that there were 
substantial individual differences in people’s ability to introspect on their own judgment 
strategies. In addition, people’s statistical models included fewer PMFs and AFs on average 
than their self-reports. This supports equivalent findings in previous research (e.g., Dhami & 
Ayton, 2001; Dhami & Harries, 2001; Konečni & Ebbesen, 1982, 1984). Social desirability 
response bias (Paulhus, 1991; Podsakoff et al., 2003) could have caused participants to rate 
PMFs and AFs as important when they are not, in fact, part of their judgment policies. 
Lastly, the cluster analysis identified sub-groups of participants who appeared to have 
similar views about the relative importance of PMFs and AFs for sentencing. One sub-group 
emphasised AFs and were relatively unaffected by AFs and PMFs overall. Participants who 
were more affected by the sentencing factors tended to have a balanced perspective, or give 
more weight to PMFs than AFs. Possible reasons for these clusters could be explored in 
future research. 
5.5.1. Potential Implications 
 The present study has both theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical 
perspective, the results of the present study show the benefits of using an idiographic 
methodology to study human judgment. The approach captures variation within a sample 
group and can reveal patterns in the data that could not be observed otherwise. For example, 
in the present study the aggregated results were broadly in line with sentencing policy, 
whereas the individual-level results revealed underlying disparity. The idiographic data also 
enabled a detailed visual representation of people’s different judgment models, which is the 
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first of its kind in the judgment and decision making literature. Lastly, the cluster analysis 
added a new dimension by showing how people’s individual judgment policies can be 
grouped based on the pattern of weights given to different variables without losing the 
richness of the underlying individual-level data. 
 The finding that people vary widely in their ability to report their own judgment 
strategies adds to the substantial body of evidence that simply asking people about their 
judgments is not an effective way to discover their judgment strategies (e.g., Newell & 
Shanks, 2014; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). It also suggests that the ability to introspect on our 
own judgments may be mediated or moderated by one or more individual difference variables. 
 Turning to the practical implications, people in the present study mostly judged that 
only one or two of the PMFs tested should play a role in sentencing, and people differed 
greatly regarding which PMFs they believed should make a difference. All of the PMFs 
tested are listed in the England and Wales sentencing guideline for assault as factors that 
should be taken account of in sentencing (Sentencing Council, 2011a), and research suggests 
that they have an effect on sentence outcomes in practice (Jacobson & Hough, 2007; see also 
Study 1). In other words, most people in the present study disagreed with current sentencing 
policy and practice on personal mitigation to some extent. If policy-makers want to take 
proper account of public judgments about personal mitigation, the present findings suggest 
that sentencing policy should move away from giving substantial value to PMFs as a matter 
of course. However, it may be that the relative punitiveness found in this study – and that 
found in past studies of public attitudes to criminal justice (e.g., Dawes et al., 2011; Hough et 
al., 2013; Ipsos MORI, 2010) – is a product of the public’s relationship with sentencing, 
which they experience through the prism of television, newspapers and social media. Cases 
are rarely reported in detail and tend to be chosen for media attention precisely because they 
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are atypical, making them a small, unrepresentative sample of sentencing outcomes (Green, 
1996). 
  Research suggests that when the public are given an opportunity to improve their 
knowledge of sentencing, their attitudes tend to become less punitive (e.g., Chapman et al., 
2002; Hough & Park, 2002; Salisbury, 2004). The Ministry of Justice recently had some 
success with the ‘You be the Judge’ website, an interactive website that aimed to show users 
how judges and magistrates decide sentences (Ministry of Justice, 2013). ‘You be the Judge’ 
was viewed by 74,000 people up to 31 December, 2012 and appeared to change many 
people’s overly punitive attitudes to sentencing. 41% of participants started with the opinion 
that sentencing is “too lenient” and 52% started with the opinion that sentencing is “about 
right”. After viewing the website, 72% stated that sentencing was “about right” and only 14% 
stated that sentencing is “too lenient”.  A similar online education programme could perhaps 
be used to help people understand how and why PMFs are applied in practice. This, in turn, 
might close the gap between public judgments about PMFs and current sentencing practice. 
The discrepancies found between sentencers’ and the public’s judgments about PMFs 
also emphasise the importance of having guidance on the use of PMFs in sentencing that is 
based on empirical evidence both of current sentencing practice and public opinion on 
sentencing. Guidance can not only increase consistency in sentencing, but also enhance the 
transparency of the process, giving the public a better understanding of when and how PMFs 
influence sentencing. A more transparent process should promote procedural justice (i.e., the 
sense that a decision is the product of an acceptable decision-making procedure), which has 
been found to be an important determinant of satisfaction with the criminal justice system 
(e.g., Casper et al., 1988; Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2012; Rottman, 2005; Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003; Tyler et al., 1997; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  
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5.5.2. Proposals for Future Research  
 On a theoretical level, it would be useful to explore possible individual differences 
that may mediate or moderate people’s ability to report their own judgment policies 
accurately. A potential variable of interest is cognitive reflection (Baron, Scott, Fincher & 
Metz, 2015; Frederick, 2005; Toplak, Stanovich & West, 2011), which has previously been 
implicated in research dealing with people’s ability to override unconscious intuitive 
judgments.  
This study used regression analysis to estimate participants’ judgment policies. As 
discussed above, while this is a recognised approach both in sentencing research and 
judgment and decision making research based on social judgment theory, it does have 
limitations (discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 36-37). Future research could explore promising 
alternatives to linear regression models for estimating people’s judgment policies about 
sentencing, including fast and frugal heuristics (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; von Helversen & 
Rieskamp, 2009) or coherence-based networks (e.g., Glöckner & Betch, 2008; Glöckner et al., 
2014). 
  Another interesting avenue of research would be to use a similar design to investigate 
public judgments about the role of PMFs in other offence types, such as sexual offences. 
Sentencing policy already highlights certain PMFs as being particularly relevant or irrelevant 
to certain offences. For example, the new guideline for sexual offences states in relation to 
rape, that “in the context of this offence, previous good/character/exemplary conduct should 
not normally be given any significant weight” (Sentencing Council, 2013c, p. 11). The 
guideline for causing death by driving highlights remorse as a PMF for this category of 
offence, stating that, “whilst it can be expected that anyone who has caused death by driving 
239 
 
would be expected to feel remorse, this cannot undermine its importance for sentencing 
purposes” (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2008, p. 6). 
Lastly, in order to bridge the gap between current sentencing practice and public 
judgments about PMFs in sentencing, further research is needed to understand better how and 
why sentencers take account of PMFs in practice (an issue explored further in Study 2). If we 
want people to appreciate the role played by PMFs in sentencing, we need to be able to 
describe to them why a given PMF may matter more or less in a particular context, and how 
this might affect an offender’s final sentence. This information could then be used to inform 
education programmes aimed at explaining the role of PMFs to the public.  
5.5.3. Strengths and Limitations  
 Like all research, this study had some limitations. The sample used cannot be said to 
be fully representative of the UK public as a whole. However, there was a relatively even 
gender split, and a good spread of family income and political affiliation. There was no ethnic 
diversity in the sample. In addition, the study used multiple linear regression, which is a 
correlational analytic technique and so strictly speaking it cannot confirm the presence of 
causal links between variables. Nevertheless, it does provide a good indication of the likely 
impact of PMFs on sentence lengths. Finally, some (e.g., Lovegrove, 2011) have questioned 
the external validity of using short hypothetical scenarios of the type used in the present study, 
given that real sentencing cases are so much richer and factually complex. This is always a 
downside of using a controlled, experimental approach, but in this case the brevity of the 
scenarios reflects the public’s interaction with sentencing practice, through media headlines 
and summaries. 
 Strengths of the present study include that it is the first to use an idiographic, 
quantitative methodology to investigate public judgments about PMFs in sentencing. The 
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results provide new empirical evidence about the weight given by the public to several 
important PMFs, and also give a striking picture of the range and variety of people’s 
judgments about the importance of PMFs in sentencing (and their relationship to AFs). The 
results raise both theoretical and practical implications for future research and guidance on 
sentencing policy and practice. 
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6. Further Analyses and General Discussion 
 
The primary aim of the present PhD research was to understand better the role of 
PMFs in criminal sentencing. There were three secondary aims, each of which focused on the 
character-based PMFs remorse, addressing addiction, and good character. The first secondary 
aim was to examine how sentencers use character-based PMFs in their sentencing judgments. 
The second was to explore public judgments about the role of character-based PMFs in 
sentencing. The third was to compare sentencers’ use of character-based PMFs with public 
judgments about PMFs. Studies 1 and 2 were intended to fulfil the first aim, while Studies 3 
and 4 were intended to fulfil the second aim. The third aim was addressed to some extent in 
Studies 3 and 4 but is considered more fully in this chapter. 
Studies 1, 3 and 4 used exclusively quantitative methods. Study 1 involved a 
statistical analysis of sentencing data, while Studies 3 and 4 both used experimental designs 
to capture individuals’ judgment strategies. Study 3 used a nomothetic approach, aggregating 
the judgments made by groups of participants, while Study 4 used an idiographic design, 
capturing and analysing participants’ individual judgment strategies. Study 2 used a 
qualitative methodology (thematic analysis) in order to explore Study 1’s quantitative 
findings and the questions Study 1 left unanswered, and to suggest directions for further 
research. 
The following three sections discuss how the present research has fulfilled each of its 
three aims. The remaining part of the Discussion deals with methodological and practical 
implications and offers suggestions for future research. 
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6.1. Sentencers’ Use of Character-based PMFs 
Criminal sentencing is a challenging, important and highly consequential judgment 
task. Personal mitigation – the process whereby an offender’s personal characteristics and/or 
circumstances can be used to reduce his or her sentence – is a recognised part of the 
sentencing process in most jurisdictions. In England and Wales, sentencing statistics and past 
research suggest that Personal Mitigating Factors (PMFs) can make a substantial difference to 
sentencing judgments, in particular by reducing the chance that an offender will go to prison 
(Hough et al., 2003; Millie et al., 2007; Sentencing Council, 2012, 2013a, 2014, 2015a). 
However, until now, the effect that individual PMFs have on sentencing outcomes has not 
been quantified. The first part of the PhD research examined the impact that PMFs have on 
sentencing judgments by focusing on three pivotal character-based PMFs: remorse, good 
character and addressing addiction.  
Study 1 used a statistical analysis of archival sentencing data from the Crown Court 
Sentencing Survey (CCSS) to explore relationships between the three character-based PMFs 
and the likelihood of an offender receiving a custodial sentence. The study confirmed that the 
three character-based PMFs each have a mitigating effect on sentencing judgments for 
common violent and property offences, since all three PMFs were associated with a 
substantially smaller chance of an offender going to prison. Addressing addiction predicted a 
non-custodial sentence much more strongly than either remorse or good character, which had 
similar predictive weights for both assault and burglary. (Immediate custody was 3.88 times 
less likely in cases of assault that involved addressing addiction; for burglary, the figure was 
4.93 times. Remorse predicted 1.88 and 1.63 times lower likelihoods of immediate custody in 
assault and burglary, respectively. Good character predicted a 1.69 times lower likelihood of 
immediate custody for both offences). Addressing addiction was also the strongest predictor 
(of all PMFs) for both assault and burglary, while remorse and good character were the 
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second- and third-weakest predictors for burglary and amongst the weakest predictors for 
assault (see Table 6.1). The extent to which the three character-based PMFs predicted a non-
custodial sentence did not differ substantially between assault and burglary cases. 
Table 6.1 
Character-based PMFs’ ranked by their power in predicting non-custodial sentences in 
assault and burglary cases 
PMF Assault 
ranking (/11*) 
Burglary 
ranking (/13*) 
Mean 
ranking 
Addressing 
addiction 
 
1 1 1 
Good character 8 11 9.5 
Remorse 7 12 9.5 
*Total number of PMFs listed in the relevant guideline 
Study 1 also found evidence of underweighting in cases where either remorse and 
addressing addiction or good character and addressing addiction occurred together. In other 
words, offenders in such cases did not receive full credit for each of the PMFs present 
(compared to offenders in cases where only one or other PMF was present). 
Study 1 represented a number of firsts for sentencing research. It was the first 
quantitative research to study the PMFs good character and addressing addiction, and the first 
to compare the effects of the three character-based PMFs on sentencing outcomes. It was also 
the first study of sentencing judgments that tested for the effect of interactions between PMFs. 
Lastly, it was the first quantitative study on PMFs that controlled fully for the effect of all 
other PMFs and aggravating factors, compared different offence types, and aggregated data 
from multiple years. 
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Study 2 helped to explain and extend Study 1’s quantitative findings in a number of 
ways. The study highlighted the importance of examining the way that judges say they use 
different types of evidence when evaluating PMFs, such as what indicates genuine remorse, 
how to deal with character references, and where to ‘draw the line’ with addressing addiction 
where previous attempts have failed. Study 2 also identified possible hypotheses 
(psychological and practical) that may explain the underweighting of multiple PMFs and the 
relative weight given to addressing addiction compared to remorse and good character. 
 The sentencers interviewed in Study 2 also disagreed on a number of issues including 
the use of evidence when assessing PMFs and even the meaning of the PMFs themselves 
(especially good character). Differences in perception or understanding between sentencers 
may well influence their judgment strategies and produce inconsistency in their sentences. 
Further quantitative research would be required to test this hypothesis. 
Overall, Study 1’s findings provided much-needed empirical evidence of current 
sentencing practice in relation to PMFs. Study 2 provided additional insight into those 
findings, suggested areas where further research may be necessary in order to understand why 
character-based PMFs have the impact they do, and opened the debate for guidance on the 
correct use of evidence for evaluating PMFs. In addition, the present research was the first to 
use a mixed methods approach to investigate the use of PMFs in sentencing judgments. 
Studies 1 and 2 together illustrate how quantitative and qualitative research can be used in 
tandem to generate a cycle of complementary research that can progressively improve our 
understanding of personal mitigation as a phenomenon. 
6.2. Public Judgments about Character-based PMFs in Sentencing 
The second part of the present PhD research aimed to examine public judgments 
about the role of PMFs in sentencing. It is generally recognised that public opinion is relevant 
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to sentencing, and so it matters whether public perceptions of PMFs are consistent with 
current sentencing practice. The present research aimed to quantify the impact that the 
character-based PMFs have on people’s sentencing judgments, as well as exploring the scale 
of variation amongst people’s judgments about PMFs.  
Like Study 1, Studies 3 and 4 also broke new ground in sentencing research.  To date, 
only one other experimental study (Hough et al., 2009) explored public judgments about 
PMFs in sentencing; it used different PMFs across different scenarios (precluding direct 
comparisons), and it did not test either good character or addressing addiction. Studies 3 and 
4 directly compared the effect on public judgments of the three character-based PMFs. Study 
4 was also the first use of an idiographic approach in the study of sentencing judgments.  
Studies 3 and 4 were designed differently, in order to explore different aspects of the 
public’s involvement with sentencing. First, in real sentencing cases, PMFs can occur 
individually or along with other PMFs and/or aggravating factors (AFs). Study 3 explored the 
former situation, while Study 4 explored the latter. Second, public judgments about 
sentencing can be measured in various ways. Study 3 gave people case summaries that 
included the sentence passed, and asked them to evaluate the fairness of that sentence (in 
terms of whether the sentence was too harsh, too lenient, or just right, on a 7-point Likert-
type scale). This mirrors people’s everyday exposure to sentencing, i.e., reading or hearing 
cases reported in the media. However, the concept of “fairness”, while central to criminal 
justice, is a step away from making an actual sentencing judgment. Consequently, Study 4 
adopted a more direct approach, asking participants to choose custodial sentence lengths (in 
years and months) for a range of different cases. Third, Study 3 investigated burglary, while 
Study 4 examined assault (since Study 1 covered both offence types). 
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Studies 3 and 4 were consistent in finding that public judgments were, on average, 
influenced by all three PMFs. However, the relative weight given to the PMFs differed 
between the two studies (see Table 6.2 below). Addressing addiction and remorse were both 
ranked one place higher in terms of influence in Study 3 than in Study 4. However, the 
difference in relative weight between Studies 3 and 4 was far greater for remorse than for 
good character (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3 below).  Good character was weighted highest in 
Study 3 but lowest in Study 4. The difference in PMF weights between the studies could be 
partly explained by the different offence contexts in Studies 3 and 4 (i.e., burglary and assault, 
respectively). The difference between public judgments about burglary and assault contrasts 
with the finding for sentencers, whose judgments about the relative importance of the three 
PMFs remained broadly consistent across assault and burglary cases.  
Table 6.2 
Character-based PMFs ranked by the size of their effects in Study 3 (burglary) and Study 4 
(assault). 
PMF Study 3 
rank 
Study 4 
rank 
Mean rank 
Addressing 
addiction  
 
2 1 1.5 
Good character 1 3 2 
Remorse 3 2 2.5 
 
Study 3 and Study 4 both found that the effect of PMFs on people’s sentencing 
judgments was influenced by the presence of other variables. Study 3 found that addressing 
addiction had more effect on participants’ fairness judgments in cases involving a community 
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sentence, and good character had more effect on fairness judgments in cases involving a fine. 
The effect of remorse was not found to differ across sentence types37. Study 4 found that for 
42% of participants, the predictive weight of one or more PMFs differed depending on 
whether a second PMF (or aggravating factor) was also present in a case. The PMFs that 
interacted in this way varied widely between participants; the most common combinations 
were remorse and good character, and good character and under the influence. 
Study 4’s analysis of individual participants’ judgment strategies revealed that people 
varied considerably in terms of which PMFs they judged important. Interestingly, 65% of 
participants in Study 4 had one or no PMFs in their statistically estimated judgment model 
(36% = 1, 29% = 0), and none of the three PMFs tested were included in the judgment model 
of more than 48% of participants. These findings are contrary to the current England and 
Wales sentencing guidelines, which require that all three character-based PMFs should be 
taken into account when sentencing offenders. Lastly, Studies 3 and 4 both found 
discrepancies between people’s statistically estimated judgment strategies and their self-
reported judgment strategies. This finding validated the use of an experimental methodology 
for these studies, rather than relying on self-report measures that are likely to be inaccurate. 
In summary, Studies 3 and 4 found that the public’s sentencing judgments were, on 
average, mitigated by all three PMFs. However, the studies also found possible differences in 
the impact of PMFs (in particular good character) on public sentencing judgments between 
burglary and assault offences, and substantial variation in the weight given to the three PMFs 
by individual members of the public. 
 
 
                                                            
37 However, since the effect of remorse was small, there may not have been sufficient statistical power to detect 
an interaction between remorse and sentence type. 
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6.3. Comparison of Sentencers’ and Public Judgments about PMFs 
The present research was the first to compare sentencers’ judgments about PMFs with 
those of the public. Comparisons of the absolute weights given to the PMFs across the three 
studies are difficult given the different designs and measures used. However, this does not 
prevent meaningful comparisons of the relative weights given to the three PMFs in each 
study. In order to compare the relative influence on sentencing judgments of the three 
character-based PMFs in Study 1 with those from Studies 3 and 4, the findings for each PMF 
from each study are presented together on one page, in Figures 6.1 to 6.3. The results of the 
three studies for addressing addiction were consistent: sentencers and the public (on average) 
both judged it to be an important PMF. In addition, Study 2 did not identify any major 
evidential difficulties in determining whether to take account of addressing addiction as a 
PMF. It may simply be a matter of determining that an offender is prepared to take treatment 
seriously, and that they have not already failed on too many previous occasions.  
Studies 1 and 3 and the aggregated data from Study 4 all showed that both sentencers 
and the public treated remorse as a relatively weak PMF. Study 2 and feedback from the pre-
test for Study 3 suggested that scepticism about the sincerity of remorse is an issue for both 
sentencers and the public, and this may have contributed to the finding that remorse had only 
a small mitigating effect. However, the extremely weak effect found for remorse in Study 3, 
relative to good character and addressing addiction, suggests that the public may be less 
influenced by remorse than sentencers. This conclusion is supported by the idiographic 
findings of Study 4 (discussed further below).  
In general, public sentencing judgments support sentencers’ use of good character as a 
PMF, although Studies 3 and 4 produced conflicting results regarding the weight that it 
should be given. The larger issue with good character is simply that both sentencers and the 
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public accept it as a PMF. Conversely, most leading sentencing researchers argue that good 
character should not be a PMF at all, since it amounts to intrusive “social accounting” or 
“moral policing” that should have no part in the sentencing system (Ashworth, 2010, 2015; 
Maslen & Roberts, 2013; Murphy, 2006). In addition, Study 2 suggests that there may be a 
great deal of division amongst sentencers about what good character means (in particular the 
relationship between positive good character and lack of previous convictions), as well as 
ambiguity about what sort of evidence is relevant and the impact that it should have. In the 
circumstances, sentencers’ current approach is likely to be inconsistent and may be prone to 
bias. 
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Figure 6.1. Study 1 – Mean reduction in custodial sentence likelihood obtained from logistic 
regression models for Crown Court assault and burglary offences. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Study 2 – Effect sizes of each PMF on fairness judgments. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Study 4 – Mean regression coefficients for the weight given to each PMF in 
participants’ regression models. 
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While the findings of Studies 1 and 3 were broadly consistent with each other, Study 
4’s idiographic analysis of individual judgment policies told a different story. The majority 
(65%) of participants judged that none or only one of the PMFs tested should result in a 
reduced sentence – and there was considerable disagreement about which PMFs should 
matter. This suggests that a sizeable proportion of the public may not support the substantial 
role given to PMFs in current sentencing policy and practice. This disconnect between 
sentencers and the public in relation to personal mitigation is perhaps the most concerning 
issue arising from the comparison of data from sentencers and the public. 
Both Study 1 (sentencers) and Study 4 (the public) found that PMFs were weighted 
less than aggravating factors (AFs)38. Lastly, the present research found that underweighting 
of multiple PMFs (i.e., where two PMFs together provide less mitigation than the sum of the 
two individual PMFs) is a phenomenon which appears to affect both sentencers and the 
public. Study 1 found underweighting of two pairs of PMFs: remorse and addressing 
addiction, and good character and addressing addiction. Study 4 also found underweighting 
of multiple PMFs; in addition, people’s judgment models varied widely in terms of the pairs 
of PMFs underweighted in this way. This finding conflicts with past research on public PMF 
judgments that found no significant interactions between factors (Hough et al., 2009 – 
although as discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 31-32, that study’s design may not have enabled it to 
detect interactions).  
6.4. Theoretical/Methodological Implications: How Psychology Can Inform 
Research on PMFs  
The following section describes how psychology can help to advance research into the 
role played by PMFs in sentencing in two ways. First, psychological research offers various 
                                                            
38 Study 4 found a very small effect for the AF “under the influence” but only because some participants treated 
it as an AF and some treated it as a PMF. 
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possible explanations for the findings contained in the present thesis. Second, methodologies 
developed by decision science (and psychology more generally) can help researchers to 
investigate the influence of PMFs on judgments made by sentencers and the general public.   
6.4.1. Psychological Explanations for the Present Research Findings 
The psychological research reviewed in Chapter 1 can help explain several of the 
findings reported in this thesis. First, underweighting of multiple co-occurring character-
based PMFs was found in sentencing judgments made by both sentencers and the public 
(Studies 1 and 4). Two cognitive biases identified by heuristics and biases research 
programme (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982) may be at work here. As discussed in Study 1 (see Chapter 2, p. 124-125), 
sentencers’ holistic approach to personal mitigation may have resulted in the subadditivity 
effect, meaning that two PMFs taken together were given less weight than the sum of their 
individual weights.  
In addition, order effects could be involved. The “primacy effect” is the tendency to 
give disproportionate importance to the first item of information received, compared to 
subsequent items (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Sentencers may be relatively strongly 
influenced by the first PMF mentioned by defence counsel, but less influenced by subsequent 
PMFs mentioned in the same case. If two PMFs such as remorse and good character that co-
occur frequently were mentioned in a different order from one Crown Court case to another, 
the CCSS data overall would show reduced weight given to each factor when both factors 
were present (since each PMF would be a weaker predictor in cases where it was mentioned 
second). The possible impact of order effects on the weight given to PMFs in sentencing 
could be investigated experimentally.  
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Second, Studies 1 and 4 found that addressing addiction predicted a reduced sentence 
much more strongly than either remorse or good character. Researchers have argued that 
intuitive legal judgment involves sentencers building a coherent, holistic narrative of each 
offender’s morality (see Ashworth, 2015; Fitzmaurice & Pease, 1986; Pennington & Hastie, 
1986, 1992; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004).  Offenders judged to be basically good or honest 
are more likely to be given a chance and kept out of custody; their offences are viewed as 
one-off lapses rather than indicative of a bad character. It follows that if addressing addiction 
has a stronger mitigating effect than remorse or good character, this may be because 
offenders’ efforts to address an addiction that is likely the root of their offending have a 
stronger impact on judgments about their moral character than expressions of remorse or past 
good deeds. Remorse and good character may also be undermined by other, conflicting 
narratives: for example, that manipulative offenders may shed crocodile tears to reduce their 
sentence – a perception that was observed in Studies 2 and 3 – or use their good name in the 
community to shield or even facilitate their offending – an issue that is flagged in the current 
England and Wales sexual offences guideline (Sentencing Council, 2013c).  
Alternatively, the perceptual shorthand and focal concerns theories of sentencing 
(Albonetti, 1987; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998) would suggest that addressing 
addiction may have a stronger influence on causal attributions of blameworthiness and likely 
recidivism or rehabilitation than the other two PMFs. Sentencers might judge that addicts 
need help more than punishment; viz. the “therapeutic jurisprudence” theme identified in 
Study 2. In addition, sentencers may attribute addicts’ criminal behaviour to their addiction 
and conclude that if they are now dealing with that addiction, they are already in the process 
of rehabilitation, are less likely to reoffend in future, and so need not be imprisoned for the 
purposes of public protection or deterrence.  
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Third, Studies 1 and 4 found that AFs carry more weight than PMFs with both 
sentencers and the public, and (for most offences) when both AFs and PMFs are present 
together, AFs dominate. Another cognitive bias, “negativity bias” can help to explain this 
finding. Negativity bias predicts that negative information will have a stronger effect on 
judgment than positive information (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Rozin and Royzman’s review 
of the psychological literature found extensive evidence that combinations of negative and 
positive items yield evaluations that are more negative than an unbiased algebraic sum of the 
items would predict.  In other words, sentencers may prioritise AFs over PMFs because of 
AFs’ inherent negativity, rather than because they necessarily have characteristics that justify 
greater weight being given to them. 
Fourth, Studies 1, 3 and 4 provide evidence that good character is currently a well-
recognised PMF which can have a substantial effect on sentencing outcomes (and public 
judgments about those outcomes). Sentencing researchers have repeatedly argued from first 
principles that good character is an illegitimate moral/social accounting that undermines the 
principle of proportionality which lies at the heart of the England and Wales sentencing 
system (e.g., Ashworth, 2015; Maslen & Roberts, 2013, Murphy, 2006; Von Hirsch, 2011). 
Why, therefore, are both judges and the public substantially swayed by an offender’s 
previous good character? Again, the key may be the holistic, moralistic nature of intuitive 
judgment: good character will always have a role to play in discretionary sentencing since it 
shapes the way that sentencers conceptualise the offender, viewing their offending behaviour 
in light of their character and judging it differently for that reason.  
6.4.2. Methodological Innovations from Psychological Research 
Reducing inconsistency and bias in criminal sentencing requires an understanding of 
both descriptive knowledge about sentencing judgments and normative knowledge about how 
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the sentencing process ought to operate (see Chapter 1, p. 26). Almost all criminal justice 
research to date has been carried out by legal academics or criminologists, who may not 
necessarily have the methodological tools needed to study the judgment process effectively. 
Legal researchers tend to look at sentencing from a normative rather than descriptive 
perspective. For example, researchers weigh the arguments for and against contesting 
theories of punishment (e.g., just deserts theory versus more rehabilitative approaches) and 
consider how changes to sentencing law (e.g., the introduction of guidelines) have affected, 
or might affect, sentencing practice. Empirical research by legal researchers that is from a 
descriptive perspective is typically limited to assessing whether particular judgments are 
consistent with sentencing aims or legal principles. Research of this kind is based on 
analysing judges’ stated reasons – which are more likely to be post-hoc rationalisations of the 
sentence given than veridical accounts of the actual judgment process (see Chapter 1, p. 31-
32). 
Criminologists’ approach to sentencing tends to be descriptive rather than normative. 
However, the research methods used have often not been best suited to understanding the 
mechanics of judgment: surveys, observation, interviews, or analysis of archival sentencing 
data that do not contain sufficient variables to analyse the sentencing process in detail (i.e., 
few or no legal factors – unlike the CCSS data).  Additionally, criminologists are, first and 
foremost, sociologists, who are interested in sentencing as a social process. This focus has 
naturally led researchers to concentrate on the role in sentencing of extra-legal, socially 
salient characteristics of offenders (and sentencers) such as race, gender and socio-economic 
status. While the social context of sentencing is undoubtedly important, arguably a more 
fundamental question is how sentencers actually use the legal factors (such as mitigating and 
aggravating factors) that, as a matter of law, should determine sentences. After all, it is no 
good eliminating e.g., racial bias if sentences are still not properly based on the relevant facts 
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of the case, or legal principles are applied differently from judge to judge or from court to 
court.  It is also very likely that legal and extra-legal factors interact in meaningful ways. 
However, as previously noted at p. 38 of Chapter 1, research into sentencers’ use of legal 
factors is currently lacking. It is true that some recent quantitative research has begun to focus 
on legal factors (Irwin-Rogers & Perry, 2015; Maslen, 2015a; Pina-Sanchez & Linacre, 2013; 
Roberts & Pina-Sanchez, 2014). However, more could be done to investigate the structure of 
sentencers’ judgments, and this is where psychology can potentially add substantial value to 
sentencing research. 
Judgment and decision making (JDM) is a specific sub-section of cognitive 
psychology which, as the name suggests, focuses on examining how individuals make 
judgments. JDM researchers typically use behavioural methods. These include using 
experimental methods to analyse the underlying mechanisms involved in judgment processes, 
such as how information is searched and integrated, and how features of the judgment task 
affect the decision strategies used (e.g., Gigerenzer, et al., 1999; Gigerenzer et al., 2011; 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2008b; Glöckner et al., 2014). 
The small sub-set of JDM researchers whose work is based on the principles of social 
judgment theory (e.g., Cooksey, 1996; Doherty & Kurtz, 1996; Hammond et al., 1975; see 
Chapter 1, pp. 34-37 for more detail) also use a person-by-person or idiographic approach. 
Idiographic designs capture and compare individual people’s judgment strategies by asking 
them to make a series of judgments while systematically manipulating variables of interest. 
Idiographic studies’ ability to measure inter-judge (and intra-judge) variation has proved 
particularly useful in applied domains such as criminal justice where individual judges may 
vary considerably in the judgment strategies they use (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Klaas et 
al., 2006; Konečni & Ebbesen, 1982, 1984; Sensibaugh & Allgeier, 1996).  
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JDM research typically adopts a descriptive approach, examining the strategies 
individuals use to carry out a particular judgment task. Descriptive data can then be compared 
to purported normative strategies for that task, and the two perspectives actively inform each 
other – the normative perspective can highlight potential problems in the descriptive account, 
while the descriptive perspective can challenge the accuracy or plausibility of the normative 
perspective. For this reason, JDM methodology is ideally suited to exploring the question of 
whether sentencing judgments are consistent with existing legal principles. In addition, the 
experimental methods used make it possible to identify cause-effect relationships between 
particular items of information and the judgments made. 
Unfortunately, relatively few JDM researchers have investigated sentencing 
judgments (for exceptions see Dhami et al., 2017; Englich et al., 2006; Konečni & Ebbesen, 
1982, 1984; Mueller-Johnson & Dhami, 2010; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2009). This lack 
of research may be part of a wider reluctance to engage in applied JDM research, because of 
the complexity of the environments involved. In applied domains (including criminal justice), 
it is often difficult to isolate variables of interest and control for other variables that may 
affect the outcomes studied. For this reason, JDM research tends to be limited to lab-based 
studies of simplified, hypothetical judgment tasks, typically using student samples. The 
downside of relying on lab-based studies is lack of external validity; it is easy to argue that 
the findings may not apply to real-life judgment contexts. However, it is possible to design 
experimental studies so as to improve external validity and gain meaningful insights into 
judgments in applied domains such as sentencing (see Dhami & Belton, 2017).  
First, researchers can use idiographic designs to experimentally test judgment models 
that are more psychologically plausible than regression models, for example fast and frugal 
heuristics (e.g., Dhami & Ayton, 2001; von Helverson & Rieskamp, 2009) or coherence-
based models (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2008b; Glöckner et al., 2014). Idiographic designs 
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can also provide valuable information about the specific strategies used by individual 
sentencers, rather than aggregated data across a whole community, as well as exploring both 
inter- and intra-judge consistency in sentencing strategies. 
Second, hypothetical judgment tasks can be designed to be more representative of the 
real world sentencing environment sentencers are used to dealing with, for example in terms 
of the distributions, inter-correlations and values of variables used (Brunswik, 1955, 1956; 
Dhami et al., 2004; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). Using an idiographic, 
representative approach is important because the judiciary and policy-makers are more likely 
to take notice of data showing the strategies used by individual sentencers in realistic 
sentencing tasks (Dhami & Belton, 2017). While sentencers can be a difficult group to access, 
it might be possible to obtain participants for experimental studies through proactive 
engagement with institutions that have regular access to the judiciary, such as the Judicial 
College (the body responsible for training judges and magistrates in England and Wales).  
Psychologists have also developed a rigorous approach to qualitative research (e.g., 
Silverman, 2011; Smith, 2008; Willig, 2013), as well as a small but growing expertise in 
mixed (quantitative and qualitative) methods research, an approach which can harness the 
complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses of the two methods (e.g., Franz, 
Worrell, & Vögele, 2013; Tashakkori, Teddlie, & Sines, 2012; Yardley & Bishop, 2008). 
Past qualitative research into sentencing has tended to use far too informal an approach, 
without any (explicit) recognition of the methodological issues that have to be addressed 
when performing qualitative research, or the limitations on the types of conclusion that can 
validly be drawn from such work (e.g., Gelsthorpe & Loucks, 1997; Hough et al., 2003; 
Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Millie et al., 2003; Shapland, 1981 – see Chapter 3, pp. 136-138 
for more detail). There has also been no attempt to date (with the exception of the present 
research) to produce a meaningful synthesis between qualitative and quantitative research. 
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Mixed methods research has substantial potential for enhancing quantitative research – as 
long as both elements are used appropriately (see the discussion in Chapter 3, p. 131-133).  
This thesis has used various methodologies from psychological research to advance 
our understanding of the role of PMFs in sentencing. It was not possible to use an 
experimental design to explore sentencers’ judgments and so a statistical analysis of archival 
sentencing data was used instead – but focused on PMFs, rather than the extra-legal factors 
more commonly explored in the literature. The statistical analysis was followed up with a 
qualitative study of sentencers’ perceptions, aimed at generating possible explanations for the 
quantitative findings and identifying variables for future research. Public judgments about 
sentencing were explored using experimental methods, including (in Study 4) an idiographic 
approach derived from Social Judgment Theory.  
6.5. Practical Implications of the Present Research 
The findings of Studies 1 to 4 have various practical implications for both sentencers 
and sentencing policy-makers. 
6.5.1. Why Should Personal Mitigation be Structured? 
A wealth of past research shows that discretionary sentencing produces inconsistency 
and bias (see the review in Chapter 1, pp. 2-9). For some time, researchers have argued for 
the introduction of guidance and/or structure into the personal mitigation process (e.g., 
Dhami 2013a, 2013b; Roberts, 2008, 2011; Young & King, 2011). However, any move to 
reduce judicial discretion in relation to PMFs would have to overcome two common defences 
of discretionary sentencing. The first argument asserts that by constraining judicial discretion, 
judges are prevented from tailoring their sentences to the unique facts and circumstances of 
each individual offence and offender (Ashworth, 2015; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; 
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Krasnostein & Freiburg, 2013; Tata, 2010). “The point about judicial discretion is that a 
judge is trying to do justice in the individual case” (Lord Chief Justice Judge, quoted in 
House of Commons Justice Committee, 2009, para. 24).  As Cooper puts it (2008, p. 279): 
“No case is ever identical to another... and each sentencing exercise is as particular to itself as 
the individual being dealt with”. In each of its annual reports of Crown Court sentencing data, 
the Sentencing Council stated that “[i]t is important to note that every criminal case is unique” 
(e.g., Sentencing Council, 2015a, p. 9).  
As regards mitigating and aggravating factors, Von Hirsch (2011) notes that it is 
claimed they are so many and varied, and occur in such an infinite array of different contexts 
and combinations, that no useful guidance is possible (this viewpoint was also expressed by 
the judges in Study 2 – see Chapter 3, p. 161-162). The flaw in the “every case is unique” 
argument was neatly exposed by Hood (1962, p. 16): “Magistrates and judges… place 
particular value upon their experience in sentencing. Now, if this experience is to be of value, 
then all cases cannot be unique, they must be comparable at least in some respects; and even 
if it is agreed that all cases are unique in some sense, this [uniqueness] cannot be decisive in 
the practice of sentencing” (see also Von Hirsch, 201139).  
Recent research based on large sentencing data sets from England and Wales and 
New South Wales, Australia appears to confirm that judges given wide discretion treat the 
vast majority of cases as directly comparable, and sentence them accordingly (Dhami, Belton, 
Merrall, McGrath, & Bird, 2017). The study found that across both jurisdictions, between 78% 
and 99% of offenders (depending on the sentence type) receive one of a limited set of 
preferred sentencing “doses” (between six and 25 doses depending on the court and 
jurisdiction). These sentencing doses reflect human preferences for cognitively calculable 
                                                            
39 “The argument puzzles me. Were it valid, then how could even individual judges deal with such matters? 
After all, none of us (whether judges or academic penologists) seem to possess the skills of mathematicians and 
cosmologists in dealing with trans-finite quanta” (Von Hirsch, 2011, p. xv). 
261 
 
numerical values such as custodial or community sentence lengths of 90, 180 and 360 days, 
and fines in multiples of £50. Similar findings have been reported from sentencing data in the 
USA and Canada (Jones & Rankin, 2014; Ostrom & Ostrom, 2002; Wiseman, Fischer, & 
Connelly, 2006). A more structured process where particular levels and combinations of 
mitigating and aggravating factors would lead directly to a specified sentence would, in 
theory, produce a far wider range of sentence values. Dhami et al.’s (2017) findings therefore 
strongly suggest that truly individualised sentencing may be a myth, and so a structured 
approach could produce sentences that are more genuinely individualised than is the case in a 
system where judges have wide sentencing discretion.  
The second argument often made in defence of judicial discretion is that sentencing is, 
and should remain, a fundamentally human process. Many sentencers argue that reducing 
judicial discretion “‘takes the humanity out of sentencing’ and encourages sentencers to act 
as ‘robots’ ” (Jacobson & Hough, 2007, p. 56). The non-discretionary, grid-based sentencing 
guidelines used in many US states have been condemned as dehumanising, impersonal 
sentencing machines (Aas, 2005; Tonry, 1996; Traynor & Potas, 2002). As summarised at pp. 
29-30 of Chapter 1, research suggests that people consider fair treatment by the criminal 
justice system, including treating individuals with respect and dignity, at least as important as 
a fair outcome (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). A survey of 80 English prisoners and criminal justice 
professionals (prison governors, probation officers, and police officers) found very little 
support for more automated sentencing systems or even more detailed guidelines (Dhami, 
2006).  
However, guidance on PMFs would not transform sentencing into an inhuman, 
disrespectful process. The sentencer would still have to decide whether each PMF should be 
taken account of in a given case (an unavoidably human, subjective task), and how influential 
it should be (relative to other instances of that PMF), then translate those judgments into a 
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final sentence. This would remain a challenging task. For example, the sexual offences 
guideline (Sentencing Council, 2013c) states that good character should be given 
progressively less weight in more serious cases, and where that good character has been used 
to facilitate the offence, it may be an aggravating factor.  However, it remains up to the judge 
how to interpret that guidance in any specific case. It is hard to see how extending guidance 
of that kind to other PMFs would result in a process that was either inhuman or robotic. 
In England and Wales there is now a fairly structured system of step-by-step 
sentencing guidelines. However, the process of personal mitigation is still almost entirely 
discretionary. The sentencing guidelines contain non-exhaustive lists of relevant AFs and 
PMFs but no guidance about how to use them40. The two-step structure of the sentencing 
guidelines (described at pp. 21-24 of Chapter 1) limits the impact of personal mitigation 
somewhat, since Step One factors determine the sentence starting point and range, while Step 
Two factors can generally only move a sentence up or down within the range. Nevertheless, 
sentencers still have total flexibility within those limits.  
As observed in Chapter 1, any structured approach to personal mitigation must 
incorporate both descriptive and normative perspectives, i.e., reflect current sentencing 
practice while remaining consistent with agreed sentencing principles. Study 1 has shown 
how current practice in relation to PMFs can be estimated using publicly available sentencing 
data. This work is a necessary starting point for the development of a structured approach to 
personal mitigation. However, describing current practice is only the beginning of that 
process. The present research has also identified a number of potential issues with current 
sentencing practice. Any structured approach to personal mitigation should aim to resolve 
these issues in one way or another. In practice, this would involve sentencers, policy-makers 
                                                            
40 With certain very limited exceptions, such as the guidance about the relevance of good character in cases of 
serious sexual assault (Sentencing Council, 2013c).  
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and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system determining whether current practice 
should be codified in its existing form, or adjusted to make the process fairer. Should factor A 
be less important, or factor B more important? If so, on what grounds? Perhaps factor C 
should be completely rejected as a PMF. This debate can and should take account of relevant 
psychological theories/research that can help us to understand the issues found in the data. 
The finding that both sentencers and the public underweighted multiple co-occurring 
character-based PMFs raises further questions such as where else underweighting of PMFs 
may occur (e.g., between which PMFs and in which offence types?) and why it occurs at all. 
The appropriate response to underweighting likely depends on what is causing it to begin 
with: cognitive bias (e.g., the subadditivity effect and/or order effects) or practical/legal 
constraints? If it is the former, then this clearly needs to be addressed, and probably can be 
through the structure proposed later in this chapter. If it is the latter, then this may not be a 
problem at all. Diminishing returns for multiple PMFs could be considered appropriate, at 
least in some circumstances. For example, judges in Study 2 commented that there has to be a 
cap on the overall impact that personal mitigation can have in any one case, regardless of the 
number of PMFs present in that case. Otherwise, there could be cases involving many PMFs 
where offenders would end up receiving no punishment at all (and/or their sentence would be 
outside the relevant guideline range). On the other hand, systematic underweighting of 
multiple PMFs could lead to the unnecessary imprisonment of many offenders whose cases 
lie on the cusp of custody. It may ultimately be a matter of principle to be decided by policy-
makers and/or the judiciary. Either way, the phenomenon of underweighting should be 
explored further and dealt with appropriately.  
The data from Study 1 on the relative weight currently given to the various PMFs 
listed in the sentencing guidelines should be reviewed by sentencers and policy-makers to 
determine whether the relative importance of those factors is appropriate or not. For example, 
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should addressing a drug or alcohol addiction have a much greater impact on whether an 
offender goes to prison than a genuine demonstration of remorse, or a substantial positive 
role in the community? Should remorse and good character have equal weight, or is one more 
important than the other, as a matter of principle and/or practice? Answering these kinds of 
questions is likely to require a debate about the relationship between personal mitigation and 
the purposes of sentencing, a topic which has for the most part been avoided to date (see, e.g. 
s142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which simply lists five purposes of sentencing and 
gives no guidance about how they should be prioritised in practice). Also, if, as suggested by 
psychological theories of sentencing, the impact of addressing addiction (and other PMFs) is 
linked to reduced attributions of culpability/blameworthiness, then this may be an issue for 
the guidelines process, since culpability is supposed to be dealt with at Step 1. However, if 
the mitigation applied at Step 2 of the guidelines should not be based on judgments of 
reduced culpability, then what should it be based on instead? Mercy (e.g. old age)? Practical 
concerns (e.g. primary carers)? Or something else? This question ought to be explored further. 
There is also the question of whether PMFs should be given differing weights 
depending on the type and seriousness of the offence involved. Study 1 found that PMFs are 
currently given very similar weights across burglary and assault offences but the situation 
may be different for other offence types. For example, the sexual offences guideline 
(Sentencing Council, 2013c) indicates that good character should be given less weight in 
more serious sexual offences (and can even be an aggravating factor where it is used to 
facilitate the offence).  In addition, one judge in Study 2 suggested that PMFs may matter less 
for serious drug offences, since punishment in such cases is primarily about deterrence and so 
usually necessitates a prison sentence regardless of the offender’s personal circumstances. 
This is an empirical question that could be explored using CCSS data.  
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The finding that AFs carry more weight than PMFs (with both sentencers and the 
public) raises issues of both principle and practice that would need to be resolved in any 
guideline or structured approach to personal mitigation. Past research also suggests that many 
combinations of AF and PMF are interrelated in complex ways, for example under the 
influence and addressing addiction (Padfield, 2011), and previous convictions and remorse 
(Maslen, 2015a). More research is needed into these kinds of AF/PMF relationship.  
Studies 1, 3 and 4’s evidence of good character as a PMF highlights the need for a 
resolution to the conflict between academia and sentencers about whether, as a matter of 
principle, good character should be a PMF or not. Either positive good character is a 
legitimate mitigating factor that entitles an offender to a degree of credit for their positive 
role in the community, and can help sentencers assess whether an offence is likely to have 
been a one-off (e.g., Sentencing Advisory Panel, 2010; Banks & Harris, 2012; Roberts et al., 
2016), or it is illegitimate moral/social accounting which undermines the principle of 
proportionality that is at the heart of the England and Wales sentencing system (e.g., 
Ashworth, 2015; Maslen & Roberts, 2013, Murphy, 2006; Von Hirsch, 2011). This is an 
important debate that clearly needs to be resolved.  
Finally, Study 2 suggests that the weight given to a PMF in any individual case may 
depend on sentencers’ subjective evaluation of a range of different types of evidence (e.g., a 
guilty plea, reparation, behaviour in court, character references, and response to past 
rehabilitation efforts). That evaluation of PMF evidence is therefore of central importance to 
the operation of personal mitigation, and yet, to date, there has been very little empirical 
research on that part of the process. It is likely that sentencers’ approach to evidence may be 
highly variable (Study 2 certainly suggests as much; see also Jacobson & Hough, 2007; 
Raynard et al., 1994). It follows that this element of the mitigation process might also benefit 
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from being structured, in order to promote a consistent approach to evidence use as well as 
the weight given to PMFs in different contexts. 
6.5.2. How Could Personal Mitigation be Structured? 
The conceptually simplest (but not necessarily the most useful) option for structuring 
sentencers’ use of PMFs would be to produce narrative guidance of some kind. Guidance 
could take the form of notes added into each offence-specific guideline, such as the notes on 
good character already present in the sexual offences guideline (Sentencing Council, 2013c). 
Alternatively, a separate guideline on personal mitigation could be prepared, perhaps with 
example cases to illustrate key points (see e.g., Young & King, 2013). 
A more ambitious approach would be to introduce more structure into the process 
sentencers use to determine the effect of PMFs (and AFs) on an offender’s sentence. Adding 
structure to a process can also add complexity. One of the appeals of discretionary sentencing 
is that its largely intuitive nature means it can be accomplished quickly and with relatively 
little cognitive effort. There are already several steps in the England and Wales sentencing 
guidelines, and adding another step or sub-step for mitigation and aggravation could make the 
process overly cumbersome. One solution to problems of this kind would be to build a 
computer-based, on-screen sentencing support tool that would take sentencers through the 
guideline steps. A user-friendly tool of this kind could incorporate a more structured 
approach to mitigation and aggravation without substantially increasing sentencers’ cognitive 
burden. Research in the medical field has found that easy-to-use computerised decision 
support can improve individuals’ use of and compliance with guidelines (e.g., Goud et al., 
2009; Goud, Jaspers, Hasman, & Peek, 2008). The following section describes two possible 
options for how such a tool might operate. 
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Structuring the personal mitigation process first requires a detailed analysis of the 
process itself. Figure 6.4 is a flowchart representing the judgment process that takes place in 
Step Two of the England and Wales sentencing guidelines (for a flowchart of the full 
sentencing process under the guidelines, see Dhami, 2013a). In stages 1a and 1b of Figure 6.4, 
the sentencer evaluates any evidence presented in court in support of PMFs and/or AFs and 
then weights each factor’s importance to the case in question. If the evidence for a PMF or 
AF is insufficient or unsatisfactory, that factor is ignored. In stage 2, the PMFs and/or AFs 
identified in stages 1a and 1b are integrated and the offender’s sentence is adjusted down or 
up from the starting point determined by Step One of the guidelines (see Chapter 1, pp. 22-
24).  
The flowchart distinguishes between “case weight” (the importance given to each 
PMF or AF in the current case, relative to other cases involving that factor), and “factor 
weight” (the importance given to each PMF relative to other PMFs and/or AFs). Take, for 
example, an offender who is being sentenced for a serious sexual assault and has shown 
remorse. The case weight of remorse might be large because the offender confessed 
immediately at the police station and acknowledged his wrongdoing, and has apologised to 
the victim in writing. However, the factor weight of remorse might be relatively low for an 
offence of this type and this seriousness. As a result, the offender’s remorse would be 
unlikely to have a major overall impact on his final sentence. 
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Figure 6.4. Flowchart representing the process for evaluating and integrating Personal 
Mitigating Factors (PMFs) and Aggravating Factors (AFs) at Step Two of the England and 
Wales sentencing guidelines. Key stages in the process are marked in bold. 
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6.5.2.1. Option 1 – Variable case weighting of PMFs. After determining the starting 
point and range for a given case, the sentencer would select the PMFs that he or she 
determined were present in that case (Stage 1a in Figure 6.4). These would be displayed on 
screen, alongside a set of slide bars (see Figure 6.5 below). The sentencer would allocate a 
case weight to each PMF using the slide bars, based on guidance about which evidence 
should be used to evaluate each PMF, and how it should be used (Stage 1b in Figure 6.4). 
The scales could be numbered in various ways – Figure 6.5 illustrates one option, with no 
numbers on the bars themselves but scores displayed to the right of the bars. The scale could 
be as rough or fine as desired (from, e.g., only three weight categories – “low”, “medium”, 
“high” – to the hundred-point scale illustrated below). In addition, certain PMFs could be 
numbered differently: for example, it might be judged more appropriate to make addressing 
addiction binary (since its presence makes a community sentence extremely likely).  
 
Figure 6.5. Slide bars indicating case weights to be given to particular PMFs, for use in a 
structured sentencing system. 
Sentencers’ PMF case weights could then be integrated using a pre-determined 
algorithm, along with any AFs that may be present in the case, weighted in the same way 
(Stage 2 in Figure 6.4). The algorithm would be designed take account of PMF and AF factor 
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weights for each offence type. Factor weights would be based on empirical evidence of 
current practice such as that produced by Study 1, as well as relevant legal principles. For 
example, it could be decided that AFs, overall, should carry more weight than PMFs, and/or 
that certain PMFs should be especially relevant (or irrelevant) for the particular offence 
involved (e.g., very light weighting for good character in a case of historic sexual abuse). The 
integration process could also take account of interactions between factors, if desired: for 
example, if an offender has shown remorse but he has five previous convictions for the same 
offence, his remorse might have less impact as a result. The process described above would 
produce an adjusted sentence type and amount that could then be further amended to take 
account of Steps Three to Nine of the sentencing guidelines (guilty plea reduction, totality, 
etc.).  
Option 1 would retain the flexibility to allow sentencers to decide, based on the 
evidence before them, the relative weight that each factor in a case should have, while 
ensuring that the factors were integrated in a consistent manner across every case. Sentencers’ 
judgments about the weight to give to each PMF may, however, be inconsistent and biased. 
The variation in approach to PMFs found even in Study 2’s small sample, and also in past 
research (Davies & Tyrer, 2003; Jacobson & Hough, 2007; Raynard, et al., 1994) shows how 
subjective judges’ use of PMFs may be. Some form of guidance might be required on the use 
of evidence in evaluating PMFs (i.e., Stages 1a and 1b in Figure 6.4), in order to promote a 
consistent approach to determining PMF case weights.  
Interestingly, China has recently introduced sentencing guidelines that use a 
comparable approach to that described in Option 1 (Roberts & Pei, 2016). The new 
guidelines use a step-by-step process and give starting sentence ranges for specific offences. 
Sentencers have discretion to adjust sentences within the range by defined numerical amounts, 
depending on the presence of specified mitigating and aggravating factors. For example, a 
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sentence can be reduced for “meritorious contributions to society” by up to 20% in an 
“ordinary” case, or by 20% to 50% in an “extraordinary” one. A confession is worth up to 
50%, depending on the degree to which the offender expresses repentance. Unfortunately, it 
is too early to know what effect the new Chinese guidelines will have in practice. 
6.5.2.2. Option 2 – Fixed case weighting of PMFs. Another option would be to 
remove discretion from the PMF weighting system (Stage 1b) completely. The sentencer 
would simply decide whether each PMF was relevant to the case (Stage 1a) and then move 
directly to Stage 2, where pre-determined factor weights would be applied to each PMF and 
integrated to produce an amended sentence. This would allow no room for subjectivity and 
therefore bias, other than when determining whether the factor was present or not. One 
disadvantage would be the lack of case weight flexibility. Every case involving, e.g., remorse 
would be treated the same. Further, any unintended biases in the system would then be 
applied uniformly across the whole jurisdiction.  
In reality, however, even a fixed-weight PMF system such as Option 2 would not 
remove all discretion from the process, since sentencers would still have to decide whether 
each PMF should be taken account of in any given case. Study 2 suggests that determining 
whether to take account of a PMF is not a simple box-ticking exercise. It can involve 
consideration of various kinds of evidence and/or use of intuitive character judgment, in order 
to answer questions such as “is he genuinely remorseful?” or “is her character good enough 
that it should mitigate her sentence?” Arguably, all this system would do is move discretion 
from Stage 1b of Figure 6.4 to Stage 1a. In addition, it might lead sentencers to ignore weakly 
indicated PMFs (since flagging them as present would lead to a fixed, substantial impact on 
the sentence) or simply give credit for any PMF pleaded by defence counsel, rather than 
evaluate the evidence for it in any detail. If sentencers would, in effect, be weighting PMFs in 
either of the systems described above, it might be better to have them do so explicitly as part 
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of Stage 1b, rather than implicitly while making the yes/no decision required at Stage 1a. For 
the time being, at least, the process of assessing evidence is probably too complex and 
subjective (and too little understood) to be easily amenable to a fully structured approach. 
6.5.3. Conclusions on Structured Personal Mitigation 
Options 1 and 2 above are merely illustrative examples and pre-suppose many 
changes in the present sentencing process, not least the availability of reliable in-court 
technology to implement an on-screen system. The point is that – despite the judiciary’s 
views to the contrary – it would not be impossible to devise a structured system that could 
ensure greater consistency in the use of PMFs, while also incorporating relevant underlying 
legal principles and, if desired, retaining a substantial degree of discretion. Such a system 
could also be constructed in a relatively uncomplicated and user-friendly format.  
A common argument against introducing any kind of quantitative, numerical structure 
into sentencing is that it amounts to imposing a kind of false precision on a process that is 
naturally subjective, ambiguous and uncertain – an art not a science (e.g., Jacobson & Hough, 
2007; Mackenzie, 2006; Sentencing Council, 2015a; see also Study 2). In reality, however, 
no matter how factually complex and nuanced sentencing cases may be, numerical precision 
is an unavoidable part of the sentencing task. Sentencers must take all of the facts of the case 
and reduce them to a single number: a length of time in days, weeks or months, or an amount 
of money. In that respect, sentencing is very different from a lawyer writing a legal opinion 
or an intelligence analyst preparing a report, where recognition and expression of uncertainty 
is very much part of the output. Consequently, the idea of importing more numerical certainty 
into the sentencing process is actually not as radical as it seems. The existing system of using 
unstructured, imprecise intuitive judgment to reach a fixed numerical sentence is arguably 
more incongruous than having a more structured, numerical process would be.  
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In addition, judges in England and Wales already have to calculate both the guilty 
plea reduction and the enhancement for racial aggravation, both of which are proportional, 
numerical adjustments that must be applied separately from other factors (Ashworth, 2015; 
see e.g., the assault guideline – Sentencing Council, 2011a). Ashworth (2015) notes that 
judges seem to manage these calculations without any great difficulty. In addition, some of 
the judges interviewed in Study 2 appeared to think about personal mitigation in an 
arithmetical way (i.e., in terms of subtracting so-many months from a starting point for one 
PMF, and so-many for another). This suggests that a structured numerical approach might not 
be as far from the existing practice of some sentencers, at least, as is often argued. 
Lastly, other areas of law are already very rule-based, and judges and legislators have 
not shied away from developing detailed rules, principles, tests etc., which can be extremely 
complex and are applied as consistently as possible to the facts of an individual case. Legal 
reasoning tends to be analytic rather than intuitive and, indeed, can sometimes produce a 
result that is somewhat counter-intuitive or surprising because it results from the strict 
application of a particular combination of rules and/or principles. Therefore, it is perhaps 
surprising that there is such resistance to rules in the context of sentencing practice. Why 
should the facts surrounding the criminal sentencing of a fraudster necessitate wide discretion, 
when the facts surrounding a parallel civil claim by those who suffered loss as a result would 
be dealt with in a much more structured, rule-based way? 
6.5.4. Challenges to Introducing Structured Personal Mitigation 
The work contained in this thesis has been presented at several decision-making, law-
psychology and criminology conferences, and the present author has also collaborated on 
papers in various peer-reviewed journals relating to sentencing research (see Appendix 14). 
However, the present research is likely to have much more impact on the sentencing system if 
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it can obtain support from the people actually doing the sentencing, i.e., the judiciary. 
Dhami’s (2013b) survey of 89 Crown Court sentencers found some support for guidance on 
the weighting of AFs and PMFs (36% of participants). However, the Sentencing Council’s 
consultation on the assault guidelines (Lock, 2015) found that for most of the 72 sentencers 
and 12 lawyers interviewed, adding more structure at Step 2 “would introduce too much 
complexity and remove judges’ discretion to an unacceptable degree… you cannot sentence 
people by tick boxes” (Lock, 2015, p. 28). The seven judges interviewed in Study 2 were also, 
with one exception, resistant to the introduction of any guidance on the use of PMFs. 
It can be argued that there has been too much resistance from the judiciary to 
guidance on the use of PMFs (and AFs) on principle, without considering the idea in any 
detail. It is easier to reject the idea out of hand based on sweeping statements about “tick 
boxes”, unacceptable erosion of discretion and consequent loss of individualised sentencing, 
rather than engaging with the reality of what such guidance might look like and whether it 
could be made to work in practice. In fact, intuitive discretion and a completely rule-based 
analysis (such as the grid-based systems used in some US states) lie at either end of a 
continuum; there are many possible sentencing structures between the two ends – such as 
Options 1 and 2 above – that would involve a balanced “quasirational” mix of intuition and 
analysis (see Dhami, Belton & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015).  
There could surely be little harm in trying to produce some guidance and seeing 
whether helpful consensus could be reached on any of the currently contentious issues, at 
least (e.g., remorse, good character, alcohol/drug intoxication, and employment status). As 
Ashworth puts it, “the effort should be made, in order to see whether a workable system can 
be devised” (Ashworth, 2010, p. 193). Guidance on PMFs might ultimately prove to be far 
less threatening and more useful than is currently imagined, much like the guidelines 
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themselves which many judges have admitted seemed like a bad idea at first but have shown 
themselves to be very useful in practice (Dhami, 2013b; see also Study 2). 
For the reasons discussed above, it is particularly important to engage constructively 
with the judiciary about the results of research on personal mitigation. It would be very useful 
if judges could be encouraged to appreciate that structured sentencing need not amount to a 
“tick box” exercise. Part of the solution may be idiographic, representatively designed 
research into sentencers’ judgment strategies, which would be harder for sentencers to ignore 
as irrelevant to them personally. Individually-focused research of this kind might provoke a 
debate about ways in which additional structure could support sentencers, improving 
consistency and reducing bias without removing sentencers’ ultimate control of the process. 
6.6. Implications of the Findings on Public Sentencing Judgments 
Public opinion has a legitimate role to play in sentencing. In order to maintain public 
confidence and trust in the criminal justice system and reflect government’s democratic 
accountability to the people, there must be some level of correspondence between sentencing 
practice and public opinion (e.g., Bingham, 2000; Henham, 2012; Hough & Kirby, 2013; 
Roberts, 2008; Tyler, 2007). Past studies have found that the public are more punitive than 
judges about sentencing in general (Hough et al., 2013; Dawes et al., 2011; Ipsos MORI, 
2010). However, research has not explored whether this finding extends to judgments about 
the place of personal mitigation in sentencing.  
Study 3 found that people’s fairness judgments were relatively unaffected by remorse, 
while the majority of participants in Study 4 had one or no PMFs in the model that best 
predicted their judgments of sentence length. This relative lack of sensitivity to PMFs shows 
that past researchers’ findings of public punitiveness appear to extend to personal mitigation. 
This is perhaps not surprising, given that the public views sentencing through the filter of the 
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mass media. They are not exposed to a representative sample of cases (Green, 1996); only the 
controversial ones tend to be reported (typically those where an offender is perceived to have 
been punished too leniently). The public are also disengaged from the individual offenders 
involved; unlike sentencers, they do not meet offenders face-to-face, and have no opportunity 
to evaluate their personal circumstances and/or develop any empathy for their situation. 
Recent research suggests that giving people more detailed information about the 
sentencing process can cause them to adopt less punitive attitudes (e.g., Chapman et al., 2002; 
Hough & Park, 2002; Hutton, 2005; Lovegrove, 2007, 2010, 2011; Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
It is therefore reasonable to hypothesise that public judgments about PMFs might be affected 
by giving them more exposure to the details of the sentencing process, in particular to 
offenders’ unique personal circumstances. One possibility would be to build a website like 
the one used in the “You be the Judge” project (Ministry of Justice, 2013), which could take 
members of the public through the full facts of a sentencing case, including various PMFs, 
before asking them to choose an appropriate sentence. Building public awareness of PMFs 
might increase acceptance that they have a legitimate role to play in the sentencing process. 
Another possible approach for bridging the gap between public attitudes to personal 
mitigation and current practice would be an education programme aimed at clarifying why 
the various PMFs listed in the sentencing guidelines are relevant to sentencing and can result 
in a reduced punishment. Finally, programmes that encourage engagement between past 
offenders and the community could help foster empathy and humanise offenders. Increased 
empathy could, in turn, improve people’s ability to appreciate how offenders’ personal 
circumstances or response to conviction may justify a more lenient sentence. One example of 
such a programme is Distant Voices, a collaborative song-writing project in Glasgow that 
involved offenders, prison staff, victims of crime, and members of the public (Arnal, 2016). 
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Lastly, structuring personal mitigation may improve public opinion in and of itself. 
This is because a structured process would increase transparency, which is a fundamental 
element in people’s sense of procedural justice (Tyler, 2006a). Studies have shown that 
procedural justice is an important determinant of public satisfaction with the criminal justice 
system (e.g., Hough et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
6.7. Proposals for Future Research 
The present PhD research has identified many areas where future research is needed 
in order to understand more about sentencers’ and the public’s judgments concerning the role 
of PMFs in criminal sentencing. Some of the key issues to be explored are summarised below. 
First, researchers should use experimental, idiographic methods and representative 
designs to examine individual sentencers’ judgment strategies in relation to PMFs (see Dhami 
& Belton, 2017). Amongst other things, idiographic research will highlight intra- and inter-
judge variation in sentencing behaviour and would be more difficult for judges to dismiss as 
not relevant to them.  
Second, CCSS data should be used to explore whether the relationship between PMFs 
and sentencing outcomes is different for offences perceived to be less receptive to personal 
mitigation, such as sex and drug offences, than for assault or burglary. It is important to build 
up a full picture of the role played by PMFs in sentencing. It is also important to identify any 
differences in the way that PMFs are applied across offence types, as these may either be 
legitimate or an issue to be resolved.  
Third, future studies should investigate how PMFs influence sentencers’ judgments of 
custodial sentence length, as well as the chance of a custodial sentence. This could be done 
with existing CCSS data but since that data set only contains sentence length categories rather 
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than actual sentence lengths, it would be better to obtain data including the actual sentence 
lengths (such as that used, e.g., by Pina-Sanchez & Linacre, 2013). This research would 
complete the picture of the weight given to PMFs in sentencing judgments, and help 
determine whether PMFs have a greater effect in cases that are on the borderline between 
custody and a community sentence, compared to cases where custody is virtually certain from 
the outset. 
Fourth, researchers need to explore how sentencers search for and use evidence when 
determining whether a PMF is present in a particular case, and the weight it should be given. 
Ideally, this research should be done experimentally and idiographically (see 1 above). For 
example, which types of evidence are more or less influential when evaluating a PMF? Do 
the different types of evidence interact and, if so, how? Do sentencers make use of all the 
available evidence, or do they use simpler, heuristic strategies that rely on one or a few key 
evidence items? 
 Fifth, future research could test experimentally the four possible hypotheses 
suggested by Study 2 for the underweighting of multiple PMFs: 
1. psychological –  
a. sentencers’ holistic view of personal mitigation leads to sub-additivity; and/or 
b. the primacy effect means that the PMF mentioned first in a case carries more 
weight than the PMF mentioned second. 
2. structural – sentencing guideline ranges constrain the amount that sentencers can 
reduce a sentence to reflect the PMFs involved in a case; 
3. motivational – sentencers perceive that the final sentence should reflect the overall 
seriousness of a case, regardless of the PMFs involved; and  
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4. socio-political – the media create pressure on sentencers to avoid appearing too 
lenient, which causes them to underweight PMFs in cases where several are present. 
 
Sixth, future studies should explore possible relationships between the three 
character-based PMFs and sentencers’ (and the public’s) causal attributions of 
blameworthiness and likelihood to reoffend or respond to rehabilitation. For example, does 
addressing addiction have a stronger effect on such attributions than the other two PMFs? 
Finally, researchers should investigate whether increased public understanding of the 
role played by PMFs in the sentencing process might lead to increased support for PMFs. For 
example, if a website were designed to take people through the process of personal mitigation 
in a sample sentencing case, the PMFs included in the case could be varied between 
participants to test the effect of those PMFs on people’s sentencing choices. The results could 
also be compared to people’s judgment about the same case based only on a short case 
summary. 
6.8. Concluding Remarks 
Years of sentencing research strongly suggests that unfettered discretion in sentencing 
leads to inconsistency and bias. In response, many jurisdictions have moved towards more 
structured sentencing systems. In England and Wales, while sentencers’ discretion has been 
curtailed by offence-specific guidelines that specify offence categories and sentencing ranges, 
the mechanism for personal mitigation remains almost entirely discretionary.  
This thesis has illustrated how empirical data on sentencing practice in relation to 
PMFs could be used to create guidance or, ideally, a more structured system of personal 
mitigation. This thesis has argued that a structured system could achieve more consistent and 
transparent sentencing that is less prone to bias and no less individualised than that produced 
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by the current discretionary system. PMFs are not innumerable and indefinable. On the 
contrary, the key PMFs used by sentencers can and should be identified and properly defined, 
and agreement reached on the weight they should be given when determining the type and 
severity of sentence an offender receives.  
This thesis has shown how methodological tools from psychology in general and 
decision-making research in particular can be used effectively to evaluate how sentencers use 
PMFs in real cases. The research in this thesis is the first to compare the effect of three 
important PMFs, namely remorse, good character, and addressing addiction, across two 
distinctly different offence types: assault and burglary. The present research is also the first to 
examine directly whether sentencers’ use of PMFs is compatible with public opinion on those 
same PMFs. Another first is the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in combination to 
widen our understanding of the role played by PMFs in the sentencing process.  
Criminal sentencers provide a hugely important public service. Their job is complex, 
intellectually demanding and must be both tiring and emotionally draining at times. Their 
contribution to the maintenance of a fair and just society is without question. Nevertheless, 
they should be prepared to embrace knowledge that can help them carry out their duties more 
effectively. This may mean accepting that suitable guidance on PMFs, and/or a more 
structured approach, could result in an improved sentencing system that may also reduce the 
prison population (if, for example, unwarranted underweighting of multiple PMFs could be 
avoided). 
In addition, sentencers must be sufficiently responsive to public opinion to sustain 
people’s trust in the criminal justice system. This thesis has identified some apparent gaps 
between public opinion and current practice in relation to PMFs, and has proposed a few 
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ways in which those gaps could perhaps be reduced. The key is likely to be improved public 
understanding of the legitimate role that personal mitigation can play in criminal sentencing.  
Meanwhile, decision science researchers should embrace the possibilities of applied 
research and use their methodological expertise to advance empirical knowledge of 
sentencing in general and personal mitigation in particular. Sentencing researchers, for their 
part, need to find a way to engage more effectively with the sentencing community so that 
there is a better chance that their empirical findings can have a positive impact. Ultimately, it 
is worth remembering that sentencers, researchers and the public all share the same common 
goal: a fairer criminal justice system. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Sentencing Council: Assault Definitive Guideline 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Assault_definitive_guideline_-
_Crown_Court.pdf 
[The remainder of this page is left intentionally blank] 
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Appendix 2 
Sentencing Council: Burglary Offences Definitive Guideline 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf  
[The remainder of this page is left intentionally blank] 
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Appendix 3 
Crown Court Sentencing Survey Forms for Assault and Burglary41 
Assault  
 
                                                            
41 These copies of the forms are stamped “SAMPLE – NOT FOR OFFICIAL USE – so that they cannot be used by 
unauthorised individuals.  
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Burglary 
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Appendix 4 
 
Further Details on Structure and Contents of Crown Court Sentencing Survey Data 
Sets 
The layout of the CCSS forms was completely redesigned in April 2012. The Sentencing 
Council states (in the Sentencing Council Record Level Datasets User Guide) that the post 
April 2012 CCSS dataset was incompatible with that produced previously. The pre-April 
2012 data was therefore converted to “a format as consistent as possible with that delivered 
by the new processors”. However, from April 2012 onwards there is a “significant structural 
break in the data... and users should be aware that there are some inconsistencies with the 
data delivered before then”.  In summary: 
• A new assault guideline was introduced in June 2011, so there are two files for assault 
in the 2011 database, “old” and “new”.  The old and new data differ significantly in 
format. 
• In April 2012 the design of the CCSS forms were changed but the questions were not. 
However, the “quality of data” post-April 2012 is higher (although the Sentencing 
Council does not specify how it is higher quality).  
• A new burglary guideline was introduced in January 2012, so there are two files for 
burglary in the 2012, Q1 database, “old” and “new”.  
• A new guideline for drug offences was introduced in February 2012 but new forms 
were not issued until April. So, 2012 Q1 is “old” form data only, while 2012 Q2-4 is 
“new” form data only.  
• Some changes to questions regarding a guilty plea took place in 2012-2013 (see the 
Annex for details).  
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• 2012 Q2-4 (and presumably thereafter) the proportion of records for which the 
question on no. of previous convictions taken into account was unanswered reduced 
drastically due to improved data processing.  
• Sentencing options available changed in 2012 Q2-4 as a result of the Legal Aid 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, so this is presumably reflected in 
the 2012 Q2-4 onwards data (although the Sentencing Council does not specify what 
the changes were).   
• Section 29 offence cases (racially/religiously motivated common assault) are not 
included in the 2011 or 2012 datasets but are included in the 2013 dataset. 
• From 2012, 2nd quarter onwards, the question of whether guilt was indicated at the 
police station changed from “yes/no” to “yes, no, don’t know”.  
• During 2012, recording of guilty plea discounts changed from a categorical to 
continuous measure. The 2013 data mostly have discounts recorded as numbers. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Study 1: Percentage of Assault and Burglary Cases (Table 1A.1 and 1A.2) Receiving 
Immediate Custody by Sentencing Factor in Crown Court Sentencing Survey Data Sets 
Table 1A.1 - Assault offences 
Sentencing factor Immediate custody % 
 
Constant  
Aggravating factors  
 Previous convictions 68.8 
 Location 62.1 
 Under the influence  62.3 
 Ongoing effect 71.3 
 Presence of others 63.4 
 Timing  64.4 
 Current court orders 81.2 
 Previous violence 77.6 
 Offence against public sector 58.2 
 Abuse of power 67.0 
 On bail  83.2 
 On licence  89.5 
 Gratuitous degradation  81.5 
 Victim forced to leave 73.9 
 Failure to respond to warnings 80.5 
 Attempt to conceal evidence 94.2 
 Steps taken to prevent reporting 84.0 
 Community impact  66.2 
 Exploiting contact  80.0 
 TICs  85.7 
Mitigating factors  
 Remorse  38.2 
 No previous convictions  32.4 
 Single blow 37.8 
 Isolated incident  26.3 
 Good character 24.8 
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 Age and/or lack of maturity 44.6 
 Addressing addiction 27.6 
 Mental disorder  34.1 
 Sole or primary carer  24.3 
 Lapse of time  26.9 
 Serious medical conditions  25.8 
Specific offence  
 Common assault 34.6 
 s.47 (ABH) 45.4 
 s.20 (GBH) 56.1 
 s.18 (GBH with intent) 96.8 
Seriousness  
 Category 3 23.8 
 Category 2 49.2 
 Category 1 80.0 
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Table 1A.2 - Burglary offences 
Sentencing factor Immediate custody % 
 
Constant  
Aggravating factors  
 Previous convictions 81.2 
 At night 81.4 
 Under the influence 77.1 
 Current court orders 88.1 
 On licence 93.9 
  TICs 90.4 
 On bail 86.3 
 Child at home 88.8 
 Abuse of power/trust 71.0 
 Community impact 85.6 
 Victim compelled to leave 81.7 
 Gratuitous degradation 91.2 
 Steps taken to prevent reporting  93.8 
Mitigating factors  
 Remorse 58.1 
 Addressing addiction 44.0 
 Nothing stolen 51.2 
 No previous convictions 38.0 
 Age and/or lack of maturity 54.1 
 Subordinate role 44.7 
 Good character 34.5 
 Mental disorder 45.9 
 Sole or primary carer 41.1 
 Serious medical conditions 32.9 
 Lapse of time 43.7 
 Voluntary reparation 39.6 
 Injuries caused recklessly 54.5 
Specific offence  
 Non-domestic burglary 62.5 
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 Domestic burglary 77.2 
Seriousness  
 Category 3 49.1 
 Category 2 71.2 
 Category 1 91.9 
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Appendix 6 
Study 2: Question Script for Semi-structured Interviews 
Introductory 
1. Introduce myself etc.  
2. How long have you been a judge? Ask about their career to date, especially their 
experience of sentencing. 
 
General questions about the PMFs 
My research is focused on three personal mitigating factors in particular: remorse, addressing 
drug or alcohol addiction, and good character. 
3. What is your experience of these personal mitigating factors in practice? 
4. What are the features you look for when deciding whether to take account of these factors 
in your judgments? 
5. How do you approach cases where two (or more) of these factors are present together? 
6. Do you approach personal mitigation differently depending on the type of offence 
involved – for example, violent crime versus property/financial crime? 
 
Questions about my empirical findings 
1. Why might addressing addiction have a larger mitigating impact on sentences than 
remorse or good character? 
2. Why might addressing addiction have a larger impact in burglary cases than in assault 
cases? 
3. Why might remorse and addressing addiction count for less when they are present 
together in a case than they do individually? Same question for good character and 
addressing addiction in burglary. 
4. Why might (step 2) aggravating factors have a larger impact, overall, on sentences than 
(step 2) mitigating factors? 
 
Questions about guidance 
1. Do you think guidance on PMFs, based on current sentencing practice, could be a useful 
resource for sentencers (particularly in the magistrates’ court)? 
2. If so, what do you think it should look like? [E.g., paragraph on each factor; arranged by 
offence category; example cases; just highlight particular factors that may be important 
or irrelevant for particular offences (as is already the case in the sexual assault 
guideline)?] 
3. Do you think public opinion is relevant to sentencing and, if so, in what way? 
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Appendix 7 
Study 2: Further Details of Analysis Carried Out 
The Six Questions of Thematic Analysis 
The only detailed, step-by-step guide to thematic analysis currently available is Braun 
and Clarke’s (2006) article. The analysis of the judges’ interview transcripts therefore 
followed Braun and Clarke’s principles closely, supplemented by input from other 
researchers where appropriate. Braun and Clarke (2006) identified six decisions that have to 
be made before carrying out thematic analysis. The authors noted that these decisions are 
often not made explicit but should be identified and discussed, and so in the present study, 
each one was dealt with in turn before starting the analysis. 
1. What counts as a theme? There is no universally accepted standard for 
establishing the relevance of a pattern in thematic analysis (Braun, Gavey, & McPhillips, 
2003; Trahan & Stewart, 2013; Meehan, Vermeer & Windsor, 2000). The author therefore 
used his own judgment to determine whether themes were present in the data, based on 
whether a concept captured something important to my research aims or provided a 
complement to the quantitative analysis (Trahan & Stewart, 2013), rather than relying on 
rigid numerical measurement of prevalence. 
2. Rich description versus more detail of one aspect. The present analysis did not 
attempt to represent the entire data set comprehensively but was instead focused on providing 
a detailed account of the themes relating to the research aims and the results of the 
quantitative analysis in Study 1. 
3. Inductive versus deductive analysis. The approach to coding and theme 
development in this study’s thematic analysis was primarily deductive, since it was driven by 
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specific research aims rather than being an inductive, bottom-up approach based on the data 
themselves. However, some novel themes were also developed inductively from the data. 
Combining deductive and inductive analysis is an accepted practice in qualitative research 
(e.g., Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Saldana, 2009).  
4. Semantic or latent themes. The analysis was primarily focused on the 
interpretation of the explicit statements made by the judges interviewed, rather than the ideas, 
assumptions or conceptualisations that may have implicitly shaped the explicit content of the 
data. 
5. Epistemology. As discussed above, the analysis adopted a critical realist 
epistemology, influenced to some extent by the principles of interpretational 
phenomenological analysis. 
6. The many questions of qualitative research. It is acknowledged that the present 
study involved addressing a series of different questions, from  a broad overall research 
question (How do sentencers perceive PMFs?), through the narrower, specific questions 
needed to address the specific research aims, to the individual questions asked as part of the 
interview process.  
The Six Steps of Thematic Analysis 
There were six major steps in the thematic analysis, following Braun and Clarke 
(2006). The analysis was a recursive/iterative, rather than linear, process, involving 
movement back and forth across and within the steps as needed. In particular, the data were 
returned to continually, using them to build on the analysis and checking in to make sure that 
the analysis remained faithful to the data throughout the process. 
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Step 1 – Familiarising. All of the transcripts were read and re-read in full before 
starting the coding process in order to ensure a good grasp of the material. 
Step 2 – Generating initial codes. The data were coded using a preliminary set of 
codes based on the topics determined by the study’s research aims and the questions raised by 
Study 1 (e.g., codes for each of the PMFs). Other codes were inductively generated from 
reading the data. The goal with coding extracts from the data was to identify “the most basic 
segment… that can be assessed in a meaningful way” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 63). Coloured 
pencils and a numbering system were used to mark coded sections of text, coding as 
inclusively as possible and also flagging accounts that departed from the dominant story. 
Contemporaneous analytic memos were written to clarify the researcher’s interpretation of 
emerging patterns (Charmaz, 2006; Gathings & Parrotta, 2013; Livingston, Crocker, Nicholls, 
& Seto, 2016). The data were also continually compared to one another in order to refine the 
analysis (Silverman, 2011). Lastly, the extracts for each code were collated into separate 
documents. 
Step 3 – Searching for themes. For the most part, it was not necessary to collate the 
initial topic-based codes into higher-level themes since the key initial topics (such as remorse, 
good character and addressing addiction) were relatively broad. In fact, the process used was 
mainly the reverse: once the extracts were collated by topic, they were then sub-divided into 
relevant themes that had been identified during the process of coding and memo writing.  
However, in the case of the theme, “underweighting of multiple PMFs” a number of codes 
were collated to produce this higher-level theme. To inform the analysis further, a mind map 
or “thematic map” (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was generated for each topic and its themes. 
Account was also taken of what was not said in the interviews, and the implications that those 
gaps (what my interviewees chose not to say) may have for the interpretation of the themes 
(Marzano, Ciclitira, & Adler, 2016).  
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Step 4 – Reviewing themes. At this step, the extracts gathered for each theme were 
reviewed in order to determine whether the theme, and the overall topic represented by the 
original code, was adequately supported by the extracts or need to be amended or removed 
from the analysis. A final thematic map of the whole data set was not produced. This was 
because the analysis did not include all the themes identified in the data set, since the study’s 
focus was on themes that responded to the research questions and/or provided insight into 
Study 1’s quantitative findings. 
Step 5 – Defining and naming topics and themes. The definition and content of 
each topic and related theme was refined, and a clear name for each theme generated that 
gave an immediate sense of the theme. Appendix 8 to this chapter sets out the final table of 
topics and themes that were derived from the data. 
Step 6 – Producing the report. In order to report the analysis, extracts were selected 
to illustrate each theme. The goal was to choose extracts that vividly captured the essence of 
the theme. Overall, the aim of the report was to produce a concise, coherent account of the 
patterns found in the data, both within and across the themes identified. 
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Appendix 8 
Study 2: Table of Final Topics and Themes 
No. Topic 
 
Themes  
1.  Remorse Is it genuine? 
An apology is not enough 
Objective evidence is best 
Behaviour in court can matter, too 
 
2.  Good character Positive good character vs. no previous 
convictions 
The importance of character references 
 
Good character is not exemplary conduct 
Good character and “one-off” offences 
 
3.  Addressing addiction It deals with the cause of offending 
A cusp PMF – treatment requires a community 
sentence 
Therapeutic jurisprudence 
No second, third, fourth, etc. chances 
 
4.  Underweighting of multiple 
PMFs 
PMFs seen as two sides of the same coin 
Personal mitigation is assessed holistically 
Judges’ justifications for underweighting 
 
5.  PMFs and borderline cases PMFs matter most in borderline cases 
If there is a chance, take it 
 
6.  PMFs and offence type/ 
seriousness 
Addiction linked to burglary 
PMFs matter less for long-term offences 
PMFs matter less in offences that are not about 
rehabilitation 
PMFs matter less in offences where custody is 
guaranteed 
 
7.  Inconsistency of approach Remorse 
Good character 
Addressing addiction 
Holistic approach not taken by all 
 
8.  Reluctance to accept PMF 
guidance 
It’s too difficult – every case is different 
Guidance is not needed 
It’s best dealt with by experience 
That’s what our training is for 
Support for guidance 
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Appendix 9 
Stimuli used in Study 3  
Instructions 
Please read each case and then answer the questions underneath.  To answer, please 
choose the number that best reflects your opinion.  
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
AG went into the office at the back of a newsagent’s shop while the owner was 
distracted and stole some money from an open cash box. AG was convicted of burglary. 
He is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
AG was fined 1½ times his weekly income. 
 
NP forced the side door of a local coffee shop and escaped with some cash and a mobile 
phone. He was later convicted of burglary. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
shop owner. 
NP received 12 weeks’ imprisonment. 
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Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
DR broke into a railway storage yard and stole a large roll of copper wire. He was 
subsequently convicted of burglary. He has volunteered for many years at a local 
homeless shelter. 
DR was fined 1½ times his weekly income. 
 
MT forced the front door of a golf club, smashed a trophy cabinet, and helped himself to 
several trophies. MT was convicted of burglary. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to 
the golf club members. 
MT received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid work. 
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
      Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
JS bypassed a coded door lock at a hospital and stole a set of security radios and some 
pagers. He was convicted of burglary. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme. 
JS received 12 weeks’ imprisonment. 
 
EM committed a burglary by breaking into a corner shop and stealing some cash that the 
owner had left in the cash register overnight. He was subsequently convicted of burglary. 
He assisted the police by giving them evidence about other offenders. 
EM received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid work. 
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How fair do you think this sentence is? 
    Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
RT’s wife worked at a local office building. RT borrowed her staff pass, entered the office 
after hours and removed two computer monitors. He was later convicted of burglary.  
RT received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid work. 
 
KJ burgled a council community centre by climbing in through a window and stealing a 
flat-screen television. He was later convicted of burglary. He wrote a sincere letter of 
apology to the council. 
KJ was fined 1½ times his weekly income. 
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How fair do you think this sentence is? 
    Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
FO broke into an artist’s studio. He gained entry by climbing in through a skylight and 
stole a camera and a printer. He was convicted of burglary. 
FO received 12 weeks’ imprisonment. 
 
NM gained entry to a pub by forcing the back door and stole some cash and a case of 
vodka from behind the bar. NM was convicted of burglary. He has volunteered for many 
years at a local homeless shelter. 
NM received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid work. 
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How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
    Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
CD gained access to an office building by claiming he had come to read the gas meter. 
While inside, he stole an i-pad and a mobile phone. H was later convicted of burglary. He 
assisted the police by giving them evidence about other offenders.  
CD was fined 1½ times his weekly income. 
 
BU was walking down a back street after dark and noticed that the side window of an 
Italian restaurant was unlocked. He climbed in through the window and stole the 
restaurant’s cash register.  BU was convicted of burglary. He assisted the police by giving 
them evidence about other offenders. 
BU received 12 weeks’ imprisonment. 
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How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
ML was sacked from his job at a garage. That night he went back to the garage, let 
himself in with a spare key, and stole a mechanic’s toolkit.  He was convicted of burglary. 
He is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
ML received a community order consisting of 80 hours of unpaid work. 
 
RT broke into a building site portacabin by cutting its padlock. He stole various items 
including a digital radio and a smartphone.  RT was convicted of burglary. He has 
volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
RT received 12 weeks’ imprisonment. 
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How fair do you think this sentence is? 
     Too lenient         Just right           Too harsh 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
 
How satisfied do you feel with this sentence? 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How morally good or bad is this offender? 
Very bad           Average      Very good 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
JS gained entry to a cycle shop by smashing a glass panel in the rear door. He stole a 
mountain bike and a set of bike lights.  JS was later convicted of burglary. 
JS was fined 1½ times his weekly income. 
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1.  Please match each of the four actions A – D below with 
the category that describes it best: 
 
A – Volunteering for many years at a homeless  
       shelter 
 
B – Writing a letter of apology to the victim 
 
C – Participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation 
      programme 
 
D – Giving evidence to the police about other 
       offenders 
 
 
 
 
Taking responsibility for 
your actions  
 
Assisting the prosecution
   
Unrelated kindness  
 
Showing remorse  
 
2.  How much influence do you think each of the factors listed below should have on a 
criminal sentence?  
 
 Taking responsibility for your actions 
 
 No influence         A major influence 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Showing remorse 
 
 No influence         A major influence 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Unrelated kindness 
 
 No influence         A major influence 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 Assisting the prosecution 
 
 No influence         A major influence 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3.  How harsh or lenient do you think each of these sentence types is? 
 
Community sentence  
  
 Very lenient                Very harsh 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Finally, please answer these additional questions about yourself. 
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Imprisonment 
  
 Very lenient                Very harsh 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fine 
  
 Very lenient                Very harsh 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4.  Please rank the sentences from 1 to 3 in order of harshness (with 1 being the 
harshest).  
 
Community order (80 hours’ unpaid work)  
 
12 weeks’ imprisonment 
   
Fine of 1½ times your weekly income   
 
 
5.  Please read the six statements below carefully and decide to what extent you personally 
agree or disagree with it. Circle the number which corresponds to this judgement. Make 
sure you circle a number for every statement. 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
Ag
re
e 
Sl
ig
ht
ly
 
ag
re
e 
Sl
ig
ht
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
Di
sa
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
 
 
 
I think basically the world is a just place. 
 
 
6 
 
5 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
  1 
 I believe that, by and large, people get what 
they deserve. 
 
6 5 4 3 2   1 
 I am confident that justice always prevails over 
injustice. 
 
6 5 4 3 2   1 
 I am convinced that in the long run people will 
be compensated for injustices. 
 
6 5 4 3 2   1 
 I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life 
(e.g., professional, family, politics) are the 
exception rather than the rule. 
 
6 5 4 3 2   1 
 I think people try to be fair when making 
important decisions. 
6 5 4 3 2   1 
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6.  What is your gender? 
 
   Male   Female 
7.  How old are you?   
 
________   years 
8.  How do you describe yourself? 
 
  White   
  Black         
  Asian     
  Chinese          
  Mixed          
  Other 
         
 
 
 
 
9.  What is your political preference? 
 
  Labour      
  Conservative     
  Liberal Democrat  
  Other (please specify) 
 
_______________________     
 
10.  Do you have any experience of the 
criminal justice system? 
 
 
 
  No   
  Victim or witness 
  Offender 
  Lawyer 
  Police officer 
  Other (please specify)  
 
_________________________________________ 
   
 
   
 
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study. 
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Appendix 10 
Study 4: Output of Orthogonal Design Function from IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 21) 
Card List 
 Card 
ID 
Good 
character 
Remorse Addressing 
addiction 
Previous 
convictions 
Offence 
committed 
at night 
Under the 
influence 
1 1 present absent absent present absent present 
2 2 present present absent absent absent absent 
3 3 present absent absent absent absent present 
4 4 present present present present present present 
5 5 present present absent present absent absent 
6 6 present absent present absent absent absent 
7 7 present absent present present present absent 
8 8 absent present present absent present absent 
9 9 present absent present absent present absent 
10 10 absent present present absent absent absent 
11 11 absent present absent present present present 
12 12 present present absent present present absent 
13 13 absent present absent present absent present 
14 14 absent present absent absent present present 
15 15 absent present present present absent absent 
16 16 absent present absent absent absent present 
17 17 present present present absent absent present 
18 18 absent absent absent present absent absent 
19 19 absent absent present present present present 
20 20 present absent absent absent present present 
354 
 
21 21 absent absent absent present present absent 
22 22 present present absent absent present absent 
23 23 absent absent present absent present present 
24 24 absent absent present present absent present 
25 25 absent absent absent absent absent absent 
26 26 absent present present present present absent 
27 27 absent absent present absent absent present 
28 28 present absent absent present present present 
29 29 absent absent absent absent present absent 
30 30 present present present absent present present 
31 31 present absent present present absent absent 
32 32 present present present present absent present 
33a 33 absent present absent absent present absent 
34a 34 present absent present absent present present 
35a 35 present absent absent absent present absent 
36a 36 absent absent absent absent present present 
37a 37 absent present present present present present 
38a 38 present absent present present present present 
39a 39 absent present absent absent absent absent 
40a 40 absent present present present absent present 
41a 41 present absent absent present present absent 
42a 42 present absent present present absent present 
a. Holdout 
Note: SPSS generated 10 holdout cases as well as the 32 cases used in the study. In the event, the 
holdout cases were not needed. 
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Appendix 11 
Stimuli used in Study 4  
Please read this summary of an assault case. 
John, aged 27, bumped into his ex-wife’s new boyfriend in a local pub and the two men 
argued. John became extremely angry and punched the victim repeatedly in the face, 
breaking his jaw and knocking out two teeth. The victim also suffered severe concussion and 
extensive bruising to the face. John was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm (GBH). 
The judge has ruled that a prison sentence is necessary in the circumstances.  
1. How long a prison sentence should John receive? 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
You will now be shown a number of different scenarios, each containing some extra 
information about the case described above. Please read each scenario and decide in each 
case how long a prison sentence the offender should receive. 
2. John has two previous convictions for assault and was on bail at the time of the offence. He 
wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim and is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
3. John was drunk when he committed the offence, has two previous convictions for assault 
and was on bail at the time of the offence. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:   _____  years  _____  months 
 
4. John has two previous convictions for assault and was on bail at the time of the offence. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
5. John was drunk when he committed the offence, has two previous convictions for assault 
and was on bail at the time of the offence. He has volunteered for many years at a local 
homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
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6. John was drunk when he committed the offence and has two previous convictions for 
assault. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
7. John was drunk when he committed the offence and was also on bail at the time of the 
offence.  He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
8. John was drunk when he committed the offence, has two previous convictions for assault 
and was on bail at the time of the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim, 
is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme, and has volunteered for 
many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
9. John was drunk when he committed the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
victim, is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme, and has volunteered 
for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
10. John was drunk when he committed the offence and has two previous convictions for 
assault. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme.  
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
11. John has two previous convictions for assault. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
victim and has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
12. John was drunk when he committed the offence and has two previous convictions for 
assault. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim, is now participating in a 
drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme, and has volunteered for many years at a local 
homeless shelter. 
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Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
13. John was on bail at the time of the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
victim and is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
14. John was on bail at the time of the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
victim and has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
15. John was drunk when he committed the offence and has two previous convictions for 
assault. He has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
16. John was drunk when he committed the offence and was also on bail at the time of the 
offence. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
17. John was drunk when he committed the offence. He has volunteered for many years at a 
local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:   _____  years  _____  months 
 
18. John was drunk when he committed the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to 
the victim. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
19. John was on bail at the time of the offence. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
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20. John was drunk when he committed the offence. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
21. John has two previous convictions for assault. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol 
rehabilitation programme and has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
22. John is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme and has volunteered 
for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
23. John was drunk when he committed the offence, has two previous convictions for assault, 
and was on bail at the time of the offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
24. John has two previous convictions for assault and was on bail at the time of the offence. 
He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim and has volunteered for many years at a 
local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
25. John was drunk when he committed the offence and was also on bail at the time of the 
offence. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim, is now participating in a 
drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme, and has volunteered for many years at a local 
homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
26. John is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme and has volunteered 
for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
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27. John has two previous convictions for assault. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
28. John was drunk when he committed the offence and was also on bail at the time of the 
offence. He is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme and has 
volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
29. John wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim and is now participating in a 
drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
30. John has two previous convictions for assault. He wrote a sincere letter of apology to the 
victim and is now participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation programme. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
 
31. John wrote a sincere letter of apology to the victim and has volunteered for many years at 
a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:   _____  years  _____  months 
 
32. John was drunk when he committed the offence and was also on bail at the time of the 
offence. He has volunteered for many years at a local homeless shelter. 
Sentence:  _____  years  _____  months 
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1.  Please match each of the six actions below with the category 
that describes it best, by writing A-F in the appropriate 
boxes: 
 
A – Volunteering for many years at a homeless  
       shelter 
 
B – Writing a letter of apology to the victim 
 
C – Participating in a drug/alcohol rehabilitation 
      programme 
 
D – Having two previous convictions for assault 
 
E – Being on bail at the time of an offence 
 
F – Being drunk when committing an offence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dealing with drug/alcohol 
problems 
 
Previous convictions 
  
Unrelated good deeds  
 
Being under the influence 
of drugs/alcohol 
 
Showing remorse 
 
Being on bail  
 
2.  What effect (if any) do you think each of the factors listed below should have on a criminal 
sentence?  
 
Dealing with drug/alcohol problems 
 
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
 Being on bail 
  
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
 
Showing remorse 
 
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Finally, please answer a few additional questions. 
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Unrelated good deeds 
  
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Previous convictions 
  
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
Being under the influence of drugs/alcohol 
 
Should 
significantly 
reduce the 
sentence 
Should not affect  
the sentence 
Should 
significantly 
increase the 
sentence 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
 
 
3.  What is your gender? 
 
   Male   Female 
4.  How old are you?   
 
________   years 
5.  How do you describe yourself? 
 
  White   
  Black         
  Asian     
  Chinese          
  Mixed          
  Other 
         
 
 
6.  Which of the following categories 
best describes your annual 
  Less than £10,000 
  £10,000-£14,999 
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household income before taxes?   £15,000-£19,999 
  £20,000-£24,999 
  £30,000-£39,999 
  £40,000-£49,999 
  £50,000-£74,999 
  £75,000-£99,999 
  £100,000-£149,999 
  £150,000+ 
  Decline to answer 
 
 
7.  What is the highest educational or 
professional qualification you 
have obtained? 
 
  GCSE/O-Level/CSE 
  Vocational qualifications (NVQ1/NVQ2) 
  A-Level/Scottish Higher or equivalent (NVQ3) 
  Bachelor’s degree or equivalent (NVQ4) 
  Masters/PhD 
  No formal education 
 
 
 
8.  What is your political preference? 
 
  Labour      
  Conservative     
  Liberal Democrat  
  Other (please specify) 
 
_______________________     
 
 
9.  Do you have any experience of the 
criminal justice system? 
 
 
 
  No   
  Victim 
  Witness 
  Offender 
  Lawyer 
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  Police officer 
  Other (please specify)  
 
_________________________________________ 
  
 
   
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this study. 
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Appendix 12 
Study 4: Individual Multiple Linear Regression Models 
Parti-
cipant 
No. 
b-weights for each sentencing factor (unstandardised coefficients) 
 
R2 (adjusted 
R2) 
 
ANOVA       
F value Under Influence 
(95% CI –  
lower, upper) 
 
 
Previous 
Convictions 
(95% CI –  
  
On bail 
(95% CI –  
lower, upper) 
Remorse 
(95% CI –  
lower, upper) 
Alcohol/ drug 
(95% CI –  
lower, upper) 
Good character 
(95% CI –  
lower, upper) 
1  0.063 
(-6.057, 6.182) 
-1.563
(-7.682, 4.557) 
-1.563 
(-7.682, 4.557) 
4.313 
(-1.907, 10.432 
-0.188 
(-6.307, 5.932) 
1.813 
(-4.307, 7.932) 
.108 (-.106) 0.506 
2  N/A – same answer given for all 32 cases 
3  N/A – same answer given for all 32 cases 
4  3.375 
(-0.386, 7.136) 
4.125* 
(0.364, 7.886) 
7.125** 
(3.364, 10.886) 
-3.375 
(-7.136, .386) 
-4.125* 
(-7.886, -.364) 
1.125 
(-2.636, 4.886) 
.566 (.462) 5.438** 
5  0.000 
(-1.692, 1.692) 
3.000** 
(1.308, 4.692) 
9.000*** 
(7.308, 10.692) 
0.000 
(-1.692, 1.692) 
-0.750 
(-2.442, 0.942) 
-0.750 
(-2.442, 0.942) 
.844 (.806) 22.500*** 
6  0.000 
(-1.070, 1.070) 
-0.750 
(-1.820, 0.320) 
6.000*** 
(4.930, 7.070) 
-0.750 
(-1.820, 0.320) 
0.000 
(-1.070, 1.070) 
-0.750 
(-1.820, 0.320) 
.848 (.812) 23.264*** 
7  -0.063 
(-1.763, 1.638) 
0.938 
(-0.763, 2.638) 
0.188 
(-1.513, 1.888) 
-3.563*** 
(-5.263, -1.862) 
-3.438*** 
(-5.138, -1.737) 
-0.438 
(-2.138, 1.263) 
.601 (.505) 6.266*** 
8  -0.813 
(-2.604, 0.979) 
3.688*** 
(1.896, 5.479) 
2.563** 
(0.771, 4.354) 
-3.813*** 
(-5.604, -2.021) 
-1.563 
(-3.354, 0.229) 
-0.813 
(-2.604, 0.979) 
.670 (.591) 8.474*** 
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9  -0.750 
(-1.727, 0.227) 
0.000 
(-0.977, 0.977) 
0.750 
(-0.227, 1.727) 
-0.750 
(-1.727, 0.227) 
-0.750 
(-1.727, 0.227) 
-0.750 
(-1.727, 0.227) 
.333 (.173) 2.083 
10  -0.750 
(-4.508, 3.008) 
3.750* 
(-0.008, 7.508) 
1.500 
(-2.258, 5.258) 
-2.250 
(-6.008, 1.508) 
-3.000 
(-6.758, 0.758) 
-1.500 
(-5.258, 2.258) 
.285 (.113) 1.661 
11  2.063** 
(0.864, 3.261) 
6.063*** 
(4.864, 7.261) 
 
3.063*** 
(1.864, 4.261) 
-1.688** 
(-2.886, -0.489) 
-2.813*** 
(-4.011, -1.614) 
-1.313* 
(-2.511, -0.114) 
.881 (.853) 30.917*** 
12  -1.500 
(-4.263, 1.263) 
2.250 
(-0.513. 5.013) 
 
3.000* 
(0.237, 5.763) 
-3.750* 
(-6.513, -0.987) 
-3.000* 
(-5.763, -0.237) 
-3.750* 
(-6.513, -0.987) 
.543 (.433) 4.948** 
13  4.125** 
(1.919, 6.331) 
5.250*** 
(3.044, 7.456) 
0.750 
(-1.456, 2.956) 
-2.625* 
(-4.831, -0.419) 
-4.875*** 
(-7.081, -2.669) 
-1.875 
(-4.081, 0.331) 
.724 (.671) 11.520*** 
14  -3.250 
(-8.386, 1.886) 
5.625* 
(0.489, 10.761) 
4.875+ 
(-0.261, 10.011) 
-2.000 
(-7.136, 3.136) 
-4.125 
(-9.261, 1.011) 
-4.125 
(-9.261, 1.011) 
.401 (.257) 2.787* 
15  0.063 
(-2.758, 2.883) 
3.063* 
(0.242, 5.883) 
0.688 
(-2.133, 3.508) 
-2.188 
(-5.008, 0.633) 
-5.933*** 
(-8.758, -3.117) 
-0.688 
(-3.508, 2.133) 
.518 (.402) 4.477** 
16  1.313* 
(0.134, 2.491) 
2.438*** 
(1.259, 3.616) 
0.188 
(-0.991, 1.366) 
-1.688** 
(-2.866, -0.509) 
-1.688** 
(-2.866, -0.509) 
-1.688** 
(-2.866, -0.509) 
.665 (.584) 8.262*** 
17  2.313 
(-1.694, 6.319) 
8.313*** 
(4.306, 12.319) 
2.688 
(-1.319, 6.694) 
-2.063 
(-6.069, 1.944) 
-3.813+ 
(-7.819, 0.194) 
-0.938 
(-4.944, 3.069) 
.517 (.401) 4.462** 
18  2.750 
(-1.604, 7.104) 
6.875** 
(2.521, 11.229) 
2.500 
(-1.854, 6.854) 
1.000 
(-3.354, 5.354) 
-8.000** 
(-12.354, -3.646) 
-7.750** 
(-12.104, -3.396) 
.625 (.535) 6.942*** 
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19  1.438 
(-1.222, 4.097) 
4.813** 
(2.153, 7.472) 
7.438*** 
(4.778, 10.097) 
-2.313 
(-4.972, .347) 
-3.688** 
(-6.347, -1.028) 
0.313 
(-2.247, 2.972) 
.705 (.634) 9.953*** 
20  -0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
-0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
-0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
-0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
-0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
-0.750 
(-2.295, 0.795) 
.194 (.000) 1.000 
21  1.813 
(-1.383, 5.008) 
0.438 
(-2.758, 3.633) 
3.438* 
(0.242, 6.633) 
-3.063+ 
(-6.258, 0.133) 
-1.063 
(-4.258, 2.133) 
-1.938 
(-5.133, 1.258) 
.329 (.168) 2.046 
22  1.125 
(-2.139, 4.569) 
4.875** 
(1.431, 8.319) 
12.375*** 
(8.931, 15.819) 
-2.625 
(-6.069, 0.819) 
-3.375+ 
(-6.819, 0.069) 
-4.125* 
(-7.569, -0.681) 
.753 (.694) 12.726*** 
23  -0.563 
(-2.435, 1.310) 
0.813 
(-1.060, 2.685) 
-0.563 
(-2.435, 1.310) 
-0.938 
(-2.810, 0.935) 
-4.313*** 
(-6.185, -2.440) 
0.563 
(-1.310, 2.435) 
.505 (.386) 4.253** 
24  0.125 
(-2.385, 2.635) 
5.750*** 
(3.240, 8.260) 
3.875** 
(1.365, 6.385) 
-4.375** 
(-6.885, -1.865) 
0.250 
(-2.260, 2.760) 
-1.250 
(-3.760, 1.260) 
.650 (.566) 7.725*** 
25  3.750 
(-1.054, 8.554) 
15.875*** 
(11.071, 20.679) 
9.000** 
(4.196, 13.804) 
-5.875* 
(-10.679, -1.071) 
-2.125 
(-6.929, 2.679) 
-0.250 
(-5.054, 4.554) 
.740 (.677) 11.830*** 
26  -1.313 
(-5.206, 2.581) 
6.563** 
(2.669, 10.456) 
6.188** 
2.294, 10.081) 
1.188 
(-2.706, 5.081) 
0.688 
(-3.206, 4.581) 
-0.563 
(-4.456, 3.331) 
.488 (.366) 3.977** 
27  -3.750+ 
(-7.670, 0.170) 
3.750+ 
(-0.170, 7.670) 
0.750 
(-3.170, 4.670) 
-3.750+ 
(-7.670, 0.170) 
-8.250*** 
(-12.170, -4.330) 
-2.250 
(-6.170, 1.670) 
.561 (.456) 5.331** 
28  -0.375 
(-2.171, 1.421) 
8.125*** 
(6.329, 9.921) 
5.125*** 
(3.329, 6.921) 
-2.625** 
(-4.421, -0.829) 
-2.875** 
(-4.671, -1.079) 
-0.625 
(-2.421, 1.171) 
.850 (.814) 23.658*** 
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29  N/A – same answer given for all 32 cases 
30  -0.938 
(-2.176, 0.301) 
 
1.313* 
(0.074, 2.551) 
0.563 
(-0.676, 1.801) 
-1.688* 
(-2.926, -0.449) 
-0.563 
(-1.801, 0.676) 
-1.313* 
(-2.551, -0.074) 
.463 (.335) 3.599* 
31  0.500 
(-1.975, 2.975) 
6.125*** 
(3.650, 8.600) 
1.875 
(-0.600, 4.350) 
-0.625 
(-3.100, 1.850) 
-1.875 
(-4.350, 0.600) 
-0.250 
(-2.725, 2.225) 
.556 (.450) 5.221** 
32  1.813 
(-5.603, 9.228) 
21.938*** 
(22.522, 29.353) 
29.938*** 
(22.522, 37.353) 
-5.688 
(-13.103, 1.728) 
-3.063 
(-10.478, 4.353) 
-4.563 
(-11.978, 2.853) 
.817 (.773) 18.558*** 
33  -1.563 
(-3.519, 0.394) 
13.438*** 
(11.481, 15.394) 
6.313*** 
(4.356, 8.269) 
-2.563* 
(-4.356, 8.269) 
-3.188** 
(-5.144, -1.231) 
-2.188* 
(-4.144, -0.231) 
.915 (.895) 45.120*** 
34  -0.188 
(-0.574, 0.199) 
2.813*** 
(2.426, 3.199) 
-0.188 
(-0.574, 0.199) 
-2.813*** 
(-3.199, -2.426) 
-0.188 
(-0.574, 0.199) 
0.188 
(-0.199, 0.574) 
.948 (.935) 75.667*** 
35  -1.563 
(-4.399, 1.274) 
17.063*** 
(14.226, 19.889) 
4.938** 
(2.101, 7.774) 
-0.063 
(-2.899, 2.774) 
-1.563 
(-4.399, 1.274) 
-3.063 
(-5.899, -0.226) 
.874 (.844) 28.982*** 
36  -0.188 
(-0.959, 0.584) 
0.688 
(-0.084, 1.459) 
0.938* 
(0.166, 1.709) 
-0.813* 
(-1.584, -0.041) 
-1.688*** 
(-2.459, -0.916) 
-0.313 
(-1.084, 0.459) 
.588 (.489) 5.936** 
37  -0.875 
(-3.125, 1.375) 
3.750** 
(1.500, 6.000) 
0.625 
(-1.625, 2.875) 
-1.000 
(-3.250, 1.250) 
-1.250 
(-3.500, 1.000) 
-3.375** 
(-5.625, -1.125) 
.494 (.373) 4.075** 
38  -1.313 
(-3.578, 0.953) 
-0.813 
(-3.078, 1.453) 
-1.063 
(-3.328, 1.203) 
-3.563** 
(-5.828, -1.297) 
-4.938*** 
(-7.203, -2.672) 
-2.188+ 
(-4.453, 0.078) 
.600 (.504) 6.248*** 
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39  -0.375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
-0.375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
-0.375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
-0.375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
-0.375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
-.0375 
(-1.147, 0.397) 
.194 (.000) 1.000 
40  2.625 
(-0.752, 6.002) 
3.000 
(-0.377, 6.377) 
4.500* 
(1.123, 7.877) 
-1.500 
(-4.877, 1.877) 
-1.875 
(-5.252, 1.502) 
0.750 
(-2.627, 4.127) 
.387 (.240) 2.632* 
 
Note: *** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05, + p = between .05 and .07 
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Appendix 13 
Study 4: Interaction Terms in Individual Multiple Linear Regression Models 
Combinations of variables are indicated by the formulation “Variable 1*Variable 2”. A statistically significant interaction is indicated with “Y”, 
while a non-significant interaction is marked “N”. Positive interactions are highlighted in green, and negative interactions are highlighted in red. 
Participant 
number 
Remorse* 
Addressing 
addiction 
Remorse* 
Good 
character 
Addressing 
addiction* 
Good 
character 
Remorse* 
Under the 
influence 
Remorse* 
Previous 
convictions 
Remorse* 
On bail 
Addressing 
Addiction* 
Under the 
influence 
Addressing 
Addiction* 
Previous 
convictions 
Addressing  
Addiction* 
On bail 
Good 
character* 
Under the 
influence 
Good 
character* 
Previous 
convictions 
Good 
character* 
On bail 
Row 
mean 
Y 
4 N N N N N N N Y N N N N 1 
5 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
6 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
7 Y N N N N N N N N Y N N 2 
8 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
11 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
12 N N Y N N N N N N N N N 1 
13 N N N N N N N Y N N N N 1 
14 N N N N N N N N N N N Y 1 
15 N Y Y Y (under -) N N Y (under -) N N N N N 4 
16 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
17 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
18 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
19 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
22 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
23 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
24 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
25 Y N N N N N N N N Y N N 2 
26 N N N N N Y N N N N N N 1 
27 N N N N N N N N N N Y N 1 
28 N N N Y (under -) N N N N N N N N 1 
30 Y N N N N N N N N Y N N 2 
31 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
32 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
33 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
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34 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
35 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
36 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
37 N Y N N N N Y (under -) Y N N N N 3 
38 Y N Y Y (under 
+) 
N N N N N Y N N 4 
40 N N N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Column 
mean Y 
4 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 0 4 1 1 0 
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